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ABSTRACT 
David Frost: On the Qua Problem Qua Qua Problem  
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson and William Lycan) 
 
Mental causation is one of the most discussed topics in the philosophy of mind. The well-
known “exclusion problem” is, however, often confused with a different problem called the 
“qua problem.” Contrary to conventional wisdom, Davidson’s anomalous monism does not 
suffer from the exclusion problem, although it may seem to engender the qua problem. That 
is, a given mental event can be causally related to the effect to be explained (ruling out the 
exclusion problem). But it won’t be related in virtue of its mental properties. It won’t be related 
qua mental. The critics of anomalous monism say the mental event c is a cause of the effect e. 
But, the critics ask, in virtue of what is c a cause of e? This question, I argue, contains an 
unnoticed equivocation. There is an ambiguity in the critics’ formulation of the qua problem. 
There are in fact two different “in virtue of” questions, one epistemological and one 
metaphysical, which are confused in the literature. I review some of the relevant parts of the 
philosophical literature on mental causation, causation and causal laws. And then after 
surveying the interpretative debate about what the historical Hume really said, I put forth my 
own view on the disambiguated metaphysical “in virtue of” question. The “Reverse view,” as 
I call it, answers a Euthyphro question about causes and laws in a novel, quasi-Humean way.  
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PROLOGUE 
 
 
Davidsonian philosophy of mind… enables us to treat both physics 
and poetry evenhandedly.  
– Richard Rorty, “Non-reductive Physicalism,” 1987.  
 
 
In what way does Davidson’s philosophy of mind help us to treat physics and poetry 
evenhandedly? When Rorty says “us” he means we philosophers. And the way he suggests we 
treat physics and poetry (we may substitute Geisteswissenschaften) is to basically leave them 
alone. Indeed, I take it that Rorty’s Davidsonian pragmatism says that the special sciences do 
not need nor admit of any metaphysical justification.1 As one commenter says, “Rorty scorns 
the very project of giving philosophical accounts of [subjects of traditional philosophical 
interest] or pretty much any other phenomena,” (Manning 2006: 468). Rorty himself writes 
that, “Part of my ambition… is to help it come to pass that where epistemology and 
metaphysics were, sociology and history shall be,” (2000: 103). Physics, biology, psychology, 
sociology, and, yes, poetry and the humanities are “vocabularies” that stand on their own 
without the need for metaphysical foundation. Rorty has an agenda for philosophy that is 
                                                
1 Brandom (2000) writes that, according to Rorty, democracy “does not need nor admit of 
metaphysical justification.” The same goes for other human endeavors such as the special 
sciences. 
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against any attempt to give metaphysical justification for the special sciences as well as for 
basic physics.  
 In the metaphysics of mind, the problems of mental causation – especially “the 
exclusion problem” and “the qua problem” – are good cases by which to test Rorty’s 
pragmatist, anti-metaphysical agenda for philosophy. The mental causation problem for the 
higher-order special sciences, and especially for psychology, is a request for a justifying 
metaphysical account of the possibility of those sciences and of their product: knowledge-
giving causal explanations.  
The explanations offered by the sciences are adequate explanations (or they are not) 
depending on methods of assessment internal to the sciences themselves – and without 
philosophy’s help. However, I argue that there is a “minimal metaphysics” that one is 
committed to upon affirming the explanatory adequacy of those explanations. That is to say, 
there is a certain relation between epistemology and metaphysics that even the pragmatist is 
committed to. Simply having the confidence in the explanations coming from the special 
sciences – that these sanguine pragmatists do have – imputes to them certain metaphysical 
commitments, however minimal.  
On this view, metaphysics is not necessarily a discussion about what is really real. It is 
not a discussion about the fundamental constituents of reality. In some important sense, we 
may let the physicists and the rest of the scientists tell us that. In that way, we naturalize 
epistemology. They will tell us what we know to be real. And then metaphysics becomes the 
speculative inquiry into the necessary conditions of knowledge as delivered by science. 
Metaphysics becomes what else we are committed to beyond the vocabulary of the sciences 
when we accept the causal explanations of those sciences.  
  3 
The way of doing metaphysics I have in mind is a matter of asking and answering a 
“how-possible” question of actual phenomena. For example, we come to have knowledge in 
such and such a way; how is it possible that we come to knowledge in that way? This kind of 
account of our actual epistemological practices is meant to establish metaphysical legitimacy 
for those practices, which are of paramount salience in our most global self-conception as 
human beings. 
 With respect to our case study – the mental causation debate – a tension arises if we 
allow that causation somehow involves necessity and simultaneously note that special science 
explanations involve laws or generalizations that are non-strict and not exceptionless: i.e., 
they fall short of making the effect necessary given the cause. Accepting this generates the 
problem. So, going forward I am going to assume that causation involves necessity, although 
just how that cashes out is open for discussion. I am also going to take it as given that 
sometimes our sciences – physics and the special sciences – provide genuine causal 
explanations. The task is to reconcile these two assumptions. And this task demands – even 
of the pragmatist – a minimal amount of speculative metaphysics. Or so I would argue. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
1. When I walk into the grocery store, I like to snap my fingers just before the automatic 
doors open. It gives the impression that my snapping caused the doors to open, like I’m the 
Fonz from Happy Days. 
Or consider this possible case: In a time of inefficient information distribution, a 
court astronomer could discover how to calculate when the next eclipse is going to occur – 
and down to the second. This would make it possible for the King to call a public assembly at 
that day and time and – just before the eclipse begins – announce, “In the King’s name!” 
gesturing at the sun. This would give the impression that the King had caused the eclipse. 
In each of these cases, we recognize that a purported cause is actually not a cause at 
all. The King’s gesture doesn’t cause the eclipse. Had the King done nothing, the eclipse 
would have occurred all the same. And my snapping my fingers doesn’t cause the doors to 
open. It is sufficient that I walk in front of the automatic doors; they’ll open whether or not 
I’m snapping my fingers. 
Now consider a case from the philosophy of mind, specifically couched in mental 
terms. When a student raises her hand because she wants to make a point, we might say that 
her wanting caused the action. Yet it also seems true that said wanting – a movement of the 
mind, a mental event – is realized by a physical event in the nervous system. So we might also 
say that some state of her (complex) physical system antecedent to the action caused the 
action. These two purported causes – the wanting and the physical realizer of the wanting – 
  5 
some philosophers say compete with respect to being the cause of the action. Then, because 
of orthogonal commitments to a certain kind of physicalism, it can seem to follow that the 
mental event does not cause the action at all. The purported physical cause is sufficient according to 
these physicalist commitments and “excludes” the mental event from being a cause.2  
 
2. This exclusion appears to be a problem because the mental event we were comfortable 
appealing to as a cause of an action is actually excluded from being the cause of the action by 
plausible claims about the physical world itself. Mental causation involves an apparently 
fundamental tension between the conception of ourselves as minded, causally efficacious 
agents and our scientific conception of how the world (of which we are a part) works. The 
reason the failure to establish mental causation seems devastating is because the salience of 
our practice of reason explanation commits us very deeply to a causal explanatory role for 
mental properties.3 If they are not causally explanatory then that important practice falls 
apart.4 
                                                
2 The analogy between the automatic door, astronomy cases and the mental case breaks down at 
some point, of course. The first two cases offer potential causes that are not really believable 
while it is supposed to be a deeper quandary with respect to which one is causal in the mental 
causation debate, M or P. However, we might assume that the witnesses to these events believe in 
the causality of the finger-snap and the King’s gesture. When they learned of the deceit they 
would “exclude” the purported causes not on their knowledge of sensor technology and 
astronomy but simply on an exclusion or non-overdetermination principle. 
 
3 I may sometimes refer to properties (properly, property instances) or descriptions. While these 
terms are certainly not interchangeable I do not intend to make much of the differences between 
them. Some have defended Davidson against his critics by remarking that Davidson was a 
nominalist and spoke almost always of predicates and descriptions and rarely if ever spoke of 
properties. For instance, see Gibb (2006). For my purposes, however I do not wish to let 
Davidson off the hook by invoking his nominalism. Instead I wish to remain at the level that 
almost everyone else operates at, namely the level of properties as opposed to predicates. I may 
sometimes say “descriptions” but I am assuming those descriptions cannot be true unless the 
relevant properties are instantiated by what is described. I do however count on the difference 
between properties and property bearers, namely event tokens. As per Sections 1.3.2 and 4.3 the 
extensional relation of causation holds between event tokens and not properties.  
  6 
Fodor says that failing to establish mental causation would be “the greatest 
intellectual catastrophe” (2002: 19) for humankind ever. I believe, although Fodor speaks of 
“causal responsibility” – what other words could he use?5 – that he means to be speaking of 
causal explanation. If our mental properties do not causally explain our behavior then it is the 
end of the world. I will call this – alluding to Fodor’s assessment – the Catastrophe thesis. 
So it is a matter of the all-important “because.” The eclipse happened when the King 
willed it but not because the King willed it. The door opened when I snapped my finger, but not 
because I snapped my finger. And if the story about exclusive, sufficient physical causes is 
correct, then her arm went up when the student willed it, but not because she willed it. The 
purported mental cause seems epiphenomenal. It may always be correlated with the action 
while never causing it.  
 
3. Any theory of mind and body must contend with the exclusion problem or show that the 
theory does not engender it. Davidson’s anomalous monism does not engender the exclusion 
problem. Instead it seems to suffer from the importantly different qua problem.6 According 
to the exclusion problem, the given reason or mental event is excluded from being a cause; 
while according to the qua problem the mental event is a cause but not in the right way. The 
                                                                                                                                             
 
4 Causalism about reasons has its echt-defense in Davidson (1963). I defend Causalism from 
contemporary anti-causalists in Chapter One. 
 
5 Indeed, a central claim of Davidson (1967) is that people say “cause” and mean “causally 
explain.” See Davidson (1967: 162). See my Section 4.11 below. 
  
6 The exclusion problem and the qua problem are importantly different although they look 
similar and are confused in the literature. I’ll argue below that the exclusion problem’s Causal 
Closure Principle is an existential claim about the existence of a certain kind of cause, while 
anomalous monism’s Cause-Law Thesis from the qua problem is a claim about the nature of 
causation.  
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critics of anomalous monism allow that on Davidson’s theory the mental event is a cause but 
they argue it is not a cause qua mental event – it is not a cause in virtue of its mentality. That’s 
the qua problem. “Agreed, c is a cause of e but in virtue of what is c a cause of e?” That is the 
“in virtue of” question that gets the qua problem going. I argue that the critics of anomalous 
monism do not understand what they do when they propose the qua problem. I show them 
what is really going on: I show them the qua problem qua qua problem. By the end of this 
dissertation, I will have argued that there are two – as yet to be explained – “in virtue of” 
questions, one epistemic and one metaphysical, which are often confused in the mental 
causation literature. This pragmatist or “Kantian” difference between epistemology and 
metaphysics is a point that will recur throughout the dissertation. I carefully distinguish the 
two “in virtue of” questions and, then at the end in a kind of coda, I propose a novel answer 
to the newly disambiguated metaphysical “in virtue of” question.  
 
4. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I argue for Causalism about reasons, i.e., that 
reasons are causes. I lay out a novel interpretation of Davidson’s “multiple reasons 
argument.” While there are many reasons that could be the reason for which an agent acted – 
that is, while there are many reasons that rationalize the agent’s action – the one that the 
agent actually acted on is the cause of the action. Implied in the multiple reasons argument is, 
I argue, a certain answer to a Euthyphro question about reasons and causes. Surveying what I 
call The Strict Qualification Thesis and The Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis, I consider the 
ramifications of the Euthyphronic answer that says a reason is a cause in virtue of being a 
reason (this answer simultaneously denies that a cause is a reason in virtue of being a cause). 
Here too there is an interesting upshot with respect to the relationship between metaphysics 
and epistemology. 
  8 
 
5. If we are to argue that reasons are causes and that mental events are causes, it would be 
wise to have some understanding of the nature of causation. It is easy to say that something is 
causal. But we will not know what it means to say so until we get some understanding of the 
nature of causation per se. To that end, in Chapter Two I conduct a literature review of 
causation and causal explanation, including scientific explanation. The sharp distinction I 
make between causal explanation and causation, one which is epistemic and the other 
metaphysical, is backed up by the philosophical literature which itself makes a sharp 
distinction between metaphysical causation and epistemic causal explanation. Finally, in 
advance of moves I make in Chapter Five, it is also necessary to review the literature on 
causal laws and the difference between accidental generalizations or de facto regularities and 
laws that possess an aspect of necessity. In Chapter Five I (merely) outline a novel position 
on the relation between causes and laws.    
 
6. In the third chapter of this dissertation, I offer a brief history of the mental causation 
debate. The contemporary roots are in the 1950s identity arguments, but a cousin or sister 
problem would certainly be Descartes’ problem with interaction of mind and matter. I 
present and discuss the contemporary formulations of the variety of mental causation 
problems. The canonical attempted solutions are also presented and criticized. I discuss the 
required background and useful concepts such as supervenience. Then I look in detail at the 
exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalists as proposed by Kim. Burge and Baker’s 
“explanatory practice” objection to Kim’s exclusion problem is found wanting. I conclude in 
Kim’s favor that indeed the problem of mental causation is a “metaphysical” problem and 
needs a “metaphysical” solution. Finally I survey a variety of responses to Kim’s exclusion 
  9 
problem, including Horgan (1989), Yablo (1992) and Davidson (1970). Here we see that 
Davidson does not suffer from the exclusion problem, although he does apparently 
encounter the qua problem. 
 
7. In the fourth chapter, I intervene in one small sub-debate in the mental causation 
discussion.7 Almost everyone agrees with Kim (1989, 1993, 1998) that Davidson’s anomalous 
monism suffers from the qua problem.8 I show that the critics have made a mistake. Kim et al 
equivocate over the words “in virtue of” in the question they put to Davidson which 
supposedly engenders the qua problem. To repeat: The qua problem is that, while it may be 
the case that the given mental event token causes the effect event token,9 it does not cause it 
in virtue of its mental properties – it does not cause it qua mental event. Rather, according to 
anomalous monism’s commitment to Nomological Causation, it causes the effect in virtue of its 
physical properties. If Davidson is asked, “The mental event token causes the physical event, 
but does it cause it in virtue of its mental properties or in virtue of its physical properties?” 
then he must reluctantly say, “in virtue of its physical properties.” Or so say the critics.  
                                                
7 There are other sub-debates in the mental causation literature. See Robb & Heil (2008) for a 
discussion of “the problem of exclusion,” “the problem for anomalous monism,” (what I call the 
qua problem) and “the problem of externalism,” also called “wide causation.” With respect to the 
latter, “Suppose, as many philosophers do suppose, that externalism is true: the contents of 
representational states of mind—propositional attitudes, perceptual experiences, mental images, 
and so on—depend, not merely on intrinsic features of those states, but on relations—in 
particular, on the causal, historical, and social relations agents bear to their surroundings,” 
(Section 7.1). In that case, then there is a worry about the causal role of our beliefs in what we do. 
“…If the content of Lilian’s thought that there is a tree in the quad is “broad”, if the significance 
of her thought depends on factors outside Lilian’s body (Lilian’s standing in an appropriate causal 
relation to the tree, for instance), then it is indeed hard to see how this content could figure in a 
causal account of Lilian's actions,” (7.1).  
 
8 Stoutland (1980), Hess (1981), Honderich (1982, 1983, 1984), Antony (1989), McLaughlin 
(1993) and more.  
 
9 And thus does not engender the exclusion problem. 
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 I show that there are two fundamentally different questions to which some properties 
and not others answer in this ballpark. That is, when we are philosophizing about causal 
explanations and we ask “in virtue of what is c a cause of e?” we might mean at least two 
distinct things. I sometimes call one the epistemic “in virtue of” question and the other the 
metaphysical “in virtue of” question and at other times simply the first “in virtue of” question 
and the second “in virtue of” question, for the misleadingly vague use of “epistemic” and 
“metaphysical” in the philosophical conversation.10 
 With these two distinct questions in hand, I show that neither of anomalous 
monism’s answers to these two questions entails Catastrophe. Importantly, with Davidson’s 
supposed Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation (PNCC) he can answer the second “in 
virtue of” question about what makes a cause be the cause it is, without fear of entailing 
Catastrophe. The qua problem has no teeth, at least not as usually formulated against non-
reductive token-identity views like anomalous monism. 
 
8. Having isolated the second “in virtue of” question about what makes a cause be the cause 
it is, I turn to examine a variety of possible answers to this question. In the mental causation 
debate, one of the most prominent answers to the second “in virtue of” question – if not 
indeed the most prominent answer – is the answer provided by the nomic subsumption view. 
According to the nomic subsumption account of causation, a cause event token, c, is related 
                                                
10 What I show is that on the first or epistemic “in virtue of” question, we are asking in virtue of 
what is reference to c’s being F an explanation of e’s being G?  In other words, in virtue of what 
is it explanatory to refer to c’s-tokening-property-F with respect to the explanandum of e’s 
tokening G? On the second or metaphysical “in virtue of” question, we are asking in virtue of 
what properties, H and J, is c a cause of e, or, in other words, in virtue of what is c related by the 
causal relation to e? These are different questions provided one avoids what I call Procrusteanism 
about causal explanation where F=H and G=J, which I argue is untenable anyway. See Section 
4.7 below. 
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to an effect event token, e, in virtue of c and e tokening, respectively, properties H and J 
which together instantiate a strict or exceptionless law. I make the observation that in 
Davidson’s original formulation of his Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation he stayed 
neutral as to what was in virtue of what, laws or causes. The PNCC just says that when there 
are causal relations there are laws. It does not say that there are causal relations because there 
are laws or that there are laws because there are causal relations. There remains after all these 
years a Euthyphronic question to be posed to Davidson’s PNCC.  
On the one hand, you could interpret the PNCC with a metaphysical order of 
explanation from nomic properties to the causal relation, such that the laws metaphysically 
explain or “govern” causes. The PNCC would thereby be read as Davidson’s critics actively 
interpret it: “When two events are related as cause and effect this is because they have 
descriptions under which they instantiate a strict law of physics.” But, on the other hand, the 
order of explanation could conceivably go the other way, such as to imply a metaphysical 
order of explanation going from causes to laws. Then we might say that it is because certain 
causal relations obtain that certain laws obtain. I call this the “Reverse View.” 
What I outline is a broadly Humean (although considerable historical, poetic and 
neologistic license is taken using this name) view modeled on discussions in the laws of 
nature literature such that the law between H and J is what it is in virtue of the causal relation 
between c and e being what it is. Having explored the so-called New Hume debate, I outline 
my so-called Quasi-Humean “Reverse View” and argue for one of its main virtues. I also 
make one attack against the main alternative to it, namely an Armstrong backed nomic 
subsumption view. 
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9. On the Reverse View, laws depend in a sense on causal relations which themselves are, in a 
sense to be explained, brute. But the bruteness of causal relations in this sense is not as 
“implausible” as McLaughlin (1993: 23) and others take it to be, or so I argue in the final 
chapter. The worry about causal relations being brute is that if that were the case then, “there 
would be nothing in virtue of which c is a cause of e,” (23). I examine this worry in order to 
show that those who would put forth this worry find it absurd that “there would be nothing 
in virtue of which c is a cause of e.” I argue, however, that as a metaphysical view bruteness is 
nowhere near absurd. It’s only on an epistemological understanding of “in virtue of” there 
that some sense of bruteness seems absurd. 
Finally I develop problems for the traditional Armstrong-backed nomic subsumption 
view. It answers the Euthyphronic question about causes and laws in the traditional way – 
causes depend on laws – which commits the view to its own sort of brute fact. That is, it 
must assert, what was called in the New Hume debate, a “straitjacketing” fact. I outline a  
more empiricist location for brute primitive facts.  
 
 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
REASON EXPLANATIONS AND MENTAL CAUSATION 
 
1.1 A Mental Causation Catastrophe 
It has been a longstanding project of the metaphysics of mind to vindicate the explanatory 
status of our commonsense, folk psychological explanations of intentional behavior.11 These 
explanations appeal to an agent’s mental events such as beliefs, desires and/or reasons in 
order to explain the agent’s action.12 Consider an elementary example: we say that Georgia 
was thirsty and believed there was beer in the fridge in order to explain why Georgia walked 
to the fridge. Some philosophers say that explanations of this sort do their explaining by 
making the action-to-be-explained seem a reasonable thing to do given the beliefs and desires 
the agent had. In this sense, the explanations are rationalizing explanations, making appeal to 
the agent’s purposes or reasons.  
Philosophers in the theory of action disagree about whether or not reason 
explanations are causal explanations. For a long while in the history of recent philosophy, 
                                                
11 An action is a behavior that is intentional, i.e., done for a reason. This follows Anscombe’s 
account of what distinguishes actions that are intentional from those that are not: “Intentional 
actions are the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the 
sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting,” (1957: 9).  
 
12 Participants in the debate I am engaging with all agree that a reason is a mental event. For our 
purposes, it will do to say the event that is the reason is the “coming to be” of a pro-attitude 
paired with a belief. Recently, some have denied that reasons are mental events. See Dancy (2004) 
and Horgan (2007) for example. See below Section 1.4 for a discussion. 
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many philosophers held that reasons could not be causes.13 But Davidson’s (1963) widely 
influential “multiple reasons argument” suggests that rationalizing explanations must also be 
causal explanations.14 According to Causalism, the explanatory reason for an action must be 
the cause of the action. Causalism in the philosophy of action then hooks up with the mental 
causation debate in the philosophy of mind. Causalism argues that reasons had better be 
causes; the mental causation debate is about understanding how that is possible. 
The multiple reasons argument, which we will discuss in greater detail below, only 
shows, it seems to me, that reasons had better be causes. Further work is necessary to show 
how it is possible for reasons to be causes. As Kim correctly observes the mental causation 
problem in the philosophy of mind is a how-possible question. The question “whether or 
not” there is mental causation, Kim says, must be answered in the affirmative. 
The phenomenon of mental causation is the thing to be captured by our 
philosophical work in this area of the philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, Kim is only 
establishing mental causation by stipulation. I follow him and the rest of the debate in that. 
However, I can imagine a philosophical account of intentional behavior that, for instance, 
held the conscious experience of willing or acting intentionally to be an epiphenomenon of a 
deeper cause of our behavior. Here there would be no mental causation. Or much less of it. 
                                                
13 For instance, Anscombe (1957), Dray (1957), Ryle (1948), and Taylor (1968). The so-called 
Neo-Wittgensteinians may have been too diverse for such a grouping to be appropriate. Some, 
for instance, may have taken it that reasons could not be causes, while others may have taken it 
that reasons need not be causes. In any case, Davidson took them to say that reasons could not 
be causes.  
 
14 Davidson (1963) argued that rationalizing explanations must also be causal explanations using 
his “multiple reasons argument,” namely, that there might be any number of reasons that 
rationalize the action that stands in need of explanation. But the reason for which the agent 
actually acted will have been the cause of the action (as well as being a reason that rationalizes the 
action). See Section 1.3 below. 
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And I do not believe it would absolutely wreck our picture of ourselves. But it is out of the 
scope of this project to discuss it here.   
Participants in the mental causation debate are tasked with vindicating psychological 
explanations against any eliminative reductionism. If our commonsense psychological 
explanations – those that appeal essentially to reasons – are to be considered legitimate, it 
must be the case that the reason an explanation appeals to actually be the cause of the agent’s 
action. However, the problem is that most of our standard physicalist theories of causation 
end up ruling out the causal efficacy of mentality. The problem of mental causation is to 
show how it is possible that mentality be causal so that mentality can be causally explanatory.15 
As said above in the “Overview,” the reason the failure to establish mental causation 
seems devastating is because the salience of our practice of reason explanation commits us 
very deeply to a causal explanatory role for mental properties.16 As Fodor has written, 
 
…if it isn't literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and 
my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally 
responsible for my saying….  If none of that is literally true, then practically 
everything I believe about anything is false and it's the end of the world (1990: 156). 
 
                                                
15 Admittedly, there are some philosophers who talk about apparently similar matters (mental 
causation, reduction, etc.,) without the aim of underwriting our everyday practices. New-
compatiblists or “overlap” theorist (in the phrasing of Harbecke (2008) and Dardis (2009), 
respectively) are involved in a metaphysical undertaking not essentially tied to the project of 
underwriting our everyday practices. They include Shoemaker (2007) and Yablo (1992).  
 
16 The Dravians and the Wittgensteinians would rightly dispute this point. After all, they too 
articulate their non-causal position as being more in line with the structure and nature of 
specifically human intentional action. As I will discuss below, they were working in a tradition 
that argued that explanation of human actions in history and psychology are different than 
explanations in the natural sciences and yet no worse off for it. Nevertheless, almost everyone in 
the mental causation debate takes it that the phenomenon of mental causation is something 
established for which we need a metaphysics. And many if not all cite our image of ourselves as 
casually efficacious agents for why mental causation must be the case. 
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Elsewhere Fodor says, somewhat less hyperbolically, not that the world would end, but that 
failing to establish mental causation would be “the greatest intellectual catastrophe” (2002: 
19) for humankind ever. I take it that, although Fodor speaks of “causal responsibility” – 
what other words could he use?17 – he means to be speaking of causal explanation. If our 
mental properties do not causally explain our behavior then we have what I will call the 
Catastrophe thesis. 
 
Catastrophe: Mentality plays no causal role in the causal explanation of intentional 
action. 
 
If Catastrophe is true then the practices mentioned above, which are very salient for us, would 
fall apart.18 This is a situation worth resisting. 
 
1.1.1 Dissenters 
On the other hand, perhaps the philosophers are right who affirm Catastrophe. After all, the 
Catastrophe thesis is not catastrophic merely in virtue of its name. It can be endorsed; it’s just 
that it comes at a price. Who would affirm it and at what cost? Any philosopher who denies 
causation in the manner of Russell (1913)19 would thereby deny mental causation and affirm 
                                                
17 Indeed, a central claim of Davidson’s view is that people say “cause” and mean “causally 
explain.” See Davidson (1967/1980 p. 162). See Section 4.11 below. 
 
18 As many have noticed, Kim’s arguments generalize to any domain of properties supervening in 
the basic physical domain, which is all of them. So by Kim’s argument, more about which see 
below, geological properties, biological, social and psychological properties are epiphenomena. All 
the more reason to resist such an account. For more on the generalization argument against Kim 
see Bontly (2002), Schoeder (2002) and Moore (2010).  
  
19 Russell colorfully writes: “All philosophers of every school, imagine the causation is one of the 
fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced science such as 
gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs… The law of causality, I believe, like 
much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the 
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Catastrophe. The cost in that case would be the high cost of denying causation entirely (see 
Price and Corry 2007) much less being able to underwrite our causal explanatory practices 
with respect to human agency and behavior. This latter cost is shared by eliminative 
reductionists like Churchland (1981), who does not deny causation per se but denies mental 
causation because he denies the existence of propositional attitudes entirely and thereby 
affirms Catastrophe. A view that affirms Catastrophe would have to give an explanation for why 
our explanatory practices make reference to beliefs and desire as causally effective. It would 
also have to replace or build back up our self-image as causally effective agents.20  
Another group of philosophers endorse Catastrophe, namely the Neo-Wittgensteinians. 
Not every philosopher was convinced by Davidson (1963) and they remain parties to the 
debate in the theory of action. But in the philosophy of mind’s mental causation debate the 
Neo-Wittgensteinians are not parties to the debate, which stipulates that endorsing Catastrophe 
is more than expensive; indeed it’s catastrophic.  
Finally, there has been a movement in empirical psychology to suggest that there is no 
such thing as mental causation. For example, Wegner (2002) denies the causal efficacy of the 
conscious will and Wilson (2002) goes a long way toward concluding that most of our actions 
are automatic and the feeling of willing is a post-hoc construction by the mind.21 On these 
views, and on certain readings of Nietzsche (see Leiter 2002, 2007), an action and the feeling 
                                                                                                                                             
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” For a sympathetic but 
ultimately negative assessment of Russell see Price & Corry (2007).  
 
20 Churchland attempts both of these tasks in his classic (1981). Bontly (2005), as I’ll discuss later, 
says that mental causation is a Moorean fact, which means that there is more in its favor than 
could be said for any theory that denied it. 
 
21 See also Haidt (2001) and Greene (2008) for discussion of post-hoc rationalization. Haidt’s 
work suggests that Wegner’s and Wilson’s work can be generalized from willing to the case of 
reasons, i.e., beliefs and desires. See Frost (in preparation). 
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of willing (including a post-hoc construction of a reason for action) are effects of a common 
cause in the unconscious. On this view, a reason and an action may always be 
counterfactually dependent in the right way without being causally related. However, I believe 
this is counterintuitive with respect to our self-image as causally effective agents. There may 
be ways to build back up an image of the self that is lost when mental causation is denied and 
Catastrophe is affirmed, but that is not the project in this dissertation.   
In mental causation debate that we engage with here, almost all participants take it 
that reasons are causes. The mental causation debate itself usually stipulates that reasons 
(mental events) are causes and that we need a metaphysics for how this actuality is even a 
possibility. But the philosophy of action, starting with Davidson (1963), gives the arguments 
for the causality of reasons that Kim et al. assume. So, before starting in on the mental 
causation debate we need to engage with the thesis that reasons are causes, i.e., Causalism 
about reasons.22 
 
§ 
 
1.2 Causalism about Reasons 
In the following sections, I argue for a particular and, I daresay, unique reading of Davidson’s 
“multiple reasons” argument. The view I lay out is the view I think Davidson was getting at 
all along, although the secondary literature does not read him this way. If the reader disputes 
what I say as good Davidson exegesis, I can easily give up the claim that Davidson holds the 
                                                
22 Finally let us say, “we refer to reasons as causes,” and mean by this that Causalism about reasons 
is true. For Causalism about reasons to be true, mental causation had better be true. Let us say, 
“Some mental events cause some physical events,” and mean by this that there is truly mental 
causation. 
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views I discuss here. I will nevertheless assert them myself as a Davidsonian account. They 
hang together as an account of the relation between actions and the reasons that explain 
those actions.23  
We begin by considering the history of antagonism between proponents of causal 
explanations and those of “making-intelligible” explanations. This historical sketch leads us 
from the European debates about the Geisteswissenschaften to the anti-causalist milieu in which 
Davidson wrote “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” (1963, hereafter ARC). We then consider 
what is, and what is not, actually demonstrated by Davidson in that article. ARC shows that 
the explanatory reason must be a cause but ARC does not offer a “causal criterion” by which 
to discover the causal reason. We discuss my Strict Qualification Thesis and my Priority of the 
Phenomenon Thesis, which if true suggest a certain pragmatist relation between epistemology 
and metaphysics. 
 
1.2.1 History of Geis t eswissenschaft en versus Naturwissenschaft en  
Davidson’s intervention in ARC changed the debate and set the agenda for “a whole 
generation of philosophers,” (Leist 2007: 1).  In order to understand his contribution, we 
must first properly understand how the dialectic stood prior to Davidson’s contribution. 
Davidson’s target in ARC – namely, the anti-causalist thesis that rationalizing explanations 
cannot be causal explanations – has a rich genealogy in European philosophy of social 
science. 
Consider, again, some example explanations:  
 
Jill returned to the bank because she believed she left her glasses there. 
Georgia walked to the fridge because she wanted a beer. 
                                                
23 Along the way I articulate a specific position on the relation between epistemology and 
metaphysics which again I think is in line with Davidsonian pragmatism. But if it’s not, it remains 
an interesting view on its own. 
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Let’s assume these are true, accurate and adequate explanations of Jill’s and Georgia’s 
intentional actions. Many philosophers have thought that explanations of this kind do their 
explaining by “making intelligible” the agent’s action in light of the beliefs and desires 
attributed to the agent in the explanation.24 Sometimes called “rationalizing” explanations, 
these explanations of actions show how the action was the rational thing to do given the 
beliefs and desires of the agent.25 They are also often called “reason explanations,” or 
“intentional explanations.” A certain tradition in the philosophy of social science debates 
whether or not there is a unified structure of explanation shared by reason explanations and 
explanations found in natural sciences, such as physics.  
 In fact, the debate in the philosophy of social science is broader. It tends to contrast 
explanation in the natural sciences (or, natural scientific explanation) with not only reason 
explanations but any explanation from a wide range of disciplines including psychology, 
history, economics, anthropology and sociology. These are sometimes grouped together 
under the heading of “sciences of man” (more appropriately discriminated as “sciences of the 
mind”), or Geisteswissenschaften and les sciences d’espirit in German- and French-speaking circles 
respectively. Geisteswissenschaften, as I will call them, includes psychology while excluding 
                                                
24 The example explanations I have offered are enthymematic insofar as one references a belief 
while only implying a relevant desire, and the other references a desire while only implying a 
relevant belief. That is to say, Jill had to also desire to recover her glasses for our reference to her 
belief that they were at the bank to be able to explain her returning to the bank. Her desire, 
however, is plausibly implied. It would be the other way around for Georgia. It is standard since 
Davidson (1963) to take reasons for action to be a belief and desire pair. (Actually, because of 
certain counterexamples involving desires the agent does not identity with or value, “desire” is 
best replaced by “pro-attitude.”) Taking a reason as a pro-attitude/belief pair remains 
foundational in, for example, Smith’s seminal “Humean Theory of Motivation,” introduced in his 
(1987) and defended more recently in Smith (2004).  
 
25 Rationalizing explanations can be misleading if it is taken to mean that explanations of this kind 
only work if an agent acts in a rational manner with respect to her beliefs and desires. Irrational 
actions can be explained by “taking the perspective” of the irrational actor. 
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physiology of the brain. They are to be contrasted with Naturwissenschaften, such as biology, 
chemistry and especially physics. A strict criterion to differentiate is not necessary, won’t 
delay us and probably wouldn’t be forthcoming anyway.  
However, we can make an initial stab at a potential distinguishing difference between 
Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften by simply letting the list of differing attempts at a 
definition wash over us. Perhaps the top things Geisteswissenschaften has been said to study are: 
Seelenleben, the life of the soul as opposed to the body; consciousness and events 
understandable only qua conscious events; society, practical reason, agency and morality. 
Indeed, Geisteswissenschaften was the word the first German translator of Mill took for Mill’s 
use of the term “moral sciences.”26    
We might also discuss our difference in terms of the difference between Erklären and 
Verstehen.27 In Europe there was a debate between the proponents of the unity of science, and 
those who denied a monism of acceptable methodology, i.e., those who defended an 
autonomous and sui generis “science of man.” The latter preferred to think that explanation of 
human action provided not Erklären (“clarification/explanation”) but Verstehen (literally, 
“understanding”).  Weber took the word “Verstehen” from Jaspers (Descombes 2001: 37). 
Dilthey and Gadamer (and later Winch and Taylor) emphasize the affinity between the social 
sciences and the humanities and the disaffinity between, say, psychology and physics.  
 
1.2.2 Hempel and Dray 
The distinction between causal explanations and “making intelligible” explanations was 
passed into our contemporary discussion from the Vienna Circle via Hempel. Hempel (1942) 
                                                
26 See Descombes (2001: 30). 
 
27 The history and relevance of the Verstehen –Erklären debate is discussed in Apel (1984), 
Descombes (2001), Marras (1993), Friedman (1999). Relevant are Gadamer (1960), and Dilthey 
(1883) and von Wright (1971). 
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argues, for instance, that historical explanation shares the deductive-nomological (DN) 
structure that physics employs (see Section 2.2 below). An event is successfully explained if 
and only if it follows deductively from a set of law-like generalizations, together with initial 
conditions. To use Hempel’s example, the Dust Bowl farmers migrated to California because 
– and here’s the law – “populations tend to migrate to areas offering better living conditions” 
and California offered better living conditions – there’s the initial condition. Their migration 
is predicted by the explanatory law.28  
Opposing Hempel was Dray (1957) who argued that the social sciences had a 
different explanatory goal and different method than the natural sciences. The goal was 
“understanding” or “intelligibility” not causal explanation, that is, not the kind of explanation 
offered by natural sciences like physics. The method would be, for example, to make clear the 
rationality of an action as one done for reasons and to uncover the meaning of, or 
significance of, the action for the agent who performs it. 
 
§ 
 
1.3 Actions, Reasons and Causes 
Going forward let Causalism about Reasons be the thesis that the explanatory reason for a given 
action is the cause of that action. Anti-Causalism about Reasons would hold that the explanatory 
reason for an action cannot be the cause of the action. It is a good argument for Causalism 
about Reasons to note that what someone would do in a situation is different than what 
                                                
28 Hempel augmented and made his theory more sophisticated by allowing that historical 
explanations were often only “explanation sketches” which would account for the poor predictive 
capabilities of the lessons of history. Except “Winter invasions of Russia always fail,” there are 
few laws in history capable of providing true predictions. Hempel also suggested statistical laws 
for historical explanations that would predict and explain the frequency of kinds of events.  
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someone did do. Lots of reasons rationalize a given action, but only one rationalizes and 
brings it about. The idea seems to have been in the air. John Passmore makes such a move: 
 
Explanation by reference to a “principle of action” or a “good reason” is not, by 
itself, explanation at all…For a reason may be a “good reason” – in a sense of being a 
principle to which one could appeal in justification of one’s action – without having 
in fact the slightest influence on us,” (1958: 275). 
 
Hempel has a paper targeting Dray’s contention that the popular method of explaining 
actions in terms of underlying reasons in the light of which the agent acts, cannot be 
construed as conforming to the covering-law pattern. Hempel writes that: 
 
 
To show that an action was the appropriate or rational thing to have done under the 
circumstances is not to explain why in fact it was done… The presentation of an 
action as being appropriate to a given situation, as making sense, cannot, for purely 
logical reasons, serve to explain why in fact the action was taken, (1963: 102). 
 
In his influential book Theory of Action Lawrence Davis29 writes: 
 
While the explanation of Sam’s action aims at displaying the action’s intelligibility… 
explanation of… a “mere” event, aims at displaying its inevitability. Reasons-
explanations and causal-explanations differ, then, in their aims and the battery of 
concepts that apply to them (1979: 85). 
 
Davidson’s main point in his “multiple reasons” argument was that there are many 
reasons that would rationalize the action-to-be-explained. (Let’s call the given action-to-be-
explained, “the primary explanandum.”) Regina may desire to annoy her neighbor by mowing 
her lawn in the early morning but it is conceivable that she actually mows it early in the 
morning for the reason that this is the most convenient time (cf. Mele 1997). There is an 
important difference between all those accurately rationalizing explanations that exist and the 
one that actually explains the primary explanandum. The difference, Davidson argued, is that 
                                                
29 All quotations from Sandis (2006) whom I follow closely here. 
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the explanatory reason is the cause of the action. “When we offer the fact of the desire and 
belief in explanation,” Davidson says, “we imply not only that the agent had the desire and 
belief, but that they were efficacious in producing the action,” (1974: 232, italics mine). This is 
his multiple reason argument and it is meant to show that the explanatory reason is the 
reason that caused the action.  
 
1.3.1 The Neo-Wittgensteinians’ Logical Connection Argument 
 
It is hard to know whether or not, or to what extent, Wittgenstein himself was influenced by 
this European tradition of philosophy of social science, Geisteswissenschaft versus 
Naturwissenschaft, Erklären versus Verstehen. However, Wittgenstein’s discussion in Philosophical 
Investigations (and elsewhere) about reasons for action influenced the so-called Neo-
Wittgensteinians’  “Logical Connection Argument,” which I will try to present as charitably as 
possible. 
The anti-Causalists take it that a cause and its effect must be logically distinct entities. 
(They think they find this in Hume.) They then argue that a reason and the action it 
rationalizes are in some sense logically related, and thus not logically distinct. So the reason 
that rationalizes an action cannot be a cause of the action. The reason that rationalizes an 
action is logically connected to or dependent on it perhaps because they are interdefined. 
Thirst is defined as causing thirst-quenching behavior and thirst-quenching behavior is 
defined as what one does when thirsty. But causal claims must be unlike definitions. In order 
to be causally explanatory causal relations cannot be statements characterized as stating 
logical necessities. We cannot causally explain why Jones is a bachelor by asserting that he is 
an unmarried male. There is an explanatory generalization here “all bachelors are unmarried 
males,” but it is not a generalization ready to underwrite causal explanation. It’s a definition 
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that is making a logical connection between, or interdefining, “bachelor” and “unmarried 
male.” In fact, the supposed explanation is just a redescription of the explanandum. But 
nothing can causally explain itself. The logical connection argument says analogously that to 
give a reason for an action is just to redescribe the action, since that action is interdefined 
with the beliefs and desires that rationalize it.  
 
1.3.2 Davidson’s “Descriptions Argument” Against the LCA 
Against the logical connection argument Davidson gives an argument suggesting that both 
logical and causal relations are a matter of how we describe things. He points out that it is 
possible that an action and a reason can be (or, better, can be seen to be) logically related 
under one description but not others. For example, if we ask for what reason Oedipus 
gouged out his eyes (an action), it would not be acceptable to say, “because Oedipus lusted 
after the Queen,” since there is no logical or rationalizing relation there. However it would be 
explanatory to say, “because Oedipus lusted after his mother,” because if you find yourself in 
that state and you’re a Greek hero, it makes sense to poke out your eyes. Both rationalizing and 
causal explanations, Davidson says, are intensional in this sense: they do not preserve truth 
(or in our case epistemic adequacy of explanation) upon substitution of co-referential terms. 
Even though Jocasta, his mother and the Queen, are all the same entity, only under some 
descriptions does reference to Jocasta explain Oedipus’s gouging out his eyes.30 
  Similarly, causal explanation is intensional in that the very same event may be 
described as a hurricane and as “the event reported on page one of the News and Observer,” 
but only under the former description does reference to that event provide epistemic 
                                                
30 We have occasion to discuss “intensionality” again in Chapter Two’s review of the causation 
literature. 
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satisfaction as to why the Cape Fear basin is flooded. With these observations in mind, 
Davidson argued that it was possible that a reason and an action (as two events) could be 
both logically connected as well as causally connected, simply under different descriptions.  
 But don’t we want to say that relations between two entities hold no matter how 
described? If “Jocasta” and “the Queen” and “his mother,” are descriptions of the same 
entity, and that entity is related to Oedipus’s action, then that entity is so related no matter 
how described; we may just not come to know it under certain descriptions. Indeed this is 
Davidson’s position and he captures the “no-matter-how-described” phenomenon just 
discussed by calling causal relations “extensional” relations between events simpliciter.31 I’ll 
explain. 
  “The event reported on page one of the News and Observer caused the Cape Fear basin 
to be flooded” is a true singular causal statement but it is not explanatory, Davidson famously 
reminds us. This singular causal statement is true because there is indeed a causal relation 
between the event reported on page one of the News and Observer and Cape Fear being 
flooded. It holds true no matter how its relata are described. But causal explanation (and 
rationalization for that matter) is intensional and is only achieved under descriptions with the 
right intension.  
The relata of the causal relation are events themselves and not events-under-a-
description. However, causal explanation works or does not work depending on the given 
descriptions of the events. We return to the discussion of the causal relata below. The 
important point now is that causal and logical connections can obtain between the very same 
two events, contra what the proponents of the logical connection argument asserted.  
                                                
31 What would an intensional theory of causation (and not merely causal explanation) look like? It 
would make mind-dependent the question of what was a cause and what was not. In this regard, 
see the criticism of Yablo in my Section 3.9.3 and 3.9.4 below. 
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§ 
 
1.4 New Arguments against Causalism 
1.4.1 Reasons are not Mental  Events nor Mental Events  
Davidson (1963) is widely considered to have “demolished” (see e.g., Schueler 2003: 9) the 
anti-causalist position. Recently, however, the anti-causalist position has had something of a 
resurgence. The whole mental causation debate depends on the success of Causalism in the 
battle between Davidson and the Neo-Wittgensteinians.32 Perhaps the resurgence of anti-
causalism can show that causalism is false; that would undermine the whole foundation on 
which the mental causation debate stands. So we had better take a look. 
 The thrust of the new anti-causalist argument is actually two pronged. They do not 
have an argument against causalism per se. Instead, they argue that reasons are not mental 
events nor mental events. That is, (1) they argue that a reason is not a psychological state of the 
person who has a reason for action. They argue that reasons are not inner mental events. 
They argue (2) that reasons are states of affairs out in the world. For instance, Dancy says 
“even the most cursory glance at the sorts of reasons we actually give, in explaining our 
actions or those of others, reveals that,” reasons are not psychological states (2000: 15). 
Bittner says we understand our actions primarily in terms of their place among things 
happening, not in terms of our attitude to things happening,” (2001: 110). Scanlon (2000) also 
has an externalist view such that reasons are states of affairs. 
                                                
32 It is a fact that Kim overlooks Davidson’s work in philosophy of action as a possible source to 
ground the causality of reasons. Instead Kim stipulates that reasons are causes. 
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I think there is a debunking explanation for why we have the intuition with Dancy 
and others that reasons are not our psychological states. I’m going to explain away the 
intuition they seem to appeal to. And in the end causalism is going to stand. 
Here’s why we have the intuitions we have. It is true that our own psychological 
states are rarely the thing that we appeal to in order to justify our actions. We do not say that 
my desire to help the child I believed was crying justified my helping the child. That the child is 
crying justifies my helping, not anything about me. Indeed, we appeal to states of affairs in the 
world. But it could be said that states of affairs in the world cannot be proximal causes of our 
intentional behavior. Only our beliefs about states of affairs in the world can cause us to act. 
This is most obviously the case in situations where we have a false belief about the state of 
affairs in the world and act on that false belief. In the non-veridical case, we would say that 
the belief – the false belief – caused us to act. So too in the veridical case we ought to say it is 
a belief that causes us to act. This belief represents the state of affairs; it has the state of 
affairs as its content. 
Furthermore, notice, when we speak of action by referencing reasons qua inner 
causes it is not so counterintuitive to say that my belief she was crying and my desire to help 
caused me to help. Going the other way, the state of affairs that she was crying did not directly 
cause me to help (not without my believing this was the case), but is more comfortably talked 
about as a reason. These observations betray a tension between the justifying aspect and the 
causal aspect of reason explanations.  In the former, I think, we have “one thought too 
many” if we take our own mental states as justifying helping the child. Mental states are better 
thought of as causes. In the latter, our sense of causation excludes states of affairs, which 
cannot have an impact on us without causing a belief in us via our perceptual apparatus. 
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Indeed, states of affairs function better as reasons. But any reason has to do double duty as 
justification and efficient cause.  
After all, in the framework we’ve set up so far, an agent acts only if the reason to act 
includes both cognitive and conative aspects. Someone may desire a beer but not know that 
there is beer in the fridge. And someone may know that there is beer in the fridge but desire 
something else. If in either case one didn’t get up and go to the fridge at all we’d understand 
why. What’s relevant to this discussion is that one needs to be in the proper state of mind 
with respect to the reason-as-states-of-affairs in order for the latter to be an explanatory 
reason.  
But it is not enough to believe or have a representation of the state of affairs in order 
for it to be a consideration for or against acting. One’s representation needs to be accurate. 
Otherwise you don’t have a reason. Is that right? Not entirely. You would not have a 
justificatory reason but you would still have an explanatory reason.33 In the end, the mental 
causation debate is only talking about the causal status of actually correct and adequately 
explanatory explanations of behavior, made in the intentional idiom. So in the mental 
causation debate we are assuming a good case. There’s no point in proving mental causation for 
purported causal explanations that do not actually reference actual causes, or causal 
explanations that fail to adequately explain in virtue of positing non-veridical states of affairs. 
There’s lots of ways for a causal explanation to go wrong. We are interested in the 
metaphysics of good explanations. This will have further relevance later. 
 
§ 
                                                
33 I do not mean “justificatory” in the sense in which a justified false belief remains justified. I 
mean “justificatory” in the sense in which some reasons justify and other do not justify a certain 
action.   
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1.5  A Euthyphro Question Regarding Reasons and Causes 
In the following sections, I describe a number of theses that I believe Davidson endorses in 
the philosophy of action. However, if it could be shown that Davidson does not endorse 
these theses, I would still defend them. If he didn’t endorse them, he should have and I will.34 
 The importance of the collection of theses will become apparent only in Chapter 
Four where it will be used as a defense against the so-called “Identification Problem,” which 
is the problem of identifying which tokens are identical in a token identity theory.   
 
 
1.5.1 The “Strict Qualification” Thesis 
 
In this section, I’m going to argue for the truth of what I call the “strict qualification” thesis. 
This thesis says that the only reasons we are interested in, and the only reasons Davidson was 
interested in, are those reasons that are actually explanatory.  
Davidson opens his (1963) this way: “What is the relation between a reason and an 
action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing it?” (3). “A 
causal relation,” Davidson answers. But his answer and the implications thereof can be 
misunderstood. The first misunderstanding arises with respect to just what the question is 
asking. Davidson is not asking broadly about the relation between reasons and actions. Only 
a subset of, or a certain kind of, reasons interest him. We need to recognize the strict 
qualification inherent in the clause, “when it explains the action by giving the reason.” Truth be 
told, Davidson limits his interest in reasons to those appearing in successful explanations of 
intentional action, reasons that actually explain.  
                                                
34 In other words, I have two goals, Davidson interpretation and correcting the mental causation 
dialectic. I think they go together but they can be considered separately. 
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To see how, recall that Davidson foregrounds the fact that citing a reason is not the 
same thing as citing the reason for an action. He asks us to imagine situations in which there 
are multiple reasons that justify the action in question. This is the multiple reasons argument 
that I mentioned earlier when discussing Davidson’s argument for the causal requirement. 
The thought is that there might be lots of reasons that rationalize or make intelligible a given 
action. But the reason, as opposed to simply a reason (the explanatory reason as opposed to a 
merely justifying reason), is the one that actually caused, produced or brought about, etc., the 
action in question.35 “When we offer the fact of the desire and belief in explanation,” 
Davidson says, “we imply not only that the agent had the desire and belief, but that they were 
efficacious in producing the action,” (1974: 232).  
Here’s my argument for the “strict qualification” reading of the first line of Davidson 
(1963). Reasons appear in successful and unsuccessful explanations of intentional action. Only 
the explanation that appeals to the efficacious reason, we must admit, will count as successful. 
So we should focus our attention on only those justifying reasons that are actually 
explanatory if we wish to discover the relation between the reason and the action it explains, 
rather than any old justifying reason. If we want to know the relation between a reason and 
the action that it explains then we need to look at only reasons that appear in true and 
epistemically adequate explanations. This is what we should do and this is what Davidson 
does.  
However, this raises the question of how we know what was the reason for which an 
agent acted. How do we come to know the explanatory reason?  
                                                
35  He later amends this to “caused in the right way” in order to account for deviant causal chains. 
See Davidson (1973). In any case, deviant causal chains do not occur with respect to intentional 
action done for reasons.  
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1.5.2 The Epistemology of the Reason 
In Davidson’s framework, the epistemology of the reason is essentially our standard folk 
psychological practice of intentional behavior explanation through mental state attribution, 
including the principle of charity.36 Roughly speaking, a reason explanation explains by 
positing or merely hinting at an effective mental-event that is related to the explanandum by 
some loosey-goosey lore. 
The reason that is offered as explanatory is in fact attributed or ascribed to the agent 
by the explainer with evidence that is severely underdetermining of the agent’s possession of 
said reason. Some philosophers think this is perhaps analogous to the way the electron and 
other unseen theoretical posits are used in physical science. They are adopted for their 
explanatory power in relation to choice explananda. But it is always possible that new 
phenomena will be observed that make another posit more likely and the former one much 
less likely.  
In any case, a reason explanation posits an agent’s reasons for the given action by 
assuming the agent is like the explainer or follows relatively rational behavior-guidelines and 
participates in the same form of life, or cultural ways and mores, as the explainer; and by 
assuming lots of detail about the context of the action and what has come before. In this way, 
reason explanations make actions intelligible. This last sentence was the rallying cry for 
Davidson’s anti-causalist opponents when his (1963) was published. But here too is another 
misunderstanding of Davidson. As far as the epistemology of the reason goes, it is not widely 
recognized that Davidson does not actually (mean to) advance the discussion beyond his 
                                                
36 All I need to show, I think, is that Davidson does not hold that reason explanation has the DN 
form. I regard it as a family dispute whether Davidson or I need to adopt a Quinean view, a 
Davidsonian view, a McDowellian view or a Brandomian view.  
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original interlocutors, the Neo-Wittgensteinians, on this point. Davidson’s rhetoric may suggest 
he has refuted the Neo-Wittgensteinians’ claim that reason explanations are not causal 
explanations. But on this point – on what might be called the methodological point about the 
structure of reason explanations – they agree that the strict DN explanations in physical 
science differ from the hermeneutic explanations of folk psychology. Reason explanations for 
Davidson and the Neo-Wittgensteinians rationalize the behavior according to our essentially 
normative notions of what would be appropriate for an agent to do who had the beliefs and 
desires that we holistically attribute to her in the context. (Then that reason is designated as 
the cause, according to Davidson.)  
Again: it is a misunderstanding to take it that Davidson overturned the anti-causalist 
hegemony by arguing that reason explanations had the form of DN explanations. But this 
misunderstanding persists. For an example, Anthony (1989) writes that a reason explanation 
gets its “explanatory force” in virtue of a covering law (23). Sandis (2006) lists Davidson with 
other commentators who take reason explanations to be DN explanations:  
 
…there are those who think that all reason-giving explanation of our actions is a 
subset of scientific explanation and, consequently, relies upon causal laws. These 
covering-law theorists include C. J. Ducasse (1925), Carl G. Hempel (1962), Donald 
Davidson (1963 & 1976), Alvin I. Goldman (1969), Thomas Nagel (1970), Peter 
Railton (1978), Fred Dretske (1988), Al Mele (1992), Rowland Stout (1996), Jim 
Lenman (1996), Gregory Kimble (1996), and John Searle (2001).37  
 
Many will disagree with my claim about Davidson’s position on how folk psychology 
explains. My view is certainly in disagreement with a popular misconception. But Davidson 
did not think folk psychological explanation was DN, as some philosophers persist in 
thinking.  
                                                
37 Sandis (2006: 2) is clearly wrong to place Davidson in that group. He does so perhaps because 
Sandis confuses epistemological and metaphysical matters.  
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It is clear that we accept as successful or true many explanations in folk psychology 
that do not have the same form as physical explanations; their explanatory structure is 
interpretative, an exercise in hermeneutical Verstehen appropriate to an object of the various 
Geisteswissenschaften, just as it is for the Neo-Wittgensteinians. The difference might be that 
Davidson seems to want to make that type of explanation fit into a naturalistic metaphysics, 
whereas his opponents may have felt they had come to the limits of naturalism or at least the 
limits of scientific explanation.  
 
1.5.3 The Priority of the Phenomena Thesis 
Furthermore, the reason is what you would naturally be interested in if you conceived yourself 
as engaged in one traditional type of metaphysical inquiry. The way of doing metaphysics I 
have in mind is, as I’ve said, a matter of asking and answering a “how-possible” question of 
an actual phenomenon. For example, we come to have knowledge in such and such a way; 
how is it possible that we come to knowledge in that way? This kind of account of our actual 
epistemological practices is meant to establish metaphysical legitimacy for those practices, 
which are of extreme importance in our self-conception as agents. 
When Davidson asks, “What is the relation between a reason and an action when the 
reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing it?” he is engaging in a 
project we might call a metaphysical project and he is suggesting that it is distinct from 
projects we might call epistemological. It is a matter of epistemology, let’s agree, to come to 
know the reason for which an agent acted; it is a matter of metaphysics, let’s say, to make the 
inquiry into the relation between explanatory reasons and the actions they explain. According 
to Davidson, one condition of possibility for a reason to be an explanation of an action is 
that the reason be the cause of the action. 
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In the project proposed by “the relation question,” Davidson, as we said above, limits 
his interest to just those reasons that actually explain the action. (This is what we called the 
strict qualification thesis.) Once we have isolated the reason, i.e., once we have a successful 
explanation in hand, only then is a different question – the metaphysical question – raised: 
how is it that that reason can be a cause? That is to say, Davidson does not ask the 
metaphysical question, “How could a reason be a cause,” until he has got a fixed reason in 
hand. It gets fixed as our object of metaphysical inquiry by appearing in a successful folk 
psychological explanation, which, because it is successful, assumes a legitimate epistemology 
of the reason. Only after this stage is the metaphysical “how-possible” question asked.38 The 
problem is to say how the phenomenon of mental causation, which is an actuality, is even a 
possibility. As long as we are not eliminativists and we continue to consider 
epiphenomenalism a liability, the mental causation debate is about “saving the phenomena.” 
Establishing “mental causation” or achieving the metaphysical project called “mental 
causation,” is meant to metaphysically underwrite our folk psychological explanatory 
practices, which have priority.   
 
1.5.4 The Euthyphro Question Regarding Reasons and Causes  
Anytime you have two things, or two properties of one thing, and you want to find some 
relation of priority between them, then you can ask a Euthyphro question about the direction 
of priority. In this case, we have a mental event that is both the reason and a cause. We ask: Is 
it a cause because it is the reason or is it the reason because it is the cause?  Answer: It is a 
cause because it is the reason. It is not the case that it is the reason because it is the cause. Let 
                                                
38 The additional salience of my treating it this way will become apparent later when these 
observations are used as a defense against the so-called “identification problem.” See Section 3.10  
below. 
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me be clear. I am not saying that some kind of epistemic Euthyphronic direction goes from 
reason to cause while some metaphysical Euthyphronic direction goes from cause to reason. I 
am saying that there is a Euthyphronic direction from epistemology to metaphysics. In other 
words, the reason is the cause in virtue of being the reason not the other way around. It is 
our best epistemology whose deliverance is the reason which imputes to us the metaphysical 
commitment that said reason is also the cause.  
Why answer in this manner? I believe the Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis provides the 
answer to this Euthyphro question. The Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis says we first come to 
know the reason for which someone acted and we come to know it through “the 
epistemology of the reason,” as I have called it. So we may say that this event is the cause it is 
in (Euthyphronic) virtue of being the explanatory rationalizing reason it is. 
 Does anything interesting follow from this? Is anything at stake? Yes. This 
Euthyphronic order of explanation will be relevant any time a proponent of another theory 
tries to formulate causal criteria by which to identify the reason for an agent’s action. It’ll 
show that strategy to be wrong-headed. You’ll be getting things backwards if you try to 
discover the reason for action by seeking the cause of the action. The order of explanation 
goes the other way such that we may seek the cause of an action only through seeking the 
reason for the action.  
 So, Kim gets it exactly backwards when he says, “Reasons explain actions in virtue of 
being their causes,” (2006: 176). That is just wrong. Reasons are causes in virtue of 
epistemically explaining their actions. For another example, Campbell says:  "Although 
Davidson acknowledges that rationality is an ideal that shapes our mental ascriptions and 
folk-psychological explanations, he has argued that we should not regard the rationalizing 
feature of reason explanation as the source of its explanatory force," (Campbell, 2005: 445) 
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This author is saying its being a cause is the source of a reason’s explanatory force. However, 
the author is wrong. Explanatory force comes from intensional matching. Truth comes from 
whether the causal relation is actual between the posited cause and the effect to be explained. 
(See Section 4.3 - 4.5 for more on explanatory force.) 
The epistemology of the reason is not like an epistemology of causes. In the latter, 
we, assuming that every event has a cause, seek the cause of the given effect event using tried 
and true methods of causal discovery. Whereas, in the former we attribute mental states 
according to a normative system (described above in Section 1.5.2) and then designate that 
reason as the cause. The epistemology of causes of events is structured differently than the 
epistemology of reasons for action. A point that remains from our history of the intellectual 
milieu before ARC.  
Even if it is the case that there are times when the epistemology of the reason looks 
like an epistemology of causes it is nevertheless still the case that we operate in a certain 
order. First we determine the reason using the epistemology of the reason, whatever it is, and 
then second, we designate (metaphysically-speaking) that reason as the cause. It does not go 
the other way around. 
 
§ 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the history of the philosophy of Geisteswissenschaften and the 
philosophical milieu at the time Davidson wrote “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” (1963). I 
have argued that Davidson took it as a necessary precondition of genuine reason explanations 
that the reason appealed to in the explanation actually be the cause of the action explained. I 
  38 
have registered my agreement. I have also outlined how this view fits into a systematic way of 
thinking, which includes a certain relation between epistemology and metaphysics. The Strict 
Qualification Thesis and the Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis highlight the direction of relation 
between metaphysics and epistemology.   
I posed a Euthyphro question about reasons and causes and argued on the basis of 
those two theses that reasons are causes in virtue of being reasons not the other way around, 
i.e., it is not in virtue of being causes that reasons are causes. This will be relevant in Chapter 
Three where we defend anomalous monism from the so-called “identification problem.”  
 Next, in Chapter Two, we make a survey of the literature on causation and causal 
laws. For the sake of argument with his critics, I adopt a Davidsonian version of the 
nomological account of causation. But we should also explore how each account of causation 
fares with respect to the problem of mental causation. Perhaps an account of causation can 
avoid the exclusion of mental properties by physical properties even though Esfeld 
(forthcoming) says, “The problem of mental causation and the argument for token identity 
are independent of the stance that one takes in the metaphysics of causation,” (1). 
It will have been worthwhile exploring the vicissitudes of causation and causal laws 
when, in Chapters Four and Five, we defend anomalous monism and go beyond it to 
reconsider the relation between causes and law. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
CAUSATION AND CAUSAL LAWS  
 
It is easy enough to say that reasons or mental events are causes. But what are causes? What is 
causation? Until we have some understanding of answers to these questions we cannot really 
know what it means to say that reasons are causes.  
 What we will see upon making a survey of the philosophical literature is that 
philosophers make, as I do, a strong distinction between metaphysical causation and 
epistemic causal explanation.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
We recognize causation any time we drop a glass and the impact with the floor causes the 
glass to break. Consider that smoking causes cancer. Striking the cue ball with the stick caused 
the ball to move. Philosophers say a cause makes something happen, brings something about 
or makes a difference; and “the difference it makes,” says David Lewis, one of the most 
influential thinkers on causation, “must be a difference from what would have happened 
without it,” (1973: 160-161). When we say that the financial crisis could have been avoided, 
we mean in part that there was an event, or were events, without which the crisis would not 
have happened. These are the causes of the crisis. 
An analysis of causation aims to explain what it is for two events to be related as 
cause and effect – what must be the case, metaphysically speaking, for two events to be so 
  40 
 
related. This kind of inquiry is different from the inquiry by which we come to know that two 
events stand in the causal relation, which is an epistemological project.  
There are many kinds of analyses of causation in the literature. Despite of, or perhaps 
because of, the fact that causation is one of the most important and widespread issues in 
philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct approach. In a recent anthology, Helen 
Beebee et al. writes, “No theory has won univocal support in the literature. The discussion 
consequently is a little bit of a hodge-podge,” (2010: 1).  
There are nevertheless issues that reappear in many of the discussions below. As we 
will see, differentiating between what’s causal and what’s only apparently causal is a difficult 
task for many theories. 
 
2.1.1 Causation versus Correlation 
Often the first thing to say about causation is “Correlation is not causation.” It’s true that the 
difference between genuine causal connections and mere correlations is central to an 
understanding of causation. However, the saying, “Correlation is not causation,” is 
incomplete. It would be more accurate to say, “Correlation is necessary but not sufficient for 
causation.” Two events, c and e, may be constantly correlated and not yet causally related. 
For instance, they may have a common cause in a third event, b.  
Consider this example: sleeping with the lights on is strongly correlated in adults with 
waking up with cephalalgia, or headache. One might conclude, epistemologically speaking, 
that sleeping with the lights on caused the headache. However, if we can imagine a plausible 
common cause then this inference will seem illegitimate. After all, it is possible excess alcohol 
consumption caused both the headache and sleeping with the lights on.  Making this 
epistemological error – the “common cause error” – amounts to mistaking an effect for a 
  41 
 
cause. Metaphysically speaking, for the assertion that Event 2 is a cause of Event 3 to be true, 
there must not be another event, Event 1, causing both Event 2 and Event 3. In Figures 1 and 
2 the dotted arrow represents an apparent connection, which is in fact no connection at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider a more concrete example. Nietzsche writes of the strange case of Cornaro, 
who thought that his meager diet caused longevity. Nietzsche says, “The worthy Italian 
thought that his diet was the cause of his long life, whereas the precondition for a long life, 
the extraordinary slowness of his metabolism, the consumption of so little, was the cause of 
his slender diet,”39 as well as of his longevity.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                
39 For more see Leiter (2002: 156-157). 
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2.1.2 Token and Type Causation 
Consider these two statements: 
 
(a) The short circuit caused the fire. 
(b) Short circuits cause fires. 
 
The former is an example of what philosophers call token or singular causation – an 
individual event causing another individual event. The latter is an example of type or general 
causation – causation between properties or kinds of events. Many philosophers hold that 
token and type causation are different kinds of causality. Sober (1985, 1986) and Eells (1991), 
for example, argue for theories of type and token causation that differ considerably. 
Cartwright (1989) and Hausman (1998), on the other hand, hold that type causation depends 
upon the more fundamental token causation. It is possible to hold the view that type-level 
relations are fundamental (see Tooley 1987). We proceed talking usually about token 
causation. 
 
2.1.3 Causation versus Causal Explanation 
Consider these two token causal claims: 
 
(a) The hurricane caused the building to collapse. 
(b) The event reported on page 5 of the Times caused the building to collapse. 
 
Assuming (a) and (b) are both true, only (a) is explanatory; (b) is not, even assuming, as we 
do, that the hurricane is the very same thing as the event reported on page 5 of the Times. 
True singular causal statements are called “extensional” because they remain true under 
substitution of all true descriptions of the relata (the things related by the causal relation). The 
Hurricane caused the building to collapse and so did the event on page 5 of the Times because 
they are one and the same thing. On the other hand, causal explanation can be called 
“intensional” because there are salience requirements on the proffered descriptions of the 
causal relata in order for the explanation to be genuinely explanatory.  
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If we ask again for an explanation of why Oedipus gouged out his eyes, recall that it 
would not be explanatory to say, “because Oedipus lusted after the Queen.” That description 
is somehow not relevant or salient. However it would be explanatory to say, “because Oedipus 
lusted after his mother,” because when you do that and you’re a Greek hero, it makes sense to 
poke out your eyes. Causal explanations, Davidson (1967) says, are intensional in this sense: 
they need not preserve explanatory adequacy upon substitution of co-referential terms 
(differing terms that nevertheless have the same referent). Even though Jocasta, his mother 
and the Queen, are all the same entity, only under some descriptions does reference to 
Jocasta explain Oedipus’s gouging out his eyes. Nevertheless, it’s true that he lusted after 
Queen Jocasta/his mother just as it is true that the event reported on page 5 of the Times 
caused the building to collapse. Each is true, but not explanatory. Causation and causal 
explanation are different insofar as it is possible for a sentence to be non-explanatory while 
still being causal. 
Interest-relative, mind-dependent features of a situation are relevant to whether an 
explanation is more or less explanatory. Lewis’s (1979) theory of causal explanation includes 
the idea that an explanation describes (or gives information about) a part of the causal history 
of the event to be explained.  Which part of the history is relevant will change relative to the 
context of the inquiry. Imagine a car crash.40 The road engineer will find the improper 
grading for the arc of the road’s curve to be explanatory. The policeman will find the driver’s 
speed to be explanatory. The driver himself, having safely navigated that curve at that same 
speed many times before, may blame the fresh rain on the road.  
As Lewis says: 
 
                                                
40 This example is found in Lewis (1986) and Kim (1998). 
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If someone says that the bald tire was the cause of the crash, another says that the 
driver’s drunkenness was the cause, and still another says that the cause was the bad 
upbringing which made him so reckless, I do not think any of them disagree with me 
when I say that the causal history includes all three. They disagree only about which 
part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some particular inquiry, 
(1979: 215). 
 
On the other hand, with respect to causation per se it is often considered a 
desideratum that causation be mind-independent. “Causal relationships are features of the 
world: they are ‘out there’ in nature. By contrast, explanation is an activity carried out by 
humans and conceivably by some other animals, having to do with the discovery and 
provision of information, information based on causal relationships,” (Woodward 2003: 23). 
 
2.1.4 Causation, Possibility and Necessity 
As we have observed, one way to think of causation is to think that a cause necessitates its 
effect. Given the cause you’d necessarily get (it would be impossible not to get) the effect. 
Causation is, thereby, intimately bound up with possibility and necessity.  
Possibilities are things that could have happened, even if they never take place. 
Something is necessary when it is impossible that it fail to happen. Necessity and possibility 
are, thereby, like two sides of a coin. Furthermore, there is nomological or natural necessity 
and possibility and then there’s logical necessity and possibility. For example, a round square 
is logically impossible while faster than light travel and 3 cubic mile gold cubes are naturally 
impossible but logically possible. Insofar as the concept of causation involves necessity, it is 
natural necessity and not absolute necessity. That is to say, the relation of necessity between 
cause and effect is a relation of necessity only in this world and not in every possible world.  
 
2.1.5 Theories of Scientific Explanation 
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Philosophers disagree about the extent to which philosophical theories of scientific 
explanation should make fundamental reference to causal concepts. The logical empiricists 
tried to do without causal concepts. More recently, problems with the deductive-nomological 
(DN) model and other theories suggest that theories of scientific explanation require causal 
concepts. We may briefly explore three popular theories of scientific explanation for their 
relation to a discussion of causation. There is the DN model as developed by Hempel & 
Oppenheim (1948) and Hempel (1965); the statistical relevance model of Salmon (1971); and 
the unificationist models as developed by Friedman (1971) and Kitcher (1981, 1989). The 
DN model of explanation has it that explanations are deductive arguments. The premises of 
the argument are the explanans (the thing doing the explaining) and the conclusion of the 
argument is the explanandum (the thing explained). The explanans contains at least one law 
of nature and it must contain it essentially such that the inference would not go through were 
it left out. An explanandum is explained if it is possible to deduce it from sentences about the 
antecedent conditions together with the law of nature.  
Among many well-known problems,41 DN has difficulty accounting for what we 
usually take to be the asymmetry of many scientific explanations. For instance, we normally 
take there to be an asymmetry pointing from the explanans to the explanandum: we derive 
the length of a shadow from the height of a flagpole and the angle of the sun (plus a law). 
The DN model captures this explanation perfectly. But it just as perfectly goes the other way: 
it purports to explain the height of the flagpole in terms of the angle of the sun and the 
length of the shadow (plus the law). But this is a counterintuitive result. DN is allowing too 
many things to count as explanations. We do not normally explain the height of a flagpole by 
referencing the length of its shadow. Normally, it goes the other way around. Kitcher (1989) 
                                                
41 For a comprehensive discussion of the main problems for DN see Salmon (1989). 
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argues that what DN is missing is the asymmetry of causation. He diagnoses DN’s symmetry 
to be a result of the empiricists’ Humean desire to do without “mysterious” causal powers.     
 The central tenet of the statistical relevance model is roughly that statistically relevant 
features are explanatory features. Statistical relevance, then, is based on the conditional 
dependence of an event on other events. It says that given a class A, an attribute C will be 
statistically relevant to another attribute B if and only if P(B|A&C) ≠ P(B|A). In other words, 
C is statistically relevant to B if and only if the probability of B given A and C is different 
from the probability of B given only A. For an example, let’s say that whoever is infected by 
streptococcus (S) and takes the medicine penicillin (M) has a very high probability of quick 
recovery (R). This we would represent as follows: P (R|S&M) is very high. We compare this 
to the probability of recovery given streptococcus without taking penicillin, or P(R|S). So the 
equation above says that if the probability of a certain outcome is different (higher or lower) 
given the streptococcus than the probability of an outcome given the streptococcus plus 
another factor (the medicine) then the medicinal factor is statistically relevant to the outcome.  
 One problem for the statistical model of causal explanation is a classic kind of 
trouble: namely with common causes and epiphenomena. A perfect description of statistical 
relevancies may not yet capture the actual causal relationships at work (Salmon 1971). For 
example, imagine Event 2 is causally relevant to Event 3 while Event 1 is an epiphenomenon 
necessitated (represented by the double arrow in Figure 3) by Event 2. In this situation, 
Event 1 and Event 2 have the same statistical relevance with respect to Event 3, even though 
only Event 2 causes Event 3. As counterfactual dependence alone is not causation, neither is 
statistical relevance alone causation, for there may be a common cause. 
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Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989) have put forth a unificationist account of 
scientific explanation. The essence of the unificationist account is that “scientific explanation 
is a matter of providing a unified account of a range of different phenomena,” (Woodward 
2009b: Section 5.1). There is intuitive support for unification as part of what scientific 
explanation does. “Successful unification may exhibit connections or relationships between 
phenomena previously thought to be unrelated and this seems to be something that we 
expect good explanations to do,” (5.1). Furthermore, the unification of theories has clearly 
played a role in the history of scientific progress. “Paradigmatic examples include Newton's 
unification of terrestrial and celestial theories of motion and Maxwell's unification of 
electricity and magnetism,” (5.1). “The key question, however, is whether our intuitive notion 
(or notions) of unification can be made more precise in a way that allows us to recover the 
features that we think that good explanations should possess,” (5.1).  
The purpose of this literature review is in part to demonstrate the striking distinction 
here between metaphysical causation and epistemic causal explanation. We looked at theories 
of scientific explanation. In the positivist tradition said theories were attempted without 
essential reference to causal concepts. But it has become apparent, to some in any case, that 
the theories of scientific explanation do not succeed without appeal to causal concepts. We 
now turn to a discussion of causation per se.  
E1 
E2 
E3 
Figure 3 
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2.2 Causal Accounts and Analyses   
An account of causation is meant to provide some understanding about causation. An 
analysis of causation is a specific kind of account of causation in which causality is analyzed 
or broken down into more fundamental, non-causal, parts. Analysis is thereby a reductive 
project, reducing causality to something having to do with possible worlds, or with laws of 
nature for example. The opposite of a reductive account would be a realist account. 
 We will consider each theory of causation with respect to its applicability to the 
mental causation debate.  
 
2.2.1 Regularity and Nomological Theories of Causation 
A standard regularity theory will start by saying: c caused e if and only if c preceded e, and 
events like c are always followed by events like e. This naïve definition captures the intuitions 
behind sayings like “The same cause is always accompanied by the same effect” and “If no 
cause is present, no effect occurs.” In a bit more detail: 
c causes e if and only if: 
(1) c precedes e in time  
(2) c and e are contiguous in space 
(3) c is a C-type of event 
(4) e is a E-type of event and 
(5) events of type C are regularly followed by events of type E. 
 
There is a Humean tradition of regularity theories in which the regularities in (5) are merely 
de facto regularities without the aspect of necessity often associated with our idea of 
causation.  
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 Another kind of regularity theory is the nomic subsumption view, which says that 
when c is a cause of e this is so in virtue of a relation of necessity or a strict law between C-
type events and E-type events. So (5) would not be merely de facto regularity but nomic 
necessity. The difference between a de facto regularity theory and the nomic subsumption 
theory raises the question of how to account for the aspect of necessity that makes the 
difference. For this we need a theory of the nature of laws. Below in Section 2.3 we discuss 
Armstrong’s Non-Humean account and Lewis’ Humean account of causal laws.  
 
2.2.2 Mackie’s INUS Conditions 
Above we have sometimes spoken of “the cause.” But do not most events have multiple 
factors that bring them about? Once you start thinking of causes – plural – instead of the 
cause, you see there is a set of causes and conditions that were jointly sufficient but not 
necessary for the effect. For example, a fire can be started by a short circuit but only in the 
presence of oxygen. Together those two states amount to a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for a fire. That is, they are enough to cause a fire, but the fire could be caused in 
another way, say by striking a match. With respect to the cause of the fire Mackie (197x) 
offered a proposal he called INUS conditions: 
 
In this case, then, the so-called cause is… an insufficient but necessary part of a 
condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result  (414). 
 
So the short circuit is itself a necessary part of the set of conditions which were sufficient but 
not necessary for the fire. Also the short circuit is with respect to the set of conditions of 
which it is a part, insufficient alone for the fire. It needs the rest of the set of conditions. So 
the cause, the short-circuit, is an insufficient but necessary part of a set of conditions, the set itself 
being unnecessary but sufficient for the result – INUS.  
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 A naïve regularity theory might take causes to be necessary and sufficient for their 
effects. Mackie’s view is therefore a sophisticated regularity view. With all its sophistication it 
does not appear to be the case that the problem of mental causation would not arise on this 
theory. That is, Kim would probably say that even given Mackie’s INUS conditions we would 
still get a conflict between causes, mental and physical, where the physical excludes the 
mental. Or Kim might say that the physical property meets the INUS conditions and the 
mental property does not.  
 
2.2.3 Counterfactual Theories of Causation 
Counterfactual theories of causation abound today. But there was a time when they were not 
in favor. Regularity theories were favored for a variety of reasons, including the remaining 
influence of logical positivism. But, additionally, counterfactual accounts of causation had 
been unpopular because such a program looked like explaining a difficult concept with 
another difficult concept since it was controversial just what made counterfactuals true. 
Counterfactuals were things needing explanation, not things to appeal to in an explanation. 
Lewis’ possible world semantics for counterfactuals, however, gave one more or less plausible 
account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals. Indeed, Lewis’ counterfactual theory was 
intended to unseat regularity theories, whose “prospects look dark,” according to Lewis 
(1967: 160). 
The regularity theory says, “A cause is defined (roughly) as any member of any 
minimal set of actual conditions that are jointly sufficient, given the laws, for the existence of 
the effect,” (Lewis 1967: 159).  He goes on to note problems with the regularity view. Lewis 
notes that “c might rather be an effect of e: one which could not, given the laws and some of 
the actual circumstances, have occurred otherwise than by being caused by e. Or c might be 
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an epiphenomenon of e: a more or less inefficacious effect of some genuine cause of e,” 
(xyx).  
Lewis took his counterfactual account as both building on a part of what Hume said 
and improving on regularity theories. Lewis argued that chains of counterfactually dependent 
events are sufficient for causality. Counterfactual dependence of e on c is the thought that 
had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. As Lewis says (as noted above), “We think of 
a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a 
difference from what would have happened without it,” (557). So a cause, c, of an event, e, 
makes a difference to the event, e, coming to be. That is, without c we would not get e. We 
can say with Lewis, “e counterfactually depends on c iff, if c had not been, e never existed,” 
(xy). The counter to fact situation “if c had not been, e never existed,” needs to be evaluated. 
According to Lewis, “If P were the case, Q would be the case” is true just in case Q is true in 
the closest P-world. In other words, just in case Q is true in the world in which P is true and 
that, apart from P’s being true there, is as much like the actual world as possible. 
Lewis represents counterfactual dependence as ~c  ~e and asserts it as Hume’s 
meaning in his (Hume’s) second “definition” of causation: “Where if the first object had not 
been, the second never existed,” as we noted above. For an example at this stage of Lewis’s 
theory, consider a fully functional barometer that accurately measures atmospheric pressure. 
If the barometer is working correctly then the reading we make depends counterfactually on 
the atmospheric pressure. That is, if the pressure goes up, then the barometer’s reading goes 
up; and had the pressure not gone up, then the barometer’s reading would not have gone up. 
Having eliminated the possibility of any common cause, we would say that counterfactual 
dependence of this kind bespeaks casual dependence of the barometer reading on the 
atmospheric pressure. 
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 It has been widely noticed, however, that such kind of counterfactual dependence is 
not necessary for causal dependence. That is, there could be causally related events that were 
not counterfactually dependent. This is so in the famous so-called potential pre-emption 
cases.42 A potential but pre-empted cause c* is an event that would have led to an effect e, 
but it is such that its occurrence is blocked or pre-empted by the occurrence of another event 
c, which nonetheless causes e. So, for instance, suppose that two men Mr White and Mr Pink, 
independently of each other, are set on killing Osama bin Laden (Psillos 2002: 97). The case 
is such that they both make similar arrangements to kill Osama: 
 
Mr White fires his rifle; the bullet takes its course and strikes Osama in the head. 
Osama dies. Mr Pink was ready to fire his rifle, and had he fired it, given his position, 
his shooting skills, and so on, the bullet would have also struck Osama in the head, 
leading to his death. But Mr White’s shot scares off Mr Pink, who then flees the 
scene. Mr Pink’s shot is a potential alternative cause of Osama’s death: it was pre-
empted by Mr White’s shot, but had it not been pre-empted, it would have caused Mr 
Smith’s death. 
 
Cases such as these demonstrate that there can be causation without counterfactual 
dependence because Osama’s death is not counterfactually dependent on Mr White’s shot. 
It’s not because if Mr White had not fired his shot then Mr Pink would have fired his own 
and Osama would have died anyway.  
 The Lewisian notion of chains of actual counterfactually dependent events deals with 
cases of pre-emption like this. There is, if we introduce plausible intermediate events, such a 
chain between Mr White’s shot and Osama’s death, while there is not such a chain between 
Mr Pink’s possible shot and Osama’s death.  
 
                                                
42 We are only discussing cases of early, asymmetrical pre-emption and will not be covering the 
more recondite cases of late pre-emption and symmetrical overdetermination.  
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Take an intermediate event d (e.g., that the bullet passed in between two trees) 
between Mr White’s shot c and Osama’s death e. Then e is causally dependent on d 
and d on c. And <c,d,e> is a causal chain and it is in virtue of this chain that c caused 
e. 
 
There is no such chain between Mr Pink’s shot and Osama’s death.  
 There is a problem here however. One may doubt that the effect e counterfactually 
depends on the intermediate event d. That is, one might think this way: if d had been absent, 
c would also have been absent, since d is there because c caused it to be; but then c* would 
have occurred and caused e. In order to block this, Lewis denies the counterfactual, “if d had 
been absent, c would also have been absent.” He calls such a thing a “backtracking 
counterfactual,” because it would make a temporally prior event be counterfactually 
dependent on a temporally posterior event. 
  The counterfactual approach to causation may hold promise as a solution to the 
problem of mental causation.43 Some authors have suggested that overdetermination (see 
Section 3.4.4 below) is an option provided one endorses a Humean, counterfactual theory of 
causation (see Bennett 2003, Loewer 2007, and Harbecke 2008). Esfeld (2010) argues that 
“whatever stance one takes in the metaphysics of causation, one faces the problem of mental 
causation,” (Section 1). I compare the counterfactual account and the nomological account in 
Section 2.3.1 below.  
 
2.2.4 Probabilistic Causation 
The program of probabilistic causation is intended to characterize causes as events that 
change the probability of their effects. Here is Reichenbach’s early formulation: 
 
C is a cause of E if P(E|C) > P(E | ~C) 
                                                
43 In Section 3.8.2 I consider Marras’s (1993) counterfactual account of causal relevance. 
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In other words, C is a cause of E if the probability of the effect given the cause is greater than 
the probability of the effect absent the cause.  
As we have seen, it is important that any account of causation allow us to differentiate 
a purported cause that is merely correlated with an effect from an actual cause of the effect. 
The probabilistic account can make this differentiation in its own terms. Spurious 
correlations are discovered to be spurious when the purported cause is “screened off” by the 
common cause. D screens C off from E just in case:  
 
i. P(E|DC) = P(E|D~C)  
ii. P(E|~DC) = P(E|~D~C) 
 
This means that the probability of the effect given the screener off and the purported cause is 
equal to the probability of the effect given the screener off without the purported cause. Plus 
the probability of the effect given the purported cause absent the screener off is equal to the 
probability of the effect given neither the purported cause nor the screener off. And these 
two jointly sufficient conditions for screening off strike us as intuitively for the following 
reasons: if a purported cause is screened off then its purported effect would be unchanged 
from a situation in which the cause did not exist and the screener off did. Plus, if a cause is 
screened off then it makes sense that effect would be the same if there were neither screener 
off nor cause – the same as if there was the cause without the screener off.  
Consider an example. In the barometer case, the low atmospheric pressure D screens 
off the barometer C from the storm E i.e., makes C statistically irrelevant to E. We can 
understand this as follows. The probability of the storm is the same in the case in which we 
have the pressure with the normal barometer reading as it is in the case in which we have the 
pressure but the barometer reading fails and reads a false value.  Plus, another condition is 
  55 
 
met when the pressure D screens off the barometer C. The probability of the storm were 
there, counter to fact, a high atmospheric pressure with the barometer still reading low is the 
same as the probability of the storm were the atmospheric pressure high while the barometer 
reads high too. We see thereby that spurious correlations are those mere correlations in which 
the purported cause is screened off by the common cause. 
We may keep the discussion of probabilistic causation short because it is not likely to 
be of much use in the mental causation debate unless there were knowable probabilities 
associating reasons with and actions. Hempel (1942) does make an attempt to provide a 
framework for using probabilities in historical explanation, but the project seems like a long 
shot in history as well as in action.  
 
2.2.5 Process Theories of Causation 
Hume challenges us to give a philosophical account of any connection between cause and 
effect. In order to meet Hume’s challenge, process theories introduce considerable 
conceptual novelty. For instance, Salmon (1974, etc) talks about so-called “processes” as 
primitives and dispenses with events. A process is anything that has a structure and maintains 
a unity even as it undergoes slight changes. It is continuous: a process cannot be represented 
as a series of discrete events. The continuity of the process ultimately links up cause and 
effect (Salmon 1984: 156-7) in the way Hume thought impossible. Whereas events are 
localized in space and time, processes “have much greater temporal duration,” (1984: 139). In 
the language of special relativity, a process is represented by a world line in a Minkowski 
diagram, while an event is represented as a point. Processes “are the mechanisms that 
propagate structure and transmit causal influence in this dynamic and changing world… they 
provide the ties among the various spatiotemporal parts of our universe,” (1997: 66). Objects 
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that persist through time, therefore, are processes. So is a propagating wave. A rolling ball. 
Turning gears.  
 We were just now discussing causal processes. There are also such things as pseudo 
(causal) processes.  Differentiating the two is key. A causal process is one that transmits a 
mark and a pseudo causal process is one that does not. A mark is a modification to the 
structure of a process. For example, a moving car is a causal process while the shadow the car 
makes is not. Let’s say a process P is that which would remain uniform with respect to 
characteristic Q in the absence of other processes; and a process P is that for which Q would 
be manifest over an interval spanning both A and B (A not equal to B). Then a mark would 
consist of a modification from Q to Q* which has been introduced into process P by means 
of a single local interaction at point A and which is transmitted to B, (see 1984: 148). For 
example, a rotating beacon casts a white spot that moves around a circular wall. The spot is 
marked by interposing a red filter near the wall. This process is not causal. But we can put a 
red lens at the beacon which would be an interaction on our part which transmits its 
structure. As a result of this, the white spot turns red, by means of a single local interaction 
and remains so while it moves around the wall.  
 For another example of a causal interaction, consider the classic case of a collision 
between two billiard balls. Two processes, P1 with characteristic Q and P2 with characteristic 
R, interact at point S. It is a causal interaction and each are causal processes if P1 exhibits a 
modified characteristic Q* throughout an interval after S and P2 exhibits a modified 
characteristic R* throughout an interval after S. Salmon writes: “if two processes intersect in a 
manner that qualifies as a causal interaction, we may conclude that both processes are causal, 
for both processes have been marked (i.e., modified) in the intersection with the other and 
each process transmits the mark beyond the point of intersection,” (1984: 174). 
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 It has been noticed that process theories assume physicalism. They explore, after all, 
the physical mechanism by which things are brought about. Process theories are therefore not 
useful in the mental causation debate because they’ve already decided the question about any 
competition between mental and physical for causal efficacy. It’s been decided in favor of 
whatever physical realization neuroscientists can tell us is responsible for thinking and mental 
experience. 
 
2.2.6 Manipulationist and Interventionist Accounts of Causation 
Once unpopular and much maligned, manipulationist accounts have recently been improved. 
Now interventionist accounts offer an exciting and promising account of causal claims. At the 
core of all manipulationist (including interventionist) accounts is the thought that “if c is a 
cause of e then if I can manipulate c in the right way this should be a way of manipulating or 
changing e,” (Woodward 2009: 2). This thought is common to the early manipulationists 
including Gasking (1955), Collingwood (1940) and von Wright (1971); to recent versions, 
including Menzies and Price (1993); and to recent interventionist formulations, including 
Woodward (2003), Pearl (2000) and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993).  
Woodward (2003) argues that manipulationist notions of causation abound in 
experimental design and the sciences generally. For example, Cook and Campbell (1979) say 
in their highly influential book on experimental design: 
 
The paradigmatic assertion in causal relationships is that manipulation of a cause will result in the 
manipulation of an effect…. Causation implies that by varying one factor I can make 
another vary, (36, emphasis in the original). 
 
Consider, as well, the fact that the statistician Holland (1986) expressed his view in the slogan 
“no causation without manipulation.”  From the field of economics, Hoover (1988) says that 
the following “definition of cause is widely acknowledged”: 
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A causes B if control of A renders B controllable. A causal relation, then, is one that 
is invariant to interventions in A in the sense that if someone or something can alter 
the value of A the change in B follows in a predictable fashion (173, all quotations 
quoted in Woodward 2003:25). 
 
But manipulationist accounts have not fared well in the field of philosophy, until recently. Of 
the early manipulationists, Woodward (2009) writes: 
 
… their strategy has been to take as primitive the notion of manipulation (or some 
related notion like agency or bringing about an outcome as a result of free action), to 
argue that this notion is not itself causal (or at least does not presuppose all of the 
features of causality the investigator is trying to analyze), and to then attempt to use 
this notion to construct a non-circular reductive definition of what it is for a 
relationship to be causal, (4). 
 
So the idea was to stipulate as primitive some shared experience of human agency and reduce 
causation to some notion related to it, which itself would not be causal. However, early 
philosophical manipulationist accounts faced a variety of problems including circularity and 
anthropocentrism. For example, we worry about circularity when von Wright (1971) writes:  
 
… to think of a relation between events as causal is to think of it under the aspect of 
(possible) action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little misleading to say 
that if p is a (sufficient) cause of q, then I could produce p I could bring about q. For 
that p is the case of q, I have endeavored to say here, means that I could bring about 
q, if I could do (so that) p (74). 
 
We may object that “producing” and “doing” are already causal notions and so should not be 
appealed to in a reductive account of causation. In order to dodge the circularity, von Wright 
may reply that he was referring to a primitive, non-causal notion of experience with human 
agency. But then just what causes are is unhappily married to the anthropocentric notion of 
our experience of agency, which is itself arguably causal anyway.  
The recent interventionist program, for instance in Woodward (2003), does not 
depend on human agency; nor does it even attempt the reduction of causation to non-causal 
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notions. A theory does not have to be reductive to be illuminating with respect to “how 
causal concepts are interconnected,” Woodward (27) says.44 Additionally, Woodward adds a 
counterfactual aspect that the early manipulationists did not properly countenance.  
The basic idea can be put this way: 
 
A causes B if and only if B would change if an appropriate manipulation on A were to 
be carried out.  
 
Consider the familiar example in which atmospheric pressure, A, is a common cause of B, the 
reading of a barometer, and S, a variable representing the occurrence or non-occurrence of a 
storm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this diagram, B is represented as not being a cause of S. The interventionist 
account should be able to account for this in its own terms. And it does. Manipulate B 
directly and S does not change. Manipulate A and S indeed does change, which is the right 
answer. 
Woodward’s account can also handle familiar potential pre-emption cases. Consider 
again the gunmen case. “Gunman one shoots (c1) victim, causing his death, d, while gunman 
                                                
44 Woodward has the virtue of isolating the concepts of a total, direct and contributing cause. 
However, there is not the space to reconstruct the discussion.  
Figure 4 
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two does not shoot but would have shot (c2) also causing d, if c1 had not occurred,” 
(Woodward 2009: 25). 
 
If we fix (via an intervention) the behavior of gunman two at its actual value (he does 
not shoot), then an independent intervention that alters whether gunman one shoots 
will alter whether victim dies, thus identifying c1 as the actual cause of e, despite the 
absence of counterfactual dependence (of the usual sort) between d and c1,” (25-26). 
 
Woodward’s basic idea is that the claim “X causes Y” means that at least for some 
individuals (tokens) there is some manipulation of or intervention on the value of the variable 
X that they posses such that in the right conditions the value of the variable Y changes for 
the individual possessing it. Obviously, much depends on getting “conditions” of 
intervention right. We need to specify what other variables, if any, are held fixed when X is 
manipulated.45  
Just what counts as an intervention is “a matter of some delicacy,” (Woodward 200x: 
yz). We may think of an intervention on X with respect to Y as a causal process that changes 
X in such a way and under conditions such that any change in Y occurs only in virtue of Y’s 
relationship to X.  
 
Heuristically, we may think of the allowable changes to X (interventions, as we have 
been calling them) as processes that satisfy whatever conditions must be met in an 
ideal experiment designed to determine whether X causes Y, (Woodward 2003: 46).  
 
Consider the barometer example again. We can randomly change the value of B by 
directly manipulating the dial from either high to low. “[T]he intervention ‘breaks’ the 
previously existing endogenous causal relationship between A and B,” (46). But this example 
can now be used to illustrate more about interventions per se. 
                                                
45 Different possibilities give different concepts of causation, including total, direct and 
contributing cause. 
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This example illustrates the idea that interventions involve exogenous46 changes in the 
variable intervened on. When an intervention occurs on B, the value of B is 
determined entirely by the intervention, in a way that is … independent of the value 
of A.  
 
In other words, “In this sense, the interventions need to be surgical” which means the 
intervention does not have untoward causal consequences, i.e., “that no other causal 
relationships in the system are changed,” (Woodward 2009: 16) 
An intervention I on a variable X is always “defined with respect to a second variable 
Y (the intent being to use the notion of an intervention on X with respect to Y to 
characterize what it is for X to cause Y,” (citation). Such an intervention must completely 
disrupt the causal history of X, as we said in the barometer example. Also I must not itself 
directly cause Y unless through a route that includes X; and I should not be caused by any 
cause that affects Y via a route that does not go through X. Woodward (2003) lays out other 
conditions in greater detail. 
Woodward is primed to offer an attempt at solving the problem of mental causation. 
In fact at the end of his book (2003) he makes an advertisement to that effect: “Even a very 
casual reader of work in philosophy of psychology, for example, will be struck by the extent 
to which current discussions of everything from reduction to mental content are still hostage 
to DN-inspired ideas. It is natural to wonder how these problems would look in other 
frameworks for thinking about cause and explanation,” (Woodward 2003: 375). 
                                                
46 The interventionist theory only works on non-closed systems such that interventions can be 
made exogenously, i.e., from outside the system, so to speak. This has the result that the 
interventionist account cannot be used to model causal relationships within the entirety of the 
universe. Woodward replies that at the scale of the entire universe, the concept of something 
causing something else falls away as his theory would predict.  
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However, to my mind, Woodward remains one who gives an account of causal 
explanation – indeed of a very general, non discipline-specific causal explanation. But this is 
not causation as I am treating it here. An account of causation needs to keep causation as 
extensional and usually it will say what causal relations reduce to, whether it be laws or truth 
conditions of counterfactuals, etc. It will say what in virtue of which a cause is a cause. 
Woodward does not answer this question. 
 
§ 
 
2.3 Adopting a View 
There is a good amount of plausibility to the nomological account of causation. In any case, I 
adopt it for the sake of argument, since it is arguably Davidson’s position and that of his 
closest critics.47 Davidson’s view works with strict, exceptionless laws which make the effect 
necessary given the cause. A de facto regularity theory lacks the salient notion of necessity. In 
order to understand the difference between de facto regularities and the kind of laws 
Davidson appeals to we need a theory of causal laws and the necessity therein.  
I immediately below consider just one reason to favor the nomological account to the 
counterfactual account of causation. This is not a knock down argument. It’s just one 
relevant consideration in favor of the nomological theory. 
 
                                                
47 I am going to show in later sections that Davidson’s view, properly understood, does not suffer 
from the exclusion problem and also does not suffer from the qua problem. I will disambiguate 
two “in virtue of” questions and show that on either question Catastrophe is not entailed. Then in 
Chapter Five I am going to switch gears and deny the implied directionality of what’s in virtue of 
what in the metaphysical “in virtue of” question. This may not be an answer to the question but it 
is a response to it.  
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2.3.1 The Nomological Approach Versus the Counterfactual Approach 
A counterfactual theory of causation is a promising attempt. There may be a worry that it 
presupposes a nomological account. I wish to hold the nomological account for the sake of 
exploring the qua problem. But perhaps a counterfactual account is just as good. Immediately 
below, we will discover that there are good reasons to believe that the counterfactual 
approach itself requires reference to laws, which is one prima facie reason to not give up the 
nomological approach for the counterfactual approach.   
The counterfactual approach to causation has intuitive plausibility. The space heater’s 
short-circuiting caused the fire. Why do we say that? Because if the space heater had not 
short-circuited, the fire would not have occurred. What is the basis of saying that c caused e? 
It is that had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. The same hold for situations 
involving intentional action. On what basis do we think that George’s thirst caused him to go 
to the fridge? On the basis that we believe that if George had not been thirsty, then George 
would not have gone to the fridge. As Kim writes, “In confidently making these ordinary 
causal assertions or counterfactual claims, we seem entirely unconcerned about the question 
whether there are laws about [being thirsty and going to the fridge.]”  
However, just having counterfactuals at hand is not enough to build a theory on. That 
“c caused e” cannot be grounded on the fact that “if c had not occurred, e would not have 
occurred” because they are two different ways of saying the same thing, Kim argues (2006: 
190). “Neither can ground the other; that is, neither could be offered as an explanation of 
how the other could be true,” (190). But perhaps an account of mental causation can be built 
in terms of what makes the mental-physical counterfactuals true. The semantics of 
counterfactuals – the conditions under which counterfactuals can be evaluated as true or false 
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– come in two main varieties (neither is without controversy). There is (1) the nomic-
derivational approach and (2) the possible worlds approach.     
On the nomic-derivational approach, the counterfactual conditional “If P were the 
case, Q would be the case” is true just in case the consequent, Q, of the conditional can be 
logically derived from its antecedent, P, taken together with the laws and the conditions 
holding of the situation. Consider an example: “If this match had been struck, it would have 
lighted.” This counterfactual is true because its consequent “The match lighted,” can be 
derived from its antecedent, “The match was struck,” in conjunction with the law “Whenever 
a dry match is struck in the presence of oxygen it lights,” plus the auxiliary premises “The 
match was dry” and “There was oxygen present,” (See Kim 2006: 191-192). The relative 
plausibility of this approach does not constitute a reason to give up the nomological approach 
because it too makes essential reference to laws. So let’s consider the possible worlds 
approach.  
  According to the possible worlds approach to the semantics of counterfactuals, the 
counterfactual “If P were the case, Q would be the case” is true just in case Q is true in the 
world in which P is true and that, apart from P’s being true there, is as much like the actual 
world as possible. (To put it another way: Q is true in the closest P-world.) In other words, 
we go through the following steps in order to see whether or not a counterfactual is true. 
Since we are dealing with something counter-to-fact, the antecedent, P, is false in the actual 
world. Then, as Kim relates it: 
 
We must go to a possible world in which P is true and see whether Q is also true 
there. But there are many worlds in which P is true – that is, there are many P-worlds 
– and in some of these Q is true and in other false. So which P-world should we pick 
in which to check on Q? The answer: Pick the P-world that is the most similar, or the 
closest, to the actual world.  
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So in other words, the counterfactual “If P were true, Q would be true,” is true if Q is true in 
the closest P-world; it’s false otherwise. But which is the world most similar to the actual 
world?  
 Again, consider the example of striking a match. The counterfactual is “If this match 
had been struck, it would have lighted.” So in the actual world the match was not struck. We 
need to imagine or suppose a world in which the match was struck while keeping other 
conditions the same as the actual world as much as possible. As Kim reminds us, “Certain 
other conditions must also be altered under the counterfactual supposition that the match 
was struck: For example, in the actual world the match lay motionless in the matchbox and 
there was no disturbance of the air in its vicinity, so these conditions would have to be 
changed to keep the world consistent as a whole,” (192). But in the world we have picked we 
should not suppose that the match is wet or that there is a deficit of oxygen. So in the world 
we are thinking of, the match is moved and air disturbed and the match is struck while the 
match is dry and there is sufficient oxygen. The question then is, does the match light? In 
asking this question we are asking which of the following two worlds is closer to the actual 
world: 
 
W1: The match was struck; it was dry; oxygen was present; the match lighted. 
W2: The match was struck; it was dry; oxygen was present; the match did not  
light.  
 
It seems that W1 is closer to the actual world thereby making the counterfactual true. But why 
do we judge W1 as more similar to the actual world? Kim’s answer: “Because we believe that 
in the actual world there is a lawful regularity to the effect that when a dry match is struck in 
the presence of oxygen it ignites, and W1, but not W2, respects this regularity,” (192). So in 
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judging that W1 is closer to the actual world than W2 is we are making use of a lawful 
regularity.   
 So once again we lack a good reason to leave behind the nomological account of 
causation. One thing we have learned, however, is that the possible worlds approach to the 
semantics of counterfactuals allows us to account for causation with reference to non-strict 
laws. They are non-strict laws that we appeal to when making similarity judgments between 
worlds. But this is not a decisive reason to leave behind our nomological account of causation 
which refers to strict laws. “For,” as Kim says, “it may well be that these nonstrict laws are 
possible only if strict laws are possible and that where there are no underlying strict laws that 
can explain them or otherwise ground them, they remain only rough, fortuitous correlations. 
It may well be that their lawlike appearance is illusory and that this makes them incapable of 
grounding causal relations,” (194). We cannot know that nonstrict laws are any better than 
correlations or cases of common cause unless the nonstrict laws are backed by strict laws 
which rule out such eventualities.  
 
§ 
 
2.4 On Causal Laws 
The questions “What is causation?” and “What is a law of nature?” are separate questions 
even if the answer to the first question is that causation reduces to something about laws of 
nature. Having adopted the nomological account of causation according to which causation is 
related to laws do I need to come to a position on the nature of laws? Not necessarily.  
However, as I said above, Davidson’s view works with strict, exceptionless laws which make 
the effect necessary given the cause. A de facto regularity theory lacks the salient notion of 
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necessity. In order to understand the difference between de facto regularities and the kind of 
laws Davidson appeals to we need a theory of causal laws and the necessity therein. 
So, I discuss causal laws here in advance of what I say in Chapter Five about the 
bruteness of causal relations with respect to the causal laws supposedly backing them. 
 
2.4.1 Introduction  
We are familiar with the widespread and relatively plausible idea that causal relations are 
backed by regularities of some kind. Token causal interactions are backed by regularities. 
Philosophers take these regularities to be either de facto regularities or lawful regularities that 
necessitate e given c.  
Here is Beebee (2004) summarizing a key trend in the literature on laws: 
 
There are two main camps in the debate about the metaphysics of laws of nature.48 In 
one corner, there is the anti-Humean view of David Armstrong: laws are relations of 
necessity between universals. And in the other corner, there is the Ramsey-Lewis 
view: laws are generalizations which figure in the most economical true axiomization 
of all the particular matters of fact that obtain… The debate between the rival camps 
can be read as a debate about whether or not supervenience holds for laws of nature: 
whether or not nomic facts supervene on non nomic facts, [i.e.,] to put it in Lewis-
esque terms, whether or not laws supervene on the overall distribution of particular 
matters of fact (250). 
 
Whether or not supervenience holds is a matter of what depends on what. The Humeans 
affirm supervenience of laws on non-nomic “local matters of particular fact” and the non-
Humeans deny the same while affirming the supervenience of causal facts on laws. In a 
slogan, Humeans say two worlds cannot differ with respect to laws without differing with 
respect to local matters of particular fact. And non-Humeans say two worlds cannot differ 
with respect to local matters of particular fact without differing with respect to laws, in the 
                                                
48 There are actually more camps then she countenances, but contrasting these two is important. 
 
  68 
 
sense that the supervening items are dependent on the subvening base. Let’s turn to the 
Humean position first.   
 
2.4.2 Humeanism and Regularities 
There is Humeanism about causation and there is Humeanism about laws. They are related 
but it’s important to keep them distinct. According to Psillos’s (2002) treatment, the 
“regularity view of causation,” or RVC, is a good general Humean view on causation.  
 
RVC:   
(a) causation is a species of regularity 
 (b) the species of regularity that causation reduces to are laws of nature. 
 
Now, Humeanism about laws, i.e., the regularity view of laws, RVL, goes as follows: 
 
RVL: 
  (c) laws of nature are regularities. 
 
It is important to note that RVL does not entail RVC. You can hold (c) and deny (a) as well 
as (b).  However, RVC does trivially entail RVL. If you say causes depend on laws, you had 
better have a view on laws.  
Let’s begin to present the general characteristics of a Humean view on laws by 
starting with a naïve regularity view of laws. According to such a regularity view of laws, laws 
are regularities or generalizations connecting types of events. How does the naïve RVL 
address the canonical issue of differentiating between generalizations that are merely 
accidental and those that are actually laws? There is a clear difference, after all, between the 
regularity that all apples in the bowl are red and the regularity that all metals expand when 
heated.  Both are regularities but the latter strikes us as a candidate for lawhood while the 
former does not.  
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The Humean tradition says there are no necessary connections between events; it 
“bans objective necessity from nature,” (Psillos 2002, p 139). So, not being able to say the 
laws are the necessarily true generalizations (and the accidental generalizations accidental), the 
Humean tradition has an especially hard time with this issue of differentiating accidents (as 
I’ll call them for short) and laws.  
 According to the Humean view, when it’s said it’s a law that metals expand when 
heated, what’s meant is that there is in nature a regularity according to which when metal gets 
heated, it expands. There is no necessity in the regularity because it is logically possible that a 
metal is heated and yet does not expand. But accidents are regularities as well and we still 
need something differentiating them; laws and accidents need differing treatments.  
How can the naïve RVL explain the differences? Well, only by no longer being a 
naïve view. The more sophisticated view will say that laws are regularities plus something else. I’ll 
call it “an extra bit.” And the sophistication will come from saying what this something else 
or “extra bit” is. 
 To formalize, let’s say the naïve RVL holds: 
 
It is a law that all Fs are Gs if and only if all Fs are Gs. 
 
Some preliminary sophistication that can be added to the naïve view includes holding that a 
statement, L, is a statement of a law of nature if and only if: 
 
• L is universally quantified 
• L is true everywhere and across time 
• L contains only natural-kind predicates, besides connectives and quantifiers. 
 
This is a good start, but it is still unable to deal with Reichenbach’s now classic accidental 
generalization: “All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile.” This statement has all the 
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required features just listed, but it is still arguably different than the following law, which is 
not merely accidental: “All uranium cubes are smaller than one cubic mile.” It’s only a 
contingent lack of interest and resources that prevents us from constructing a cube of gold a 
mile wide, high and deep. But we could not possibly create a cube of uranium those 
dimensions even if we had the resources and interest. That much uranium would be over the 
element’s critical mass and it would explode long before arriving at those dimensions. 
 The upshot here is that an accident lacks the “extra bit” a law has. A law doesn’t 
merely state that things are such and such a way. A law doesn’t merely say that all Fs are Gs; 
rather, a law also says that were a non-F thing to become an F thing then it would also 
become G, or, in any case, and less contentiously, a law makes a claim about counterfactuals. 
 Among the sophisticated Humean views, David Lewis’s Best System Account is, 
among other things, a powerful attempt to account for the laws’ counterfactual support that 
accidents lack.49   
 
2.4.3 Lewis’ Best Systems Account 
Lewis’ view has an ancestry in Mill’s approach. In thinking about how to “ascertain the laws 
of nature,” Mill said: 
 
According to one mode of expression, the question, What are the laws of nature? may 
be stated thus: What are the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being granted, 
the whole existing order of nature would result? Another mode of stating it would be 
thus: What are the fewest general propositions from which all the uniformities which 
exist in the universe might be deductively inferred? (1911: 207) 
 
                                                
49 The idea of laws as the “best” axioms of a deductive system goes back to Mill (1843) and was 
first defended in contemporary times by Ramsey (1928). It was made popular by Lewis (1973, 
1983, 1994).  
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Lewis’ version or “mode of expression,” goes something like this. Laws are those regularities 
(the regularities that aren’t laws are accidents) that are “members of coherent system of 
regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system”50 
striking the best balance between simplicity and strength, where the deductive system “results 
in” or “deductively explains” the total universe of local, particular matters of fact. This 
implies that “no regularity taken in isolation can be characterized as a law. Lawlikeness cannot 
be ascribed to a regularity in isolation from other regularities,” (Psillos 2002: 149) that play a 
part in the explanation.  Further, simplicity and strength are virtues of explanatory, theoretical 
systems and they pull in different directions. A system should be as informative as possible 
(have the highest degree of strength) but simultaneously be as simple as that strength will 
allow. As Lewis elegantly puts it: 
 
The virtues of simplicity and strength tend to conflict. Simplicity without strength can 
be had from pure logic, strength without simplicity from (the deductive closure of) an 
almanac… What we value in a deductive system is a properly balanced combination 
of simplicity and strength – as much as truth and our way of balancing will permit 
(1973: 73). 
 
Lewis’ account holds, more formally: 
 
It is a law that all Fs are Gs if and only if (i) all Fs are Gs, and (ii) that all Fs are Gs is 
an axiom or theorem in the best (balanced for simplicity and strength) deductive 
system.51 
 
 The best system view is in keeping with what’s called “Humean supervenience,”52 
which is “the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of 
                                                
50 This is not actually Lewis’ own mode of expression but that of Psillos (2002). 
 
51 Or, if there is no unique best deductive system, then that it is an axiom in all deductive systems 
that tie in terms of simplicity and strength. 
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particular fact, just one little thing and then another (Lewis 1986, p. ix). As the Beebee 
quotation above indicated the Humeanism of the best systems view has it that the laws 
supervene on “local matters of particular fact.” In a slogan, the regularities depend on the 
local matters of particular fact and their lawfulness is dependent on their having a role in the 
best deductive system explaining all those local matters of particular fact. 
Lewis’ account makes a good case for how to differentiate between accidents and 
laws. Those true regularities that are nevertheless accidents get eliminated by the strength and 
simplicity requirement. “All apples in this bowl are red,” and “All gold cubes are less than 1 
cubic mile,” might be true regularities, never falsified in the life of the universe, but they 
won’t play a role in the simplest deductive system that would explain all local, particular 
matters of fact. 
 Lewis’ account answers in a unique way the question of what makes a law the law that 
it is. The view says a law is a regularity that plays a role in the network of laws that makes up 
the deductive system. But the simplicity and strength requirement has moved some critics to 
accuse Lewis’ best system account of mind-dependence. 
Psillos says there are two questions here: “The first is whether the web of laws 
approach makes laws mind-dependent. The second is whether there is a worldly feature that 
makes some regularities laws.” Loewer (1996) answers that the lawfulness of the regularities 
might be mind-dependent but the regularities themselves (which are the same as the laws 
missing the “extra bit”) are not mind-dependent. The regularities we write down when we 
collect patterns do form a system. That is, the objects and properties in the world have an 
objective nomological structure. The patterns they make can be said to depend on the way 
                                                                                                                                             
52 There are many different formulations of the general idea of Humean supervenience. The 
literature on “Humean Supervenience” is quite large and diverse. But see Earman (1984) and 
Loewer (2004). 
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the world is. The regularities are the regularities that they are in virtue of the (brute) way the 
world is. And: “These relations can be captured by relations of deductive entailment” (p. 154) 
in an ideal deductive system of our (future) knowledge of the world, balanced in the right way 
with the right theoretical virtues of simplicity and strength. So in the last analysis, a regularity 
is regularity in virtue of the world but a regularity is nomological, i.e., is a law, in virtue of being 
a part of this network of regularities (themselves thereby laws) in the best system. 
 
2.4.4 The Necessitarians 
However, the non-Humean critic replies that to treat laws this way leaves out a lot of what we 
usually understand by “laws of nature.” As Carroll (1994) says, just intuitively speaking we 
usually conceive of laws as guiding or “governing” the relations between events that populate 
the universe. Laws are seen as responsible for the patterns or regularities not merely identical to 
them. To take laws as the more basic, “more primitive” entity which determines the local 
particular matters of fact among events is the non-Humean strategy of Armstrong (1983), 
Dretske (1977) and Tooley (1984).53 On accounts like this, there is a relation of universal 
necessity between types or universals. 
 
Suppose it to be a law that Fs are Gs. F-ness and G-ness are taken to be universals. A 
certain relation, a relation of non-logical or contingent necessitation, holds between 
F-ness and G-ness. This state of affairs may be symbolized as ‘N(F,G)’ (1983: 85). 
 
Notice N is not just a generalization holding between F and G, it is a relation holding 
between two things other than F and G, namely F-ness and G-ness. As Carroll (2010) says, 
“… a law is not just a universal generalization, but is an entirely different creature — a 
                                                
53 As the Beebee citation above says, the non-Humeans and the Humeans can be usefully 
described as disagreeing on whether or not nomic facts supervene on non-nomic facts.  
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relation holding between two other universals.” Armstrong’s framework is also consistent 
with lawhood not supervening on local matters of particular fact. This is a denial of Humean 
supervenience, which often goes with the universals approach. 
 
2.4.5 Evaluating the Humean and Non-Humean Theories 
Let’s compare these two. Against BSA it is argued that BSA injects a sort of mind-
dependence that is undesirable. We will return to that. Against the non-Humean 
necessitarians, there is leveled the “identification problem” and the “inference problem.” 
Basically, just what the lawmaking relation is needs to be specified (the identification 
problem). Then, it still remains to be seen if it is suited to the task (the inference problem). 
Does N's holding between F and G entail that Fs are Gs? 
In this regard, Lewis writes the following against the necessitarians: 
 
“Whatever N may be, I cannot see how it could be absolutely impossible to have 
N(F,G) and Fa without Ga. (Unless N just is constant conjunction, or constant 
conjunction plus something else, in which case Armstrong's theory turns into a form 
of the regularity theory he rejects.) The mystery is somewhat hidden by Armstrong's 
terminology. He uses ‘necessitates’ as a name for the lawmaking universal N; and who 
would be surprised to hear that if F ‘necessitates’ G and a has F, then a must have G? 
But I say that N deserves the name of ‘necessitation’ only if, somehow, it really can 
enter into the requisite necessary connections. It can't enter into them just by bearing 
a name, any more than one can have mighty biceps just by being called ‘Armstrong’” 
(1983: 366). 
 
Here Lewis makes what I take to be a classically Humean move. He denies that we can see or 
experience necessity. He also nicely exposes the fact that Armstrong can name his relation 
“necessitation” but that alone will not make it a necessary relation. 
Another dimension on which theories differ is the question of what determines what. 
The necessitarians deny that laws supervene on local matters of fact. Instead, of course, the 
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necessitarians want to say that laws determine causes and are metaphysically responsible for 
making causes what they are.  
The Humean takes it the other way around and with a twist. Laws are determined by 
causes (taken as regularities in matters of fact) in this sense that the BSA details. However, 
aside from mind dependence Humeans have a challenge in the cases brought against them 
that turn on the intuition about laws determining local matters of fact. 
There are some important cases that appear to show that local matters of fact do not 
determine the laws. Tooley’s (1977) “not yet (or never) interacting particles” example: 
 
The interaction of X and Y particles have not been studied because conditions are 
such that they never will interact. Nevertheless, it seems that it might be a law that, 
when X particles and Y particles interact, P occurs. Similarly it might be a law that 
when X and Y particles interact, Q occurs. There seems to be nothing about the local 
matters of particular fact in this world that fixes which of these generalizations is a 
law. 
 
Carroll’s case features two possible worlds, U1 and U2 which he says are the same with 
respect to local matters of fact: 
  
L1, the generalization that all X particles subject to a Y field have spin up, could be a 
law of U1. 
 
What is new about U2 is that when b enters the Y field at time t it does not acquire 
spin up. … Of course, there must be at least one more difference between these two 
worlds. Though L1 could be a law in U1, L1 could not be a law of U2; L1 is not true 
in U2. There is nothing particularly remarkable about either U1 or U2 — nothing to 
make a Humean suspicious. But here is the catch: It is natural to think that L1's status 
as a law in U1 does not depend on the fact that b entered that Y field at time t. 
 
Both of these thought experiment are aimed at the Humean. In Tooley’s it appears intuitively 
that the local particular matters of fact do not determine what the laws are. These two 
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particles have never interacted, so there is no fact about how they interact, yet it remains 
intuitively plausible that there is a law governing what they would do were they to interact. 
  I do not intend to make any knockdown arguments here against any view in the law 
of nature literature. But I do have one thought about Tooley’s case for the Humean. Tooley 
fails to emphasize that we are talking about laws and local particular matters of fact over all of 
time – the whole time scale. To do so insures that we are not talking metaphysically about 
how we discover laws nor about how we explain events by appeal to laws. Rather we are 
talking about laws and patterns in their most complete sense. With this in mind then the 
stipulation that two particles have never collided means they never will collide. And if they never 
will collide it seems intuitive, at least to me, that there would be no law describing their 
colliding-behavior.  
 
§ 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have discussed causation per se, causal explanation, scientific explanation 
and the literature on the laws of nature. We return throughout the dissertation to the notions 
laid out here.
  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 THE METAPHYSICS OF THE EXCLUSION PROBLEM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the following section, I lay out the exclusion problem for an anonymous or general non-
reductive physicalist. I am not below describing anomalous monism; that will happen in 
Section 3.9.5 below. Furthermore, I do not endorse the premises of the exclusion argument 
except for the sake of getting Kim’s position out on the table.  
I give a brief formulation here, then consider the history of the mind-body problem. 
And then return to consider only a few pros and cons for each premise in Kim’s argument. 
 
3.2 Brief Formulation of the Exclusion Problem 
In the philosophy of mind literature, the exclusion problem arises from relatively plausible 
theses that nevertheless seem to conflict with one another. 
   
  Mental Causation: Mental events cause physical events.  
  Physical Causal Closure: Each physical event, insofar as it has a cause, has a sufficient 
physical cause. 
  Non-Reduction: Mental events neither reduce to physical events nor are identical with 
them. 
  Non-Overdetermination: Physical events are not pervasively overdetermined, i.e., they are 
not subject to multiple sufficient causes. 
 
  78 
We are concerned with a problem that arises for those who – call them non-reductive 
physicalists – would affirm these four theses.54 We are not concerned at the moment with why 
they would affirm them, although they are all prima facie plausible and in any case widely 
held. Briefly, Mental Causation is meant to be the phenomenon needing to be explained. If it is 
denied, then Catastrophe follows. Non-Reduction is desirable, as well as plausible, according to 
many theorists. It is desirable as one way to protect the autonomy of explanations that refer 
to mental properties, or mental events, under mental descriptions; and it is plausible 
according to philosophical arguments such as the multiple realizability argument. Physical 
Causal Closure is a widely held and plausible commitment for physicalists. It says, roughly, for 
any event (of any type) that has a cause, that cause is a sufficient physical cause.55  
Why is there the Non-Overdetermination thesis? Physical Causal Closure did not rule out 
multiple sufficient causes. However, many philosophers have been quick to note that multiple 
sufficient causes is implausible. To this end we assert the Non-Overdetermination thesis. It says 
that events are not subject to widespread overdetermination, meaning very rarely is any event 
caused by two sufficient causes. These each will be discussed in greater detail below in 
Section 3.9.4 below. 
 
§ 
 
3.3 A Brief History of the Mind Body Problem 
3.3.1 Descartes, Elizabeth and Leibniz 
                                                
54 In this formulation I leave any distinction between token and type ambiguous because Kim 
does. Part of the reason anomalous monism dodges the exclusion problem, discussed below, 
involves properly countenancing the token-type distinction so it would not do to introduce it too 
early. 
 
55 There are a variety of more or less sophisticated formulations of the causal closure of the 
physical, but this one is sufficient for our purposes. See Papineau (2002).  
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Princess Elizabeth forced Descartes to attempt an account of psychophysical interaction. The 
two corresponded while Descartes was writing his Principles, which is dedicated to her. He 
wrote the Passions in large part as a response to her probing questions.56 Most significantly 
Elizabeth asked Descartes: “Given that the soul of a human being is only a thinking 
substance, how can it affect the bodily spirits, in order to bring about voluntary actions?” The 
question was pertinent because Descartes had described the mind as exclusive of extension, 
yet held that how a thing moves depends on “how much it is pushed, the manner in which it 
is pushed or the surface-texture or shape of the thing that pushes it,” which require contact 
or touch – impossible for an immaterial substance. Descartes made a response that left many 
unconvinced and the mind-body problem had started.57    
 
3.3.2 The 1950s and Behaviorism 
Cartesianism, in one form or another, ruled the day until the 1950s when behaviorism put 
forth a challenge that ended in a dialectical stalemate. As Lycan (2008)58 writes:  
                                                
56 See Smith (2010). 
 
57 Any attempt to somehow have the mind move matter in the realm of bodies would break the 
law of conservation of quantity of motion.  Descartes was not without resources to respond, 
however. Leibniz made a friendly reconstruction of Descartes’ argument such that indeed the 
physical system was closed with respect to conservation of quantity of motion. The affect that the 
mind had was on the directional vector of the unit of quantity of motion. Thus, Leibniz argued, 
the mind’s causal power was constituted by this special kind of influence on the physical world: 
“Descartes knew that minds could not at all give force onto bodies because there is always the 
same quantity of force in matter. Therefore, he held that the mind could change the direction of 
bodies. But this is because in his time they did not know of the law of nature that conserves the 
total direction of matter [momentum].” Translation by D.F.; the original passage is: “Descartes a 
reconnu que les âmes ne peuvent point donner de la force aux corps parce qu’il y a toujours la 
même quantité de force dans la matière. Cependant il a cru que l’âme pouvoit changer la direction 
des corps. Mais c’est parce qu’on n’a point su de son temps la loi de la nature qui porte encore la 
conservation de la même direction totale dans le matière.”  
 
58 Whom I follow closely here. 
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Until the 1950s… the philosophy of mind was dominated by Descartes’s “first-
person” perspective, our view of ourselves from the inside. With few exceptions, 
philosophers had accepted the following claims: (1) that one’s own mind is better 
known than one’s body, (2) that the mind is metaphysically in the body’s driver’s seat, 
and (3) that there is at least a theoretical problem of how we human intelligences can 
know that “external,” everyday objects exist at all, even if there are tenable solutions 
to that problem. 
 
Lycan says that for a number of reasons substance dualism of the Cartesian variety lost some 
favor: 
 
The first reason was the accumulated impact of logical positivism and the verification 
theory of meaning. Intersubjective verifiability or testability became the criterion both 
of scientific probity and of linguistic meaning itself. If the mind, in particular, was to 
be respected either scientifically or even as meaningfully describable in the first place, 
mental ascriptions would have to be pegged to publicly, physically testable verification 
conditions. Science takes an intersubjective, third-person perspective on everything; 
the traditional first-person perspective had to be abandoned for scientific purposes 
and, it was felt, for serious metaphysical purposes also.  
 
Behaviorism (see, for example Ryle [1949]) was the first main competitor against dualism. 
According to behaviorism, mental state ascriptions simply mean something about 
dispositions to behave in a certain way in response to environmental stimuli. So, for example, 
“He is in pain,” just means that he is disposed to grimace-behavior, and the like. In this way, 
no reference is made to some insubstantial, non-observable, immaterial, unscientific Cartesian 
soul.  
 This kind of “analytical behaviorism” guarded its territory aggressively against “soft-
headed” types who would countenance an immaterial mind. However, some criticisms stuck. 
For one, it was argued that we pre-theoretically can introspect actual inner mental states 
which are not tied to any behavior or even disposition to behave. Place (1956) speaks of an 
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“intractable residue” of conscious experience that is unrelated to behavior in any way.59 
Secondly, the inverted qualia argument asserts that it is entirely possible for two persons to 
differ mentally, psychologically, or experientially while being the same in terms of behavior 
and dispositions to hypothetical behavior. It might be, after all, that when I see a red object I 
have the sort of color experience that you have when you see a green object, but we both call 
the object by the same name and interact with it in entirely the same ways. Finally, behavioral 
analyses of mental state ascriptions were shown to be circular or incomplete for tacitly relying 
on mental terms within the ostensible behavioral analysis. For example, as Lycan writes, “if 
Leo believes that parsnips are dangerous and he is offered parsnips, he would shun them but 
only if he does not want to die.” The “wanting” there is unanalyzed. 
 Lycan writes that there was a dialectical stalemate between dualism and behaviorism 
until the identity theory of Place (1956) and Smart (1959) offered an irenic solution and 
moved the discussion forward.  
 
3.3.3 Place and Smart 
According to Place, the “intractable residue” of consciousness is to be identified with 
neurophysiological states of their bearer’s central nervous system. However, Place remained a 
behaviorist about what we would call intentional states. “In the cognitive concepts like 
‘knowing,’ ‘believing,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘remembering,’ and volitional concepts like ‘wanting,’ 
and ‘intending,’ there can be little doubt, I think, that an analysis in terms of dispositions to 
behave (Wittgenstein 1953, Ryle 1949) is fundamentally sound,” (44). But the phenomenal 
quality of experience (perhaps including experience of intentional states) included an 
“intractable residue” that Place held could not be analyzed behavioristically. While 
                                                
59 Although, as we will see, Place is a behaviorist about intentional states. 
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behaviorism had some limited application, “On the other hand, there would seem to be an 
intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, 
sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process is unavoidable,” (44). These 
non-behaviouristic inner processes were to be identified with neurophysiological states, for 
instance c-fiber firings. Later Armstrong (1968) would identify intentional states as well with 
neurophysiological states.60 
On the identity account, then, to be in pain is to have your c-fibers firing and “to 
believe that broccoli will kill you is to have your Bbk-fibers firing,” writes Lycan. It is an irenic 
account because it countenances genuine inner, episodic mental states like the dualists, but 
unlike the dualists these states are identical to some neurophysiological state. And like the 
behaviorist the mental states are scientifically respectable for being so identified. But unlike 
the behaviorist, mental states are not at all associated with behaviors, nor with dispositions to 
behave.  
As Lycan writes: “By making the mental entirely physical, this identity theory of the 
mind shared the behaviorist advantage of avoiding the objections to dualism. But it also 
brilliantly accommodated the inner and the episodic as behaviorism did not.”61 
  
3.3.4 Functionalism and Multiple Realizability 
Quite soon it was realized that the identity theory was inadequate as a type-identity theory. If 
being in pain means to have c-fibers firing, then organisms with other biology and anatomy 
could not properly be said to be in pain. Putnam (1960, 1967a, 1967b) and Fodor (1968b) 
                                                
60 See also David Lewis (1966, 1972). 
 
61 The identity theory dodged the problems associated with both dualism and behaviorism. Plus 
Lewis and Armstrong independently offered, as well, a deductive argument for the identity 
theory. (See Lycan 2008 for details.) 
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argue for the appropriate fix. They argued that pain and other mental states were multiply 
realizable, that is, they could be realized by a wide variety of biological or physiological 
realizers. What mattered was not the realizer but the causal role or function being realized – 
the role of pain or other mental states.  
Functionalism argues that pain “tokens” are identical to physiological “tokens,” but 
the property of pain, or any other mental state types, are identical only to the role that pain or 
these other states play in the mental and behavioral economy of the agent. So functionalism 
asserted token identity but denied type identity on the grounds that mental types are multiply 
realizable.62  
Around the same time as functionalism, or actually 5-10 years later, another token 
identity view that denies type identities arose – namely, Davidson’s anomalous monism. The 
particulars of anomalous monism (as well as its troubles with the qua problem and the 
identification problem) are discussed below in Chapters Three and Four so we may skip over 
the details for now. Suffice it to say that anomalous monism signaled a shift in the state of the 
dialectic in the mind body problem. In time, non-reductive physicalist views (type-nonidentity 
views that nevertheless claimed physicalist bona fides) became the received wisdom.  
 
§ 
 
3.4 Formulation of the Exclusion Problem 
As promised we will now layout a more detailed formulation of Kim’s exclusion 
problem. 
                                                
62 Lycan (2008) gives further details on the various kinds of functionalism. Lewis (1972 and 1994) 
and Jackson, Pargetter and Prior (1982) argue from functionalism to type identity, for one 
instance. Also see Block (1980). 
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 (1. MC) Some mental events cause physical events.  
 (2. CP) Each physical event, insofar as it has a cause, has a sufficient physical 
cause.  
 (3. NI)  Mental events are nonidentical to physical events. 
 (4. NO) Physical events are not pervasively causally overdetermined. 
 
The problem is the four are inconsistent together, yet individually plausible. Anyone who 
holds these four theses – namely non-reductive physicalists – will have the exclusion 
problem. Let’s now take a less cursory look at each premise individually. I am assuming these 
propositions for the sake of argument. I’ll give a few considerations for or against each one. 
However, I am assuming them in the end in order to represent Kim’s formulation.   
 
3.4.1 First Premise 
The first premise is 
 
(MC) Some mental events cause physical events. 
 
 
There are considerable pressures to avoid dropping this premise in any attempt at 
consistency. The causal efficacy of the mental is after all the phenomenon we have tasked 
ourselves with accounting for.63 Let’s review a few different but interrelated reasons to hold 
this premise. 
Some will say that the causal efficacy of mentality, mental events and/or mental 
properties, is non-negotiable. We can see this by observing the extent to which it is fatal to a 
theory if it entails mental epiphenomenalism. 
                                                
63 There is evidently counterfactual dependence often enough between agents’ reasons and their 
actions. But the multiple reasons argument of Chapter One requires that the reason be a cause of 
the action, not merely correlated or related by counterfactual dependency. 
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But we should also ask a further question. Namely, why is it so important that causal 
efficacy be explained in our account and not eliminated? Why is it non-negotiable? I believe 
the answer lies in the practical significance of our reason explanation practices, which 
themselves refer to mental events as causes. 
Indeed, the project in the mental causation debate is to vindicate the legitimate and 
autonomous explanatory status of reason explanations or explanations of intentional actions. 
This, admittedly, is only one part of scientific psychology and even only one part of folk 
psychology. But it is the recalcitrant part, the part which has resisted a naturalistic accounting. 
Kim captures the non-negotiable status of this premise, that some mental events 
cause physical events, in his distinction between how and whether questions. He says the 
question of whether or not there is mental causation must be answered in the affirmative. 
Our task is to answer the question about how that actuality is possible. 
One final way in which this premise has been argued for has been to invoke G.E. 
Moore (for example in Bontly 2005). Mental causation, the fact of the causal efficacy of 
our mental events, is a “Moorean fact,” meaning it has more in its favor than anything you 
could say from philosophy suggesting its non-existence. As when Moore held up his hands 
and said “Here is a hand and here is another,” in his argument against external world 
skepticism, so too can participants reply to any skeptic about mental causation, “Here is some 
mental causation: I am making my finger move with my mind,” or some such. Mental 
causation is everywhere and is basic. 
I am, as I said, assuming the premise that mental events are causally efficacious in 
bringing about physical events. The debate treats it as non-negotiable. The proposition: 
“Some mental events cause physical events,” cannot be dropped. However, as I should 
hasten to add now, this does not mean that our interpretation of MC might not change 
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slightly. In what follows, it will be suggested, among other things, that MC be read as saying 
that mental event particulars but not the mental properties of those particulars are 
causally related to physical event particulars. This seems natural in a philosophical discussion. 
Of course, MC would change its meaning from one theory to another if those theories 
differed with respect to their theories of the causal relata. 
Furthermore, we might also add similar but slightly different premises and 
propositions. In the reconstruction of the qua problem it is often put forth that the premise 
we cannot intuitively do without is this: 
 
(MC*)  Mental events qua mental cause physical events. 
  
We will return to MC* in Chapter Four. 
 
3.4.2 Second Premise  
The second premise is: 
 
(CP) Each physical event, insofar as it has a cause, has a sufficient physical cause.  
 
 
This proposition – called “the causal closure of the physical” – entails that in principle an 
explanation of a physical event could be accomplished without reference to any non-physical 
cause. It has been argued that causal closure is a key tenet of any physicalist theory. One 
might argue that if any biological or psychological events are to have physical effects then 
they themselves must be physical events or constituted by physical events, causal closure 
implies.64 
                                                
64 The inference however does not logically follow. “If physical then causal” is fine. But there 
may be other ways of being causal. However, it is not my intention to challenge this premise of 
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 For a long while, causal closure functioned in important arguments in the philosophy 
of mind without being explicitly stated. According to Papineau (2002) we need only: 
 
… consider J.J.C. Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with 
brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which 
play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David 
Armstrong's (1968) argument that, since mental states are picked out by their causal 
roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be 
identical with those physical states. 
  
Smart’s, Lewis’s and Armstrong’s arguments assume something like causal closure. If 
something is not physical then it’s a dangler without causal efficacy. This is because the only 
way to have effects is to be physical.65 
Causal Closure can be resisted, but it is not my intention to attempt a direct refutation. 
For instance, there might be multiple sufficient causes for all Causal Closure says. Kim’s non-
overdetermination is discussed below. 
 
3.4.3 The Third Premise 
The third premise is:   
 
(NI) Mental events do not reduce to or are not identical with physical events. 
 
 
As discussed above, there are at least two main reasons philosophers have adopted 
nonidentity with respect to mentality and physicality. However, those two reasons, multiple 
realization and anomalism of the mental, lead to denying only type-identity. Token identity 
                                                                                                                                             
Kim’s exclusion problem. My challenge takes the form of introducing the distinction between 
tokens and types which Kim does not appropriately countenance.  
  
65 Again, this does not actually follow from the way Causal Closure is formulated.  
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can remain. In the due course of our discussion below, (NR) will have to be disambiguated as 
to the token-type distinction with respect to events.  
 
3.4.4 The Fourth Premise 
The fourth premise is generated after contemplation of the premise (CP), Causal Closure. 
The fourth premise is, of course, non-overdetermination:   
 
(NO) Physical events are not pervasively subject to multiple sufficient causes, or 
overdetermination. 
 
 
Causal closure, as it is written, does not rule out multiple sufficient causes. It does not 
exclude the effect also having a sufficient mental cause. If it also had a mental cause then we 
would have an event that was “overdetermined.” This would be analogous to some oft-cited 
examples. As Kim says, “A man is shot dead by two assassins whose bullets hit him at the 
same time; or a building catches fire because of a short circuit in the faulty wiring and a bolt 
of lightning that hits the building at the same instant,” (Kim 1993: 252). These are perhaps 
legitimate examples of overdetermination of an effect; but it is dissatisfying to imagine that a 
situation so statistically unlikely happens in every last case of mental causation. Every time I 
willed my arm to move and it moved, there would be a grand cosmic coincidence such that a 
neurophysiological state caused my arm to move, just at the same time as my willing caused 
my arm to move. Kim finds this unacceptable, and, so to disallow the possibility of 
overdetermination, he institutes his non-overdetermination principle. 
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 There are a number of moves available to a non-reductive physicalist that could 
embarrass the proponents of the non-overdetermination thesis. That is, overdetermination 
may not be a crazy view.66 But I am not pursuing the matter here. 
 
3.4.5 The Logic of the Exclusion Problem 
The four plausible theses are mutually inconsistent. And that is the problem. We could have a 
consistent account if we relinquished any one of these, but no such relinquishing is without 
cost. For the sake of thoroughness, here is the logic that supports the inconsistency claim.  
 
(1.MC) & (2.CP) & (3.NR) & entails ~(4.NO) 
 
That is, affirming (1), (2) and (3) seems to entail denying (4), which amounts to an implausible 
commitment to widespread overdetermination of all mentally caused events. 
 
(1.MC) & (2.CP) & (4.NO) entails ~(3.NR) 
  
 
Affirming (1), (2) and (4) seems to entail denying (3), which amounts to mental type 
reduction or identity. However, as we’ve discussed, there are good reasons to deny type 
reduction or identity. 
 
(1.MC) & (3.NR) & (4.NO) entails ~(2.CP) 
 
   
Affirming (1), (3) and (4) seems to entail denying (2), which denies a key tenet of physicalism. 
 
(3.NR)  & (2.CP) & (4.NO) entails ~(1.MC)  
 
  
                                                
66 See Sider (2003), Bernstein (manuscript), Bennett (2003), and Carey (2011) for discussions of 
the viability of overdeterminationism. 
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Affirming (2), (3) and (4) seems to entail denying (1), which denies the phenomenon to be 
captured.  
 Kim’s version of the exclusion problem concludes that no mental event ever causes 
any physical event. But in other places Kim has put forth the same argument plus a 
supervenience thesis. With the addition of a supervenience claim Kim concludes that no 
mental events cause any mental events. 
 
§ 
 
3.5 What is Supervenience? 
Supervenience is a philosophical notion that is meant to capture a certain metaphysical 
relation between properties or kinds of properties.67 It is most often supposed to be a 
determination or dependence relation, such that a variation in the supervening properties 
cannot occur (i.e., is impossible) without a variation in the subvenient or base properties. 
That is to say, the sets of properties must exhibit a pattern-like covariation. It was first 
proposed, with respect to the philosophy of mind, by Davidson  (1970).68 As Horgan (1993) 
writes in surveying these early days, philosophers took a great interest in the notion and 
developed all sorts of varieties of supervenience.69  
                                                
67 For example, pain is a token of the type of property called a mental property. Pain may be said 
to supervene on its subvenient base, or mental properties in general may be said to supervene on 
physical properties in general. 
 
68 See Hare (1952) and Moore (1922). 
 
69 “Davidson's invocation of supervenience in connection with the mind/body problem 
resonated strongly among philosophers working in philosophy of mind and metaphysics; there 
commenced a rapid and fairly widespread appropriation of supervenience into these branches of 
philosophy,” (Horgan 1993: 564). 
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As a preliminary definition we might say: A-properties supervene on B-properties “if 
and only if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also differing 
in their B-properties,” (Horgan 2002: 150). The B-properties fix the A-properties. In a slogan, 
no change in the A-properties without change in the B-properties.  
So, for example, “being healthy, a property instantiable by humans, plausibly is 
supervenient on physical features [of humans] such as percentage of body fat, level of 
cholesterol in the bloodstream, absence of cancerous tissue, and the like: i.e., if one human 
being is healthy and another is not they must also differ in some of these physical features,” 
(150). Your being unhealthy depends on your possessing one of the physical characteristics 
underlying ill health. Looked at the other way, if you possess any of the physical 
characteristics underlying ill health, then it is determined that you have the property of being 
unhealthy. 
The impossibility implied by the “cannot” in the above rough definition of the 
supervenience relation (“two objects cannot differ in mental properties without differing in 
physical properties”) invites a definition in modal terms of necessity and impossibility. 
Modality is often expressed in possible worlds talk such that we might say: A (short for A-
properties) supervenes on B if and only if in any possible world where A changes, there is a 
change in B. Or, put negatively, there is no possible world in which A changes, and B does 
not change. To say, “in any possible world,” is to say, “necessarily.” So we can rewrite the 
positive characterization of supervenience this way: “A supervenes on B if and only if 
necessarily where A changes, there is a change in B.”  Now, this possible worlds – or 
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necessity – claim can be cashed out either in metaphysical possibility, logical possibility, or 
nomological possibility.70 
We are now prepared to notice that multiple realizability of A by B is supposed to be 
allowed in cases where A supervenes on B. In other words, the determination is supposed to 
be one-way or asymmetric. An unhealthy human may differ from a healthy one by differing 
in any one of the physical features we mentioned. If someone possesses the property of being 
unhealthy it is not determined which subvenient physical base property is also possessed. But, 
if someone has the subvenient physical base property of, say, cancerous tissue, then it is 
determined that this person also has the property of being unhealthy. In possible worlds talk, 
imagine an object x and an object y in one world. Object x and object y could be indiscernible 
(i.e., no different) in terms of their A-properties while being discernible (i.e., different) in 
terms of their B-properties. This is so because A is multiply realizable by B. (They may be 
both unhealthy but for different reasons.) But, because B determines A, if object x and object 
y are indiscernible in terms of B-properties, then they also are indiscernible in terms of A-
properties. (If they both have high cholesterol, then both are unhealthy.) 
 Now it is time to catch up this discussion with recent work. Recently some have 
argued that supervenience is more a statement of a problem, than it is a solution. What we 
need to know is what explains the supervenience, i.e., we need to know the 
superdupervenience relation. Indeed there has been a disillusionment about the concept’s 
usefulness. After a series of influential articles hit the scene (see Horgan 1993, Wilson 1999), 
philosophers became more and more convinced that supervenience lacks some important 
                                                
70 Nomological possibility means what is possible in terms not of what is conceivable according to 
our concepts (that’s logical possibility), but what is possible according to the laws of physics of 
our world. Because of what inheres in the concept of “bachelor,” it is logically impossible to be a 
bachelor and yet be a married male. In this sense, the property of being a bachelor logically 
supervenes on being a married male. 
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desiderata. For just one example consider the summary of the situation by Lynch & Glasgow 
(2003):  
… a growing consensus amongst writers on the topic indicates that nonreductive 
materialists face a special explanatory burden when invoking supervenience. Unless 
supervenience itself is materialistically respectable, it can hardly be taken to contribute 
towards the respectability of an upper-level phenomenon. As Terence Horgan and 
others have noted, materialistic respectability requires more than a supervenience 
relation in which the physical facts are “ontically basic” by virtue of fixing all other 
facts (see Wilson, 1999; Kim, 1990; Schiffer, 1987). The example of Moore makes the 
point: he held that non-natural moral facts supervene on the physical facts. Since 
these Moorean facts and the accompanying Moorean supervenience relation are not 
materialistically respectable, it is clear that, as John Heil puts it, we need to “move 
beyond formal characterizations of supervenience” (1998, p. 150). Consequently, 
Horgan has argued that nonreductive materialists must appeal to an upgraded 
“superdupervenience,” if supervenience is to do any work for their view. 
 
One can try to defend non-reductive physicalism by coming up with a viable account of how 
mentality supervenes on, but does not reduce to, physicality. However I leave that project to 
others. Now I will reconstruct Kim’s use of supervenience in his criticism of non-reductive 
physicalists.  
 
§ 
 
3.6 Kim’s Exclusion + Supervenience Argument 
Kim’s version of the exclusion problem concludes that no mental event ever causes any 
physical event. But in other places Kim has put forth the same argument plus a 
supervenience thesis. With the addition of a supervenience claim Kim concludes that no 
mental events cause any mental events. 
Kim’s overarching claim in this argument seems to be this: given supervenience and 
minimal physicalism – that is, given a metaphysical necessitation relation between M (mental 
properties) and P (physical properties), and given the completeness and closure of physical 
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causation – we can give an explanatory account for any selected event (mental or physical) 
without appealing to any other mental event. We can make the account in terms of P alone, 
and if we mention an M it will be merely as a by-product, an epiphenomenon of some P. 
To prove his point, Kim asks us to imagine a case in which “an instance of mental 
property M causes another mental property M* to be instantiated,” (Kim 1998: 41). For 
example, we might think of a case in which the experience of pain (M) causes a desire for 
aspirin (M*). That is relation (1) in Figure 5: one mental experience causing another mental 
experience.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim sees a tension between M causing M* and a commitment to supervenience: 
 
Under the assumption of mind-body supervenience, M* occurs because its 
supervenience base [let’s call it] P* occurs, and as long as P* occurs, M* must occur 
no matter what other events preceded this instance of M* – in particular, regardless 
of whether or not an instance of M preceded it. This puts the claim of M to be a 
cause of M* in jeopardy (Kim 2002: 176). 
 
That is, according to supervenience M* occurs whenever P* occurs. So if P* occurs then M* 
necessarily must even if not preceded by M. So the fact that M* supervenes on P* seems for 
Kim to undermine, or put in “jeopardy,” M’s claim to be a cause of M*. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
M 
P P* 
M* 
1 
2 
3 4 
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 But, of course, it might still be argued against Kim that M caused P*, which then is 
responsible for M*. This is represented by the unnumbered, dashed arrow in Figure 1. Kim 
considers this possibility, which he has elsewhere called “downward causation.”71 Kim says 
that it may be a plausible general principle that to cause a supervenient property to be 
instantiated, you must cause its base property to be instantiated. “To relieve a headache, you 
take aspirin: that is, you causally intervene in the brain processes on which the headaches 
supervenes. That’s the only way we can do anything about our headaches,” (2002: 176).72  So 
now we find ourselves trying to defend mental to physical causation. We need only recall, 
however, that M also has its subvenient base P; and “we must compare M and P in regard to 
their causal status with respect to P*,” (176). Again, “we begin to see reasons for taking P as 
preempting the claim of M as a cause of P*,” (176). Those reasons namely are physical causal 
closure and so-called principle of non-overdetermination. I will examine these reasons below. 
In any case, for those reasons, Kim says that P preempts M as a cause of P*. This allows Kim 
to conclude that “the most natural way of viewing the situation [our whole diagram] is this: P 
caused P* and M supervenes on P and M* supervenes on P*,” (177) and the M to M* (and M 
to P*) causal relations are only apparent, arising epiphenomenally out of the genuine causal 
process between P and P*.  
This argument might seem to go through.73 But let’s examine as promised the reasons 
why, if P is the cause of P*, then M cannot be the cause of P*. The principle of physical 
causal closure, according to Kim, holds that for every physical event e, some physical event c 
                                                
71 For a discussion see Kim (1999). 
 
72 We won’t bother with “the power of positive thinking,” or “trying to relax,” as headache relief 
because the problem of mental to mental causation is taken up in just a moment.  
 
73 Again it is not to my purpose to point out the deficiencies in Kim’s formulation of the 
problem. For present purposes, I grant what he says.  
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is causally sufficient for e.74 “If we trace the causal ancestry of a physical event,” Kim says, 
“we need never go outside the physical domain.” Kim insists that if the non-reductive 
physicalist is to be a physicalist she must endorse the principle of physical causal closure. 
What physicalism amounts to, Kim recognizes, is contentious. But to be a minimal physicalist 
requires, Kim argues, the rejection of Cartesian souls and nonphysical causally active entities. 
As Kim says: 
 
To deny this assumption [physical causal closure] is to accept the Cartesian idea that 
some physical events need nonphysical causes, and if this is true there can in principle 
be no complete and self-sufficient physical theory of the physical domain. If the 
causal closure of the physical failed, our physics would need to refer in an essential 
way to nonphysical causal agents, perhaps Cartesian souls and their psychic 
properties, if it is to give a complete account of the physical world. I think most 
physicalists would find that picture unacceptable, (Kim 1993: 280). 
 
This amounts to advocating the conjunction of materialist ontology and physicalist 
epistemology. Kim’s minimal physicalism assumes 1) that the universe is made up of physical 
stuff and only physical stuff; and 2) that the completed science of physics in some kind of 
future state will completely explain all the physical phenomena.75 
Let’s summarize the discussion of physical causal closure and in so doing make a 
transition to a discussion of the principle of non-overdetermination. Under the auspices of 
physical causal closure, mental events are locked out of the closed and sufficient system of 
causes in every legitimate causal history. Mental causes need never be appealed to, because 
for every event we observe we may assume that there was a sufficient cause which will always 
                                                
74 Here I am following Kim. But note according to Baker, the causal closure of the physical 
holds, roughly that “every physical property-instantiation that has a cause at t has a complete 
physical cause at t.” See Baker (1993: 78). 
 
75 Recently some philosophers have begun to deny causal closure. It is not my strategy to argue 
directly against the principle of physical causal closure.  
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have been a physical cause. Remember that, in the dialectic, we are discussing whether M or P 
has causal relevance in relation to P* (which is the subvenient base of M* which we are 
ultimately interested in causally explaining). Notice that the only way there could be a 
legitimate mental cause (and, therefore, the only way M could legitimately cause P*) would be 
if it were possible to have two sufficient causes acting simultaneously. That is, we could avoid 
Kim’s conclusion that M doesn’t cause P* were we to allow that both M and P caused P*. This 
is still allowable under physical causal closure, which requires only that every event has a 
sufficient physical cause. It does not exclude it also having a sufficient mental cause. If it also 
had a mental cause then we would have an event that was “overdetermined.”  
But, as we’ve already said, Kim argues that this would be analogous to some oft-cited 
examples. As Kim says, “A man is shot dead by two assassins whose bullets hit him at the 
same time; or a building catches fire because of a short circuit in the faulty wiring and a bolt 
of lightning that hits the building at the same instant,” (Kim 1993: 252). As noted earlier, it is 
dissatisfying to imagine that a situation so statistically unlikely happens in every last case of 
mental causation. Kim finds this unacceptable, and he institutes his non-overdetermination 
principle: If an event c is causally sufficient for an event e, then no event c* distinct from c is 
causally relevant to e. In combination with physical causal closure (which, again, says “for 
every physical event e, some physical event c is causally sufficient for e”), the non-
overdetermination principle guarantees that in a causal competition between M and P for 
causal potency in regard to P*, M will lose. M will be screened off.  
 So summarizing Kim’s argument in a more simple form, we get the following: 
 
(1) The principle of non-reduction: For every physical event P and mental event M, P 
is distinct from M. (This represents a reasonable distinctness thesis for the non-
reductive physicalist.) 
(2) The physical causal closure principle: For every physical event e, some physical 
event c is causally sufficient for e.  
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(3) The principle of non-overdetermination: If an event c is causally sufficient for an 
event e, then no event c* distinct from c is causally sufficient for e.  
 
(Therefore) Epiphenomenalism is true: For every physical event P, no mental  
event M is causally relevant to P.  
 
The way this argument is formulated so far only concludes that there is no M to P causation. 
It says only that any time a P is caused to come into existence it was another P that is 
responsible (and responsibility is not shared with – or overdetermined by – a mental event). 
M may be distinct from P ((1) may stand), but M also never causes any P. However, if you 
add the supervenience of M on P, then you get the result that there is no M to M causation 
either. 
 
(4) The supervenience of M on P: Every mental event M is metaphysically 
necessitated by some underlying physical event P, whose causally sufficient 
antecedents (P´) are presumably sufficient for M as well.  
 
Then, by the principle of non-overdetermination M’s mental antecedents are irrelevant to P’s 
occurrence. As Yablo says, “Here the mystery is how mental events, desires for example, can 
be making a causal difference when their unsupplemented neurophysiological underpinnings 
are already sufficient to the task at hand,” (Yablo 2002: 180).  Kim’s claim is that the non-
reductive physicalists cannot get what they want; their commitments are inconsistent and to 
regain consistency they must give up the distinctness or nonreductive thesis regarding mental 
and physical properties.  He seems to suggest that they must give up Mental Causation in the 
earlier inconsistent tetrad. 
It is interesting to note that Kim’s argument does not appeal to any special 
characteristic of mentality – such as the mental’s inherent normative or intentional 
characteristics – in order to show that mentality is not causal. He need only appeal to 
  99 
This means that the problem could be generalized to other special sciences besides 
psychology. For example, if geological properties, which are appealed to in geological 
explanations, supervene on physical properties, which we assume they do, then according to 
Kim’s argument those geological properties are not really causally relevant in the 
explanations, only the basic physical properties are. To the non-reductive physicalist, who 
holds dear the autonomy of the special sciences, including psychology, this seems like a 
conclusion worthy of resisting.76 
 
§ 
 
3.7 An Initial Pragmatist Rejoinder: Baker and Burge 
I want to look at one way of responding to the worries which Kim’s arguments present to 
non-reductive physicalists in philosophy of mind. This way of responding consists of making 
a certain objection from the point-of-view of explanatory practice. The idea seems to be to 
claim that if your metaphysical commitments make mental causation appear never to happen, 
then there is something wrong with your metaphysical commitments. Kim has provided a 
preemptive defense against this style of argument (Kim 1998: 57-72). Kim’s main foil is an 
argument he sees being put forth by Lynne Baker and Tyler Burge.  
 Kim quotes Burge who says that the worries about mental causation “are 
symptomatic of a mistaken set of philosophical priorities. Materialist metaphysics has been 
given more weight than it deserves. Reflection on explanatory practice has been given too 
little,” (Burge 1993: 97). The objection, as Kim understands it, seems to be “that we should 
                                                
76 Kim claims that his own position allows for the autonomy of the special sciences via a 
particular notion of reduction and a discussion of preemptive moves (about part-whole 
relationships) against the generalizing of his supervenience argument. We will not argue the point 
here.  
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look to explanations and explanatory practice, not to metaphysics, for guidance on the matter 
of mental causation,” (Kim 1998: 59). 
The explanatory practices of ordinary life, and of psychology, commonly make 
attribution to intentional mental events. Our explanatory practice assumes “that intentional 
mental events are often causes and that psychological explanation is often a form of causal 
explanation,” (Burge 1993: 118). According to Burge, we have rather strong grounds on 
which to reject a metaphysics that says mentality is not causal. Kim finds that Burge is echoed 
by Baker, who suggests we “take as our philosophical starting point, not a metaphysical 
doctrine about the nature of causation or of reality, but a range of explanations that we have 
found worthy of our acceptance…If we reverse the priority of explanation and causation that 
is favored by the metaphysician, the problem of mental causation just melts away,” (Baker 
1993: 92-93). 
 In response, Kim says that Burge and Baker are making a fundamental error, which 
amounts to eschewing their responsibility as philosophers to think about philosophical 
questions. Kim admits that, “as Burge says, our confidence in the truth of familiar intentional 
explanations does exceed our commitment to any recondite metaphysical principles.” 
However, Kim adds that he has never contravened the explanatory relevance of mentality.77 
He says, “I doubt that very many of us who have worried about mental causation have 
actually been concerned about the possibility that our thoughts and desires might turn out to 
have no power to move our limbs,” (Kim 1998: 61). The worry about epiphenomenalism is 
not the worry that our minds cannot move our bodies; it’s the worry about how to create an 
                                                
77 This is certainly debatable. I, for one, think that his argument generalizes such that if mental 
events are excluded so too are any properties supervening on properties of basic physics. 
However, as mentioned before, Kim thinks he can dodge the generalizing worry himself even if 
non-reductive physicalists cannot. I can disagree with Kim’s reasons for thinking mental 
causation is a metaphysical issue while still thinking that mental causation is a metaphysical issue. 
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account of the fact that our minds move our bodies. Kim says, “Our worries are not evidential 
or epistemological worries…the problem of mental causation is primarily a metaphysical 
problem. It is the problem of showing how mental causation is possible, not whether it is 
possible,” (Kim 1998: 61). Answering how mental properties manage to play the role in 
causal explanations that they do play is an exercise in metaphysics. Kim says, “The issue is 
how to make our metaphysics consistent with mental causation and the choice that we need 
to make is between various metaphysical alternatives, not between some recondite 
metaphysical principle on the one hand and some cherished epistemological practice or 
principle on the other,” (1998: 62).  
As the entry on Mental Causation in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, 
“The explanatory strategy [of Baker and Burge] would at best seem to be addressing only the 
‘whether’ question, not the ‘how’ question.” The strategy seems to rest “on a conflation of 
what appears to be an epistemological notion (explanation) with metaphysical notions 
(causation and causal relevance),” (Robb & Heil 2003: Section 7.5). (Below I argue that in the 
case of his criticism of anomalous monism, it is Kim who does not take metaphysics seriously 
enough. Or, in any case, I argue he conflates a metaphysical understanding of an “in virtue 
of” question with an epistemic one. The theme of this metaphysics-epistemology distinction 
can be found throughout this dissertation.)  
Kim thinks that Burge and Baker are not taking the problem of mental causation 
seriously with their deflationary suggestion that it will “melt away,” (Baker 1993: 23) given 
“inexpensive repairs,” (Kim 1998: 59). He says that they seem to want a “free lunch” when in 
fact “we need to make fairly drastic [metaphysical] adjustments if we are serious about 
coming to terms with the problem,” (Kim 1998: 59). 
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For my purposes here, I agree that the problem ought to be addressed as a 
metaphysical problem, as Kim says, although I am also sympathetic to Baker and Burge’s 
worries. In the end, my view, proposed in Chapters Four and Five below, will be a 
metaphysical solution but one that gives considerable importance (a kind of priority) to our 
epistemological practices. As such, I believe my view improves on Kim, as well as on Baker 
and Burge. The latter say, “we should look to explanations and explanatory practice, not to 
metaphysics, for guidance on the matter of mental causation.” But what that guidance would 
be is left vague. My view gives the details regarding the guidance. Still, my view must wait 
until later chapters. We should now return to the literature on the mental causation debate 
and consider a few more sub-debates so I can establish my attitude toward them. 
 
§ 
 
3.8 Canonical Solutions 
In this section, we evaluate some of the canonical solutions to the exclusion problem.  
 
3.8.1 Eliminativist Reductive Physicalism 
My Catastrophe thesis, if true, is not catastrophic merely in virtue of its name.  That is, it is 
logically possible to embrace the Catastrophe thesis verbatim. One could affirm: “Mentality 
plays no causal role in the causal explanation of intentional action.” It does not become a 
liability because it is called Catastrophe; it is a liability because the proposition has a number of 
unhappy entailments. If mental properties cannot be appealed to in the explanation of 
intentional action, then every time someone gives a reason explanation, they are either 
speaking nonsense or saying something false. As discussed earlier (see Section 1.1.1), 
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eliminativism seems to entail Catastrophe which itself has unhappy entailment such the 
undermining of our folk explanatory practices and our self-understanding. 
 
3.8.2      The Dual Explananda Response  
The dual explananda response seems close to my view and has some merit. It is close in that 
it insists on a distinction among things-to-be-explained; and the critics violate the distinction. 
The main idea is that if there are two things to be explained, then we need to be more careful 
than Kim is with respect to the details of just what we are asking to be explained.78 Kim’s 
exclusion problem could be seen as arguing that by non-reductive physicalism’s lights 
physical properties are causally relevant to behavior and action while mental properties are 
not.  
Ausonio Marras argues that there are two things to be explained (that is, two things to 
be relevant to) and that if there are two things to be explained, then we need to be careful in 
forming the problem. According to Marras’ solution, mental properties (and not neurological 
properties) will be causally relevant to intentional action and its mental properties, while 
neurological properties (and not mental properties) may be causally relevant to bodily 
movement physically described. Let’s look at Marras’s argument.  
The causal relevance idiom says that events cause their effects in virtue of certain of 
their properties. Cause-events cause in virtue of a certain property of the cause-events, or in 
virtue of which kinds they fall under, or types they typify.  
The idiom of causal relevance prefers to present matters in this way: The idiom does 
not say ‘c caused e’, it says  
                                                
78 It remains to give an account of how principally to individuate the explananda or the levels of 
explanation. 
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c’s being F caused e’s being G. 
 
 
But this is more helpfully expressed as follows: 
 
 
c caused e, and this was so in virtue of c’s being F and e’s being G.79 
 
 
This formulation is a giant step forward for the dual-explananda approach because 
not only do you discuss the cause-event’s properties (as causally relevant) but you also discuss 
what property in particular of the effect-event you are interested in having explained.  The 
non-reductive physicalist has often argued that the same token event may be described as 
either an intentional action or as physical behavior; that is, one effect-event can typify 
physical as well as mental properties. And so it may be the case that the physical properties of 
the cause-event are not relevant to the action-theoretic properties of the effect-event. To 
decide that question you need a theory of causal relevance. After all, a property F of c may be 
relevant to causing e to be G and irrelevant to causing e to be G* or I or many other 
properties of the effect-event. But with the explanandum individuated finely enough so we 
know we are asking for an explanation of an action described in action-theoretic terms, then 
it will be difficult for friends of Kim to insist that physical properties are relevant.  
In this light, we can see that it is perhaps not coincidental that Kim, as it must be 
noted, often fails to provide the effect-event with the same structure as the competing cause-
events. And some have noted that it is his failure to individuate the explanandum properly 
that allows the problem of exclusion to rear its head.  
                                                
79 The “in virtue” idiom is more correct because after all we are saying that the properties are 
causally relevant not causes per se. 
 
  105 
Here’s Kim’s own example. We can see that he embraces the causal relevance idiom, 
but only in relation to causes. He says: 
 
c's being an event of the kind N (or having property N) caused B80  
 
 
It is quite remarkable that the effect-event is not properly represented here as having the 
same structure as the cause-event. Kim says, “B, too, can be thought of as having a similar 
structure of an event being a certain kind; but for now this won’t be necessary,” (1990: 39). 
The example being symbolized here is one in which George rises from the couch (B). This 
example of Kim’s does not conveniently fall into both an intentional description and a 
physical one. It is biased, perhaps, toward a physical reading. But a different example works 
better without changing what is at stake. Imagine instead that George is hailing a cab which 
could also be physically described as George’s arm rising to a 45 degree angle from the 
ground. According to Kim, the cause of B is either an event having a certain neural property 
or an event (Kim allows that it could be the same token event) having a certain belief-desire-
intentional (BDI) property, such as wanting beer, etc. and therefore getting off the couch, or 
in our example wanting to go downtown in a cab to see the sights. Kim thinks that one 
competing explanation (say that of BDI psychology) will appeal to a cause-event which 
causes B in virtue of the cause-event’s being a psychological kind (S). Another competing 
explanation (that of neurology, say) will appeal to a cause-event which causes B in virtue of 
the cause-event’s being a neurological kind (N). This may be symbolized as such for 
explanation 1 and 2: 
 
E1) c’s being an event of the type S caused B. 
E2) c’s being an event of the type N caused B. 
                                                
80 Kim (1990: 39). 
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Now it becomes a matter of deciding which property is relevant to bringing about B. 
For this you need a theory of causal relevance. But, before presenting a sketch of a theory of 
causal relevance, we need to translate E1 and E2 to express two concerns. First, we need to 
translate it into the “in virtue” idiom; and, second, we need to give the effect-event B the 
same structure as the cause-event, that of being of one kind or another. To do this we will 
write “B” as “e,” as is a standard for symbolic representation of an effect-event. That event 
which is extensionally equivalent to George’s hailing a cab, we said could be described in 
action-theoretic terms (let’s call that as falling under kind A) or in merely physical terms as a 
movement in space (let’s call that P).  Then each explanation, E1 and E2, can be rephrased in 
two ways, such that: 
 
S=Psychological 
N=Neurological 
A=Action theoretic 
P=Physical 
 
E1(a) c caused e, and this was so in virtue of c’s being S and e’s being A. 
E1(p) c caused e, and this was so in virtue of c’s being S and e’s being P. 
E2(a) c caused e, and this was so in virtue of c’s being N and e’s being A. 
E2(p) c caused e, and this was so in virtue of c’s being N and e’s being P. 
 
Now, which of these explanations is correct can only be answered with a theory of 
causal relevance. There is a lot to be said here, but a standard theory of causal relevance is 
formulated in terms of counterfactuals. Marras says: 
 
Where c causes e, and where c is F and e is G, c’s being F is causally relevant to e’s 
being G only if the counterfactual ‘~Fc  ~Ge’ holds.81 
 
                                                
81 Marras (1998: 448). I am following Marras very closely here.  
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So we must now evaluate the counterfactuals entailed by each explanation E1a, E1p, E2a and 
E2p. They are as follows: 
 
(1a) ~Sc  ~Ae 
(1p) ~Sc  ~Pe 
(2a) ~Nc  ~Ae 
(2p) ~Nc  ~Pe 
 
There is a prima facie way of deciding the truth of these counterfactual such that (1a) and 
(2p) are true and (1p) and (2a) are false.   
 
(1a) ~Sc  ~Ae   T Comment: Would not have hailed cab if not   
       desired to go. 
 
(1p) ~Sc  ~Pe   F Comment: Hand would have risen to 45 degrees  
              for any number of reasons. 
 
(2a) ~Nc  ~Ae    F Comment: George’s desire is multiply physically 
realizable. Without N, A can still be the 
case. 
 
(2p) ~Nc  ~Pe   T Comment: In principle, science could tell us   
   which exact neurological  
configurations produce which exact  
bodily movements. 
 
Thus, it is true to say along with (1a) that George would not have hailed a cab had he not 
wanted to go downtown in a manner that provided him a view of the sights.  But it is false to 
say as (1p) does that his hand would not have raised to a 45 degree angle had he not intended 
to go downtown with a view of the sights, for his hand might take that position for a number 
of intentionally described reasons including blessing, saluting, etc. Furthermore, it is false to 
say as (2a) does that George would not have hailed a cab had his neurological state not have 
been exactly as it was, because by the generally accepted principle of  ‘multiple realizability’ 
there is another neurological state which can realize the intention to hail a cab. Finally, 
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although it gives a lot of credence to the physicalist’s Whiggish hope for a perfect science of 
neurology, (2p) can be imagined to be true. That is to say, George’s arm would not have 
moved exactly as it did had he not had the exact neurological and muscular (physical) 
configuration that he did have. 
 While I believe that there is something right about Marras’s criticism of Kim, it is also 
true we could just complain that Marras has remained in the epistemic realm and has not yet 
dived into “real metaphysics.” What an objection like that would mean is this: It may be that 
mental properties are explanatorily relevant today (in our scientific climate) to intentional 
action and neurological properties are today in our scientific climate not explanatorily relevant 
to action. However, Kim could say, when we do metaphysics we may assume a future 
idealized science. This is a good objection to Marras’s argument in the terms in which it is put 
forth.82  
 
3.8.3  Yablo’s Proportionality Constraint 
Yablo (1992) offers a unique and clever solution to the exclusion problem. He says that 
causation is subject to a proportionality constraint, which is a constraint that mental 
properties can often satisfy while their realizers cannot. However, I would argue that Yablo is 
conflating causation with an intuitive notion of causal explanation. In articulating this 
criticism I follow closely Bontly (2005).  
 Yablo writes that “causes should incorporate a good deal of causally important 
material but not too much that is causally unimportant,” (1992, p. 274). This is his 
proportionality constraint. Bontly argues, against Yablo, that proportionality is not really a 
                                                
82 This is an important consideration for a theory like mine too. But we will not be dealing with it 
here. 
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constraint on causation but is rather “a pragmatic feature of our use of causal language,” 
(332) and cannot save nonreductive physicalism from the exclusion problem. I think this 
shows that Yablo is working with a non-extensional, intensional notion of causation, which is 
a liability. Yablo has given us an account of general (non discipline-specific) causal 
explanation, but not an account of causation.   
Yablo works in the familiar framework of nonreductive physicalists who are 
confronted by the exclusion problem. He embraces these three standard theses: 
 
The Causal Completeness of the Physical (CCP): every physical event is causally determined 
by prior physical events. 
 
The Irreducibility of the Mental (IM): mental properties and events cannot be reduced to 
or identified with physical properties and events. Instead, the relation between the 
mental and physical is one of supervenience or multiple realization. 
 
The Causal Efficacy of the Mental (CEM): mental events and properties can bring about 
physical effects.83  
 
 
Now, these seem inconsistent with a plausible principle, which we’ll call The Exclusion 
Principle:  
 
The Exclusion Principle (ExP): if E is causally guaranteed by C, then no C* distinct from 
C is causally relevant to E (Yablo 1997: 255).  
 
Or as Kim (1993: 360) puts it: “a sufficient cause of an event excludes the claim of any other 
distinct synchronous event to be a cause of that same event.” 
 To understand how Yablo thinks his proportionality constraint helps dodge the 
exclusion problem we need to start at the beginning with the Goldilocks Principle. 
As Bontly relates the fairytale: 
 
When Goldilocks came to the house of the three bears, she found the house 
abandoned. But she was hungry and tired, so she went inside, where three bowls of 
                                                
83 Slightly altered from Bontly for clarity in this context. 
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porridge were laid upon the table. The first bowl was too hot, and the second too 
cold, but the third bowl was just right, and she proceeded to wolf it down. 
 
 
Yablo’s proportionality constraint has it that causation must also be “just right.” As Yablo 
puts it: “causes should incorporate a good deal of causally important material but not too 
much that is causally unimportant,” (1992: 274). That’s the analogy. But to illustrate Yablo’s 
idea we do not actually need all three bears’ bowls. Suppose Goldilocks only burns her mouth 
on Papa Bear’s porridge. As Bontly says, “There are several porridge-eating events to which 
this effect might be attributed (or, alternatively, several different ways of describing one 
porridge-eating event),” (332).  
 
On the one hand, we could say that eating porridge caused her mouth to be burned, but 
that seems insufficiently specific. […] So perhaps we should cite the exact 
circumstances of her porridge-eating and say that it was eating porridge with a temperature 
of precisely 205.63 degrees on a Tuesday in November that caused the burn to her mouth. 
 
 
Merely citing her eating of porridge is not explanatory because porridge is often found at 
temperatures that do not burn mouths. But then citing details about the day and time is 
irrelevant; the exact temperature is overkill because there are other temperatures nearby 
which would also burn her mouth. “So perhaps we should say that the burn to her mouth 
was caused by eating scalding hot porridge, and that description is just right,” (Bontly 2005: 333). 
 What Yablo is proposing is that causation should follow the Goldilocks Principle and 
be “just right” between too much and too little information. More precisely, Yablo’s notion 
involves two counterfactual conditions, involving the concepts of “determinables” and 
“determinates”: 
 
Requiredness: C is required for E iff C has no determinable C- such that if C- had 
occurred without C, then E would still have occurred. 
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Enoughness: C is enough for E iff for all determinates C+ of C, if C had occurred 
without C+, E would have still occurred.  
 
 
Requiredness and Enoughness are together necessary but not sufficient for causation. “Red” is a 
determinate of the determinable concept “color.” And “Scarlet,” “Crimson,” “Fire Engine 
Red,” are determinates of the determinable “Red.” Thus, determinable and determinates 
work at one level or another and are level-relative. At one level “Red” is a determinate and at 
another level “Red” is a determinable. So let’s say that a certain bull will only charge at red 
capes. He will not charge at any color cape, only red. But he will charge at any red color cape, 
including scarlet, crimson and fire engine red capes. Intuitively then red should satisfy 
Requiredness while its determinable (color) does not; and red should satisfy Enoughness while its 
determinates (scarlet, etc) do as well. Intuitively red is both required and enough to cause the 
bull to charge. 
 Now the relation between determinables and determinates, Yablo has noted, is very 
similar to the relation between mental events and their realizers. 
  
If something has a determinable like coloredness, then it must have some determinate 
form of coloredness like redness. Having redness entails having coloredness, 
furthermore, but of course the converse does not hold. Similarly, if mental properties 
are physically realized, then having a given mental property M requires having some 
physical property P that necessitates, or determines, the having of M, though again 
the converse needn’t hold, (Bontly 2005: 333).  
 
In other words, being red entails being colored as being a determinate entails being some 
determinable. But being colored does not entail being red, for there are other colors to serve 
as the determinate of the determinable color.  
 How Yablo solves the exclusion problem with these tools is as follows. 
 
Suppose I feel a pain in my hand (M) and move my hand away from the source of 
irritation (E). If we contrast M with one of its higher determinables – like feeling 
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something – we see that M is required for E. If I had felt something else, like a tickle, 
without feeling pain, then E may well not have occurred. If, on the other hand, we 
contrast M with its determinate realizer P, we see that P is not required for E and M 
is enough. For had M been differently realized, say by P*, E would quite probably still 
have ensued, or so we shall assume.  Thus Goldilocks yields the conclusion that M 
caused E and P did not, even though P was (by hypothesis) sufficient to guarantee 
that E would occur.  
 
In other words, the pain (M) in my hand causes me to move (E) my hand. M satisfies 
Requiredness and Enoughness. This is so because the pain and not any old feeling would cause my 
hand to move; and, going the other way, P (one determinate realizer) is not required for E. 
For a different realizer P* would (counterfactually) also have caused E.   
 
3.8.3.1 Problems for Yablo’s Proportionality Constraint 
Consider the following anecdote. There is lesson that has application to my distinction 
between causation and causal explanation.  
Suppose Socrates drinks the hemlock and dies. As a matter of fact, he guzzled the 
hemlock, but let’s say he would still have died had he instead sipped the hemlock. Yablo’s 
proportionality constraint would hold that his guzzling was not required and so not 
proportional to his death. But does it follow that his guzzling did not cause his death? To 
answer this question, suppose that guzzling the hemlock was proportional to, and caused, his 
dying quickly and painlessly, Bontly (2005) says. He would have died a lingering and 
unpleasant death had he sipped it. So, his guzzling the hemlock caused him to die in a certain 
way. But if guzzling caused him to die in a certain way then it is hard to avoid the intuition 
that his guzzling caused him to die simpliciter. Or again: 
 
Suppose I speed through a radar trap at precisely 41 mph over the limit and get a 
ticket for $250. If I had sped through at merely 26 over, the ticket would merely have 
been $175. So my speeding through at 41 over was proportionate to, and thus caused, 
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my getting the particular ticket I did. But if it caused me to get a particular ticket, then 
a fortiori it caused me to get a ticket punkt (340). 
 
 
Yablo’s proportionality constraint would have the guzzling not be a cause of Socrates’ death, 
since guzzling does not meet the Requiredness criterion. But we have just seen that there is an 
intuition that the guzzling was a cause of his dying a certain way and thereby a cause of his 
dying. Bontly diagnoses what’s going in the following manner: 
 
… if Socrates’ drinking the hemlock was enough for his dying, then we would not in 
may contexts describe [my emphasis] his guzzling it as the cause of his dying. That, 
however, is consistent with the thesis that his guzzling it was a cause of his dying, 
which it does seem to be, since replacing the guzzling with some other determinate 
may well affect how the death comes about. It’s just that we wouldn’t cite guzzling as 
the cause of death, because there is another event (or if you prefer another way of 
describing the same event) which is preferable on pragmatic grounds – that is in 
virtue of our interests and purposes in giving and receiving causal explanations.  
 
 
Yablo’s argument for the non-proportionality of Socrates’ guzzling the hemlock and 
therefore for his notion that guzzling did not cause Socrates’ dying is pumped by the 
pragmatics of the particular context or level of explanation at which the question is pitched. 
Drinking the hemlock is all it would take to causally explain Socrates’ death in this relatively 
neutral, undifferentiated context where a contrast space has not been specified. But the 
importance of context should not be underestimated, Bontly says. It is easy to come up with 
a different context surrounding Socrates’ death where a determinate is a cause even where 
not required.  
  
Suppose (as is in fact the case) that hemlock comes in two varieties: ‘western water 
hemlock’ (Cicuta douglasi) and its less toxic cousin ‘poison hemlock (Conium maculatum). 
In sufficient quantities, either one is sufficient to cause death, but let us suppose that 
it is the latter that Socrates actually drank. Now since Circuta would have done just as 
well, his actually drinking Conium was evidently not required (meaning that the event 
of his drinking the plain ole (disjunctive) hemlock was enough (Bontly 2005: 341, 
altered slightly for clarity).  
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So his drinking Conium is in the same position isomorphically, but one level down deeper, as 
his guzzling was above. That is, the guzzling was not proportional but still seemed to be a 
cause. Conium is here not required and therefore not proportional, but if it caused him to die 
in a certain way (perhaps faster for being more poisonous) then it caused him to die simpliciter. 
But to show that this all has to do with the pragmatics of the context, let’s change the context 
and see if we can get the Conium to seem required and thereby proportional.  
 
Certainly a coroners report would say Conium and not Circuta. Rewriting history a bit, 
imagine Socrates to have fallen victim to foul play; the police have two suspects, only 
one of whom had access to extract of Conium. In that case, knowing which type of 
hemlock was involved may well prove crucial to a conviction, in which case it would 
be quite natural to say that it was his ingesting Conium, and not merely his ingesting 
hemlock, that caused his death (341-342, altered).  
 
 
That shows, I believe, that we are dealing in causal explanation. Let’s pursue a brief reverie.  
One event and not another (or one way of describing one event and not another way of 
describing it) will seem to be causal with respect to an effect depending on the context in 
which we seek a causal explanation. As we push through ever deeper explanations we push 
through levels of causal explanation. When do we reach causation? Perhaps we don’t. Any 
empirical explanation has the structure of explanatory relevance as we’ve been discussing in 
regards to the pragmatics of contexts of causal explanation. There is always the possibility of 
a deeper empirical explanation and the prospect of a context in which we would be interested 
in citing that feature as the cause. But one does not actually “arrive” at causation. Instead 
perhaps when I say causation is metaphysical and not epistemic I mean that causation is a 
posit made in the act of offering a causal explanation.  
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3.8.4 Horgan’s “Quausation” 
Horgan (1989) introduces a 4-place relation he calls “quausation”; he then tries to motivate 
the “problem of mental quausation.” The quausation relation is expressed by the locution “c 
qua F causes e qua G” and is explicated as follows: 
 
For any two events c and e and any two properties F and G, c qua F causes e qua G iff: 
(i) c causes e; 
(ii) c instantiates F; 
(iii) e instantiates G; and 
(iv) the fact that c instantiates F is explanatorily relevant to the fact that e occurs 
and instantiates G. 
 
In order to have a full understanding of what is meant by quausation, we would clearly have 
to understand what is meant by explanatory relevance. Horgan offers a fairly standard 
counterfactual account, stipulated to avoid vacuity and back-tracking counterfactuals.  
The interest for our purposes is not in Horgan’s account of explanatory relevance but 
in the fact that his attempt to motivate the quausation problem reveals how he misunderstands 
the dialectic of the mental causation debate itself.  
Horgan says the problem of mental causation is that c may cause e but it may not be 
the case that c qua F causes e qua G. To illuminate why this is a problem, Horgan makes 
reference to two now-famous intuition pumps: Dretske’s soprano and Sosa’s loud gun shot.   
 
Meaningful sounds, if they occur at the right pitch and amplitude, can shatter glass, 
but the fact that these sounds have a meaning is irrelevant to their having this effect. 
The glass would shatter if the sounds meant something completely different, of if 
they meant nothing at all. This doesn’t imply that the sounds don’t have a meaning, 
but it does imply that their having their meaning doesn’t help explain their effects on 
the glass. To know why the glass shattered you have to know something about the 
amplitude and frequency of these sounds, properties of the sound that are relevant 
involved in its effect on the glass (Dretske 1989). 
 
A gun goes off, a shot is fired, and it kills someone. The loud noise is the shot… in a 
certain sense the victim is killed by the loud noise. But not by the loud noise as a loud 
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noise, but only by the loud noise as a shot, or the like… The loudness of the shot has 
no causal relevance to the death of the victim. Had the gun been equipped with a 
silencer the shot would have killed the victim just the same (Sosa 1989). 
 
These two cases are meant to pump the intuition that “Sometimes the cause of a given 
effect,” will have “a certain property which is not appropriate to cite in a causal explanation 
of that effect,” (49). This means that something might be a cause without its being a cause in 
virtue of some property, X.  
 Horgan explains his point this way. In the following sentence the first “and” needs to 
be turned into a “because.”    
 
(1) He exercised and he wanted to reduce and thought exercise would do it. 
 
Proposition (1) says only that the agent possesses a “primary reason”84 that rationalizes his 
exercising. Horgan then argues that Davidson (1963) holds that all we need to add is 
proposition (2) to get what we want.  
 
(2) His exercising was caused by his desire to reduce and his belief that exercise 
would do it.85 
 
Horgan counters, however, that (2) is not sufficient for (3): 
 
(3) He exercised because he wanted to reduce and thought exercise would do it.  
 
                                                
84 See Chapter One. 
 
85 Horgan adds an  “in an appropriate way” clause to block deviant causal chains. I’ve elided it for 
simplicity’s sake.  
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What Horgan is saying is that it is possible that a primary reason be a cause of an action 
without it being possible for us to say that the agent took the action because of the primary 
reason. Maybe it is a cause qua neurophysiological state of affairs. That is, it might be a cause 
but it may not yet be a cause qua rationalizing reason. That’s the problem of mental 
quausation. 
However, the way Horgan has set the problem up indicates he misunderstands the 
real dialectic of the mental causation debate and the difference between causation and causal 
explanation. Let me start as follows. 
The multiple reasons argument says that it is possible that an agent have an 
appropriately rationalizing reason for an action and yet when the agent takes that action that 
reason did not produce, bring about or otherwise cause the action. This situation is not the 
one Horgan calls the problem of mental quausation. Horgan is highlighting a situation in 
which a reason that rationalizes an action is in fact a cause of an action but is not a cause qua 
reason. However, why should that bother us? Horgan says that we expect it but do we? He 
says, that is, “We believe not merely that reasons are causes, but also that people act the way 
they do because they have reasons which rationalize the actions,” (51). But there is something 
wrong about what he is saying.  
The first problem is one I can best address after the apparatus of Chapter Four is on 
the table. But suffice it here to say the following. Horgan has not specified clearly enough the 
sense of an “in virtue of” question he means with his “because.” If he means that reasons 
need to be able to be referred to in causal explanations, then the question he asks is easily 
answered. But if he means that reasons need to be the causes that they are in virtue of being a 
reason I submit he does not know what he is talking about. 
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The second problem is a problem with the implications of what Horgan is saying. 
Consider the soprano example again. Yet this time let’s actually spell out the analogy to the 
mental case.   
 
Meaningful sounds, if they occur at the right pitch and amplitude, can shatter glass, 
but the fact that these sounds have a meaning is irrelevant to their having this effect. 
 
The analogy would be as follows:  
 
Rationalizing reasons, if they are instantiated by the appropriate neurophysiological 
underpinnings, can cause actions, but their being appropriate rationalizations is 
irrelevant to their having this effect.  
 
By “can cause actions” does he mean that rationalizing reasons can be referred to in causal 
explanations or does he mean that rationalizing reasons can be related by the causal relation 
to actions? He does not say. But neither way creates a problem. (See Chapter Four.) 
 For instance, the loudness of the shot and the meaning of the notes the soprano sang 
were not causally explanatory. That is all the intuition pumps show. Reference to those 
properties is not explanatory while reference to some other properties would be. Here the 
analogy to the mental case finally breaks because reference to a rationalizing reason for an 
action (as a rationalizing reason) that actually brought the action about is causally explanatory, 
contra to Horgan’s misplaced worry. So there’s no problem of mental quausation there.  
Now with respect to causation, Horgan readily admits that the rationalizing reason is 
a cause of the action. That’s clause (i). So there’s not a problem of mental quausation there. 
The last thing that Horgan could mean is this: the rationalizing reason which is a cause of the 
action needs to be the cause that it is in virtue of being a rationalizing reason. But as I will 
argue in Chapter Four, why does this question need to be answered in mental terms? It seems 
like it will be answered in physical terms and that this is to be expected. It has no 
  119 
epiphenomenalist ramifications. As I show in Chapter Four, the question of in virtue of what 
properties a cause is the cause that it is is a different question than the question of which 
properties are those properties reference to which is causally explanatory with respect to the 
effect coming to have the properties it does in the explanandum.   
Let’s consider yet another issue to which Horgan does not speak clearly enough. 
Consider: If c qua F causes e qua G does that mean that the relata of the causal relation are “c 
qua F” and “e qua G” or is the relata of the causal relation still c and e? Horgan doesn’t say.  
On a reasonable understanding of causation and causal explanation there is no problem of 
mental quausation. On my understanding of causation and causal explanation there is no 
problem of mental quausation. But Horgan has not specified exactly what he means by the 
relation of causation, nor has he discussed its relationship to causal explanation. But, by my 
lights, whichever he might mean is not problematic. 
 
§ 
 
3.9 Anomalous Monism 
“Non-reductive physicalism” is one name for a contemporary philosophical solution to the 
problems of mental causation. Its goal is to account for the natural world of causes without 
implausibly reducing explanations of human action to deterministic causal laws, or the like.86 
Perhaps the urtext of non-reductive physicalism is Davidson’s anomalous monism (1963, 
                                                
86 There are a great variety of non-reductive physicalism theories in the literature. Certain 
functionalist theories count as versions of non-reductive physicalism (others do not). The role-
functionalist theories of Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1974) are examples of non-reductive 
functionalists theories. A priori reductive functionalist theories include Armstrong (1968) and 
Lewis (1973). A posteriori reductive (non-role, filler-) functionalism is defended by Kim (1998).  
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1967, 1970, 1993). However, anomalous monism is actually importantly different from the 
generic non-reductive physicalism that suffers the exclusion problem. 
The three premises of anomalous monism are relatively plausible notions, at least prima 
facie. In fact, Davidson originally assumes them without argument. 
 
  Interaction:  Some mental events cause some physical events. 
  Anomalism:  There are no strict laws connecting events under mental descriptions. 
There are no strict laws connecting mental events with physical 
events, such that mental events could be predicted or explained by 
physical events. 
  Cause-Law: When events are related by the causal relation there is a strict law of 
necessity connecting the events at least under some (physical) 
description. 
   
Token Identity:  Every mental event is numerically identical to some physical  
event. 
 
If understood appropriately, the first three lead deductively to the fourth proposition, Token 
Identity.  
The way the argument works is like this. Interaction says that some mental events cause 
some physical events. Given the cause-law thesis this means that there are strict laws covering 
such (singular) causation between events. But isn’t this denied by Anomalism? No. By properly 
countenancing the token-type distinction there is no inconsistency.87 Every mental event is a 
                                                
87 It is relatively common in the early reception of Davidson for commentators to take the three 
premises of anomalous monism to be prima facie inconsistent. Honderich argues that the 
conjunction of the first and second “denies” (1982: 23) the third. “Taking the strict law principle 
seriously makes it seem as though the initial premise of the argument was simply false and mental 
events cannot causally interact with physical events at all. In the author’s [Davidson’s] view, 
however, the conflict is only apparent,” (Harbecke 2008: 119). 
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physical event and when a mental event is causally related to a physical event it is their 
physical properties which instantiate a strict law as per the cause-law thesis. So there’s a law 
connecting cause and effect in physical terms; but it is ruled out that there is any law 
connecting them in mental terms. Since the mental event is causally related (by Interaction) 
there must be a law couched in physical terms (by Cause-Law and Anomalism) which means the 
mental event must have physical properties, i.e., Token Identity. The argument is often called 
“groundbreaking,” (Sandis 2009: 1) and “ingenious” (Yalowitz 2005, Hutto 1998, Blackburn 
2005, Smart 2007) in part because it argues deductively from plausible premises to 
substantive conclusion in line with naturalistic physicalism. Anomalous monism caught the 
interest of a generation of philosophers. 
The argument goes through and Anomalous Monism is often considered as a system 
of four propositions. Let’s consider each proposition in turn and note any auxiliary tenets of 
anomalous monism such as the extensionality of causation, and its unique take on the causal 
relata. We have discussed the exclusion problem which looks a lot like Davidson’s argument 
to token identity, so a lot of this looks familiar. But in fact anomalous monism is not the 
same as the generic non-reductive physicalist we were working with in setting up the 
exclusion problem. Only the first premise is the same, so we can forego discussion of 
Interaction.88  
 
3.9.5.1 The Cause-Law Thesis 
According to this premise – also called The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality – 
singular causal interactions are covered by strict (i.e., exceptionless) laws. That is, if an event c 
                                                
88 Some of the premises in the argument of anomalous monism, I take as commitments only 
because Davidson does. Others I have my own reasons for adopting. 
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causes an event e, then there are properties H and J such that c instantiates H and e 
instantiates J; and all H instantiations nomologically necessitate J instantiations. 
First, a few minor notes that may or may not be obvious. Anomalous monism asserts 
that there is, metaphysically speaking, some contingently necessary law covering every causal 
interaction among singular events. However, this is consistent with there being, epistemically 
speaking, ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences.89 Also, “strict” is not equivalent to 
deterministic. Indeterministic laws are consistent with the cause-law thesis because 
probabilistic versions of strict laws are possible as well, Davidson (1970: 219) affirms. What 
distinguishes a strict law from other kinds of laws (e.g., ceteris paribus laws) “is not so much 
the guaranteeing of the effect by satisfaction of the antecedent as the inclusion, in the 
antecedent, of all conditions and effects which could possibly prevent the occurrence of the 
effect,” (Yalowitz 2006: Section 3.1). 
 Where are we to find strict laws? Much of the secondary literature takes it that only 
physics issues in strict laws. Thus the properties, H and J, are properties of physics. However, 
Davidson is more chary: “It is plausible that there is a set of concepts (perhaps there are 
many such sets) which lend themselves to the formulation of” strict laws. Let us call these the 
concepts of physics,” (1995: xy). Davidson here is not yet talking about the social practice of 
whatever is done in physics departments; he is not talking about an idealized physics either; 
he has only used certain letters “P,” “H,” “Y,” “S,” “I,” “C,” “S” to refer to his notion that 
there is a set of concepts which lend themselves to the formulation of strict laws. I’d argue 
that we may as well call it “schmysics.” It need not be “physics,” neither contemporary nor 
idealized.  
                                                
89 It has sometimes been noted, in any case, that ceteris paribus laws might need underwriting by 
strict laws. See Kim (2006). 
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All anomalous monism asserts is that there is a strict law connecting causal events.  It 
holds only that there is such a law; it need make no commitment to our coming to know the 
law. The cause-law thesis is after all a metaphysical claim not an epistemological one. 
 
3.9.5.2 Anomalism of the Mental 
I am going to assume this premise. I am not going to reconstruct Davidson’s arguments for 
the anomalism of the mental in their entirety. I just want to describe what Davidson holds, 
which includes his epistemic arguments and his metaphysical conclusions.  
The anomalism premise has two parts: there are no psychological laws – left to right, 
so to speak – and no psychophysical laws – neither up to down nor down to up. First, 
Davidson holds that the intentional action explanations that make essential reference to 
mental properties (reasons) do not invoke psychological laws, but instead are broadly 
“hermeneutic.” (See Chapter One.) Actions are explained by being made “intelligible,” an 
endeavor which falls under Verstehen and not Erklären (see Chapter One). We explain an 
agent’s action by reference to what would be rational for the agent to do given the beliefs and 
desires we attribute to the agent.  
 
What grounds might there be for saying that a person going downstairs is off to fetch 
the dinner wine if, for example, we know they believe that the wine is upstairs, or if 
we know they want beer with dinner? And, supposing they do go fetch the wine, what 
ground could there be for saying that they desired to fetch the beer, unless we also 
hold that they believed that the wine they fetched is after all beer? The contents of the 
mental states it makes sense to ascribe to agents in order to explain their actions 
depend upon their interrelating holistically so as to render the overall pattern of their 
mental states and actions roughly rational, that is, roughly so that they meet 
normative standards according to which their actions are appropriate in light of their 
beliefs and desires (Manning 2006: 472). 
 
Second, Davidson holds that there are no strict laws connecting mental with physical events – 
none by virtue of which mental events could be predicted or explained, even from full 
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knowledge of the physics of the relevant physical event.90 This means to be a denial of bridge 
laws. It cannot be a denial of laws covering events in succession because the cause-law thesis 
affirms that there are such laws, albeit only in the physical vocabulary and albeit quite 
unknown to us. I’ll explain. 
According to the cause-law thesis, there is some law connecting each mental event 
that is a cause of a physical event to that physical event. Because of token identity, the cause-
law thesis connects (in succession, left to right) events of both types to events of both types. 
After all, a mental event is also a physical event. They are lawfully connected qua physical 
event but they are connected. There are no mentally-formulated laws connecting events of 
both types whereas there are (in principle) physically-formulated laws connecting events of 
both types, but these latter we may not necessarily come to know. 
 Now, Davidson gave at least three reasons for the anomalism premise; each reason 
worked for both parts, left to right and up and down, any place mentality shows up. They are 
“holism with respect to particular attributions, indeterminancy with respect to systematic 
interpretative frameworks and the responsiveness of mental ascription to an ideal of 
rationality,” (Yalowitz 2005). “According to holism, particular mental states can be cited in 
explanation of behavior only in the context of other mental states, whose ascription in turn 
depends on others” (27). This is supposed to make psychophysical laws impossible.  
The thesis of indeterminacy of translation says that “there are empirically adequate 
but non-equivalent complete frameworks for assigning linguistic meanings and mental states 
to a person on the basis of his behavior, and that there is no fact of the matter that 
determines that one but not other such frameworks is correct,” (27-28). “For if all the 
                                                
90 We discuss below the problem of which physical event is relevant to the given mental event. 
This is the identification problem: Anomalous monism needs a principled way of picking out the 
physical event to which the given mental event is identical.  
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physical facts are consistent with different psychological assignments, then it seems that 
knowing all the physical facts could not tell us whether some mental states were true of some 
person… just as mental anomalism maintains,” (28).  
 
3.9.5.3 Token Identity 
What do the three premises we have just discussed entail? As discussed above, in the early 
days of reaction to Davidson (1970), critics took the three premises to be inconsistent. We 
now understand that what makes the argument go through is a proper countenancing of the 
token-type distinction and an understanding that the causal relation’s relata are events 
(property bearers) not properties.  
Once again the argument works like this: there must be a law connecting the causally 
related events M1 and P2 but there is no strict law of the form, M1 P2, so there must be 
some other property of M, namely P1 which is covered by a strict law with P2. M1 is the 
same event as P1. The token identity is a metaphysical claim. It says that there is such an 
identity and, further, that there must be. But do we know which physical event the reason is 
identical to? (Problems surrounding answers to this question are discussed below in the 
section on the so-called “identification problem,” which is about determining what’s identical 
to what in token-identity theories.) 
Token identity says that every mental event is numerically identical to (or just is) some 
physical event, although not every physical event is a mental event. This gives us an 
understanding of how a kind of mental causation is possible. The given mental event (the 
reason) is shown to be identical to a physical event which thereby falls under a law and 
thereby can be a cause. So the reason is identical to the thing that counts as a cause. 
(Challenges to this aspect of the view are discussed below in the section on the qua problem.) 
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One problem to briefly consider is the challenge brought up by Leder (1995). He 
argues that to find the token identities it would require a considerable amount of type-
identities. “The only empirical evidence for specific token-identities could be type-identities 
between other mental and physical properties,” (p.42). But this is to confuse, again, 
epistemology with metaphysics. That there is a token identity is known a priori. It would be an 
epistemological endeavor to attempt to find what’s identical to what.91 
 
3.9.6 Anomalous Monism Dodges the Exclusion Problem 
The basic thrust of the exclusion problem is that one event out competes another for causal 
efficacy. But if Davidson’s argument achieves token identity then the two events are one and 
the same. And it’s hard to conceive how an event can compete with itself. (And if it does, it’s 
hard to see how it could lose.) So, the anomalous monism framework rules out the exclusion 
problem. 
Instead of the exclusion problem, anomalous monism falls foul of the “identification 
problem” and “the qua problem,” which are quite different from the exclusion problem. 
Critics of anomalous monism in fact press the qua problem not the exclusion problem when 
they press “problem of mental causation” against anomalous monism. But we should take 
this opportunity to note again the differences between the exclusion and qua problems. First, 
the exclusion problem makes use of Causal Closure while the qua problem for anomalous 
monism uses the Cause-Law Thesis.92 Causal Closure is an existential claim that a cause exists. 
The Cause-Law Thesis is a claim about the nature of causation. The main question in the qua 
                                                
91 Certain identities or neural correlates may be suggested or “discovered” but psychophysical 
laws allowing for the exceptionless prediction and explanation of action is ruled out by 
Anomalism. 
 
92 Also called the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation. 
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problem framework – in virtue of what is c a cause of e? – does not arise in the exclusion 
problem framework until a theory of the nature of causation is adopted.  
 
§ 
 
3.10 Anomalous Monism and the Identification Problem 
Before pursuing the qua problem at length we should consider briefly the identification 
problem.   
 
3.10.1 The Identification Problem 
Anomalous monism asserts a physical-mental token identity and denies that there are 
psychophysical laws. Proponents of the identification problem argue that “if there are no 
psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical descriptions of events it must be a brute 
fact or coincidence that physical events have the properties they do,” (Campbell 2008: 31, italics 
added). That is, there is nothing in Davidson’s account – apparently – that would allow us to 
provide a principled relationship between the physical and the mental; that is, nothing “that 
would allow us to understand how it is that a particular event with certain causal powers is 
also the mental event it is,” (31-32). In other words, why does this one event have both the 
physical and mental properties that it does have? If given P there seems no principled way to 
pick out the relevant M; if given M there seems no principled way to pick out the relevant P. 
If there is no way to move from the physical to the mental, then the mental properties that 
physical events do indeed have will seem unfortunately arbitrary. There seems to be no way 
to understand, in Davidsonian terms, why this physical event here, so to speak, is identical to 
this mental event here. The connection is unexplained, the identification problem says. “That 
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any event should be a token of both types (on an occasion) is beyond explanation,” Stoutland 
(1980: 358) says, by which he means brute or unexplained. “For if it is a brute fact without 
explanation that the reason that explains an action just happens to be identical to the physical 
event that causes it, we seem to have fallen short of giving reasons genuine causal efficacy,” 
(32).  
This problem is in fact one of the earliest brought to bear as a challenge to anomalous 
monism (Honderich 1982, Smith 1983). It has not been addressed much since, as a massive 
discussion grew up around problems of mental causation, in particular the exclusion problem 
and the qua problem. The identification problem will have to be met in order for anomalous 
monism to give an account of genuine mental causation.  
 Let’s begin by asking the anomalous monist how we are to pick out the physical event 
which is identical to a given mental event. If this is suggesting that one could pick out the 
physical event without a mental event already “in hand” so to speak, then it is not only 
violating the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology but it is violating what I take 
to be the order of explanation between the two, which we established in the discussion of 
“the priority of the phenomenon” thesis. This is what certainly seems to be happening in 
Yalowitz (2009): “If there are no explanatory relations between mental and physical 
properties, how is it possible that the psychological generalization that some individual will 
(given that he has certain reasons) open an umbrella on a certain occasion, predict an event 
that is also (under a different description) predicted by the physical laws?” (Yalowitz 2009: 
48) This latter clause says “predict,” which is an epistemic notion.  
According to the Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis of Chapter One, first our 
epistemology of the reason delivers its result. Then and only then do we try to give a 
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metaphysical accounting to understand how that reason could be a part of the successful 
explanation that it actually is a part of. Epistemological success first, then metaphysics.  
 To further explain what I mean by the order of explanation between epistemology 
and metaphysics, consider Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) doctrine of “program explanation.” 
Jackson and Pettit make a relevantly similar point. According to their project, a property can 
be causally relevant to an effect without being itself causally efficacious with respect to that effect. 
The causally efficacious properties are those, Jackson and Pettit say, that are “lower down,” 
so to speak, most likely physical properties; while causally relevant properties are those that 
feature essentially in a so-called program explanation, which is really just any adequate and 
true higher order explanation. For example, consider two explanations operating at different 
levels or orders of explanation: (A) Because some of its atoms decayed, versus (B) Because 
these particular atoms decayed. A and B are both explanations of the same phenomenon, let’s 
assume; A is a higher order explanation containing an existential quantifier and it “programs” 
for the particular causally efficacious properties featured in the explanation operating at a 
lower order or level. Jackson and Pettit ask: “How are we to describe the relationship 
between such a [causally relevant but causally inefficacious] property and an effect?” (1990, 
p.114).  Their answer:  
 
The realization of the property ensures – it would be enough to have made it suitably 
probable – that a crucial productive property is realized and, in the circumstances, 
that the event, under a certain description, occurs. The property-instance does not 
figure in the productive process leading to the event but it more or less ensures that a 
property-instance which is required for that process does figure. A useful metaphor 
for describing the role of the property is to say that its realization programs for the 
appearance of the productive property and, under a certain description, for the event 
produced. 
 
The fact that epistemology comes “first” before metaphysics works as a response to the 
identification problem. Where Jackson & Pettit say “programs for” I could say “posits.” It 
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doesn’t matter what I say instead of “programs for.” What I find useful in Jackson and Pettit 
is the headspace it gets one into. On my view it would be epistemology “programming for” 
metaphysical commitments. The successful explanation (in the epistemological domain) 
imputes to us certain metaphysical commitments with respect to causation. 
 In a slogan, “epistemology posits metaphysics” or epistemological success imputes to 
us certain metaphysical commitments. This is a “kantian” – small “k,” big “ian” – attitude 
towards metaphysics insofar as the position it gives to epistemology is prior to metaphysics. 
That is, there is no point to speculative metaphysics – no point to trying to decide how many 
angels can dance on the head of a pin – aside from the purpose metaphysics plays in 
grounding success in epistemology. I return to this discussion in the Conclusion to this 
dissertation. 
 
§ 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have surveyed the mind-body problem and the mental causation debate. 
We focused on the popular exclusion problem championed by Kim. We also conducted a 
small literature review of the mental causation literature with respect to some canonical 
attempted solutions to the exclusion problem.  
 In the next chapter, we discuss what has been the central critical issue with respect to 
anomalous monism – namely, the qua problem. 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ANOMALOUS MONISM AND THE QUA PROBLEM 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Criticism of anomalous monism is widespread and extremely influential.93 Kim 
(1993b) writes that philosophers believe with “an impressive if unsurprising unanimity” (20) 
that anomalous monism entails epiphenomenalism about mental properties.94 Davidson puts 
forth, as we have noted, three theses, roughly: (i) mental events cause physical events (ii) 
causal relations are backed by strict laws and (iii) there are no strict laws of psychology. These 
may look inconsistent. The way Kim and McLaughlin (1993) present the objection, however, 
is, not as a matter of inconsistency. Instead, they propose to allow Davidson all of his claims 
– including auxiliary theses such as token identity and extensional causation – but argue that 
his final position unhappily entails mental type epiphenomenalism. This being the case, the 
                                                
93 In my view, the non-reductive physicalist’s trouble with the “exclusion problem” for events 
and/or properties traces back to this criticism of Davidson. As Bennett (2006) writes: “[It is 
accepted that] it makes good sense to talk about the causal efficacy of properties, to say that c 
(your thirst, say) caused e (your movement towards the kitchen) in virtue of or qua some but not 
other of its [c’s] properties. This idea – and the worry that establishing the causal efficacy of 
particular (token) mental events… does not guarantee the efficacy of event-types or properties – 
attracted attention in the wake of Davidson’s defense of anomalous monism,” (p. 34).  
 
94 Earliest examples include Stoutland (1980), Honderich (1982), Sosa (1984), and Dretske (1989). 
Recent recapitulations of the criticism occur in Harbecke (2008) and Campbell (2008). Defenses 
of Davidson against type-epiphenomenalism include Gibb (2006), which asserts confusion about 
properties and predicates on the part of the critics, and Campbell (1997, 2003b), which pivots on 
causation as an extensional relation. My tack is different from both insofar as I allow the critics 
the entailment of type-epiphenomenalism, but argue it is no liability given proper understanding 
of other auxiliary propositions.  
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way for me to adjudicate the matter best would be to present what all parties agree to and 
then to consider what is in fact entailed. I must also adjudicate whether this entailment is a 
liability or not. 
In the end, my conclusion in the following sections will be that were mental type 
epiphenomenalism entailed by anomalous monism in exactly the way the critics formulate it, 
then this would nevertheless not be any liability for anomalous monism. The structure of 
Kim’s actual argument seems to be that anomalous monism entails type-epiphenomenalism 
which itself entails an additional thesis, namely that mental properties play no role in causal 
explanations of action, i.e., Catastrophe. But Kim is wrong about the second entailment: even if 
anomalous monism entails type-epiphenomenalism, it is not entailed that mental properties 
play no causal role in action explanation. 
So my position amounts to saying that the critics misunderstand what their objection 
actually amounts to. The qua problem qua qua problem is really about the metaphysical 
grounding of the causal relation which is a matter separate from the role of mental properties 
in folk psychological explanation. In order to show this, I analyze the representation of causal 
explanations that all parties to the debate agree upon, c’s being F caused e’s being G, and all 
that follows from it, which all parties are committed to. In the next part of this chapter, I 
articulate and defend an account of the metaphysical grounding of the causal relation that 
does not appear in the mental causation literature. But let me begin with a more complete 
reconstruction of the debate. 
 
§ 
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4.2 The Criticism 
The widely accepted objection against Davidson’s anomalous monism is that the candidate 
token event may cause the effect but it does not cause it qua mental event, or, in other 
words, not in virtue of its mental properties. This allegedly unhappy result is 
straightforwardly entailed by the tenets of anomalous monism, say the critics. Recall that 
Davidson is committed to the following:  
 
1. Mental Causation): some mental events cause physical events;  
2. Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation): When two events are related as 
cause and effect they have descriptions under which they instantiate a strict law;  
3. Mental Anomalism and Irreducibility): There are no strict laws of psychology and no 
strict psycho-physical laws, by which mental events could be predicted or 
explained with physical terms.95 
 
The second premise tells us what it is to be a cause. To be a cause is to be causally related to 
an effect, of course; but, according to (2), the causal relation is backed by strict laws. So what 
it is to be a cause is to be related to an event (the effect) by a strict law. But the only strict 
laws available are laws instantiated by physical properties; and these might be available only 
in principle, in some idealized future completed physics.96 McLaughlin expresses what 
anomalous monism entails this way: 
 
4. Type-Epiphenomenalism): (a) Events cause other events in virtue of falling under 
physical types, but (b) no event can cause anything in virtue of falling under a 
mental type. 
 
                                                
95 In fact, in order for the argument to token identity to go through (3) must also claim that the 
only strict laws available are laws instantiated by physical properties. It is plausible that Davidson 
meant to claim this and let’s assume it here.    
 
96 Subtleties of this idealization not broached by Kim or McLaughlin. 
 
  134 
A large number of intuition pumps sharing the same form are brought to bear by many 
critics, represented here by McLaughlin and Kim. For one example, a silver and square 
paperweight dropped on wax will produce an indentation in the wax. But it is the 
paperweight’s mass and square shape, not its silver color, that seem causally relevant to the 
impression made (Robb & Heil 2000). What’s pumped is the intuition that causes cause their 
effects in virtue of some properties and not others. Anomalous monism’s answer is 
counterintuitive. Mental events intuitively cause behavior in virtue of their mental properties, 
but anomalous monism goes in for physical properties.  
As I said, this is supposed to be an unhappy result. Interestingly, nowhere in 
McLaughlin (1993) can I find an evaluative expression with respect to this entailment being a 
liability or a virtue. McLaughlin merely argues that Type-E is entailed. Kim (1993) argues that it 
is entailed and that this is a liability. Here is Kim: 
 
“On Davidson’s account there is no causal role for mental properties in 
psychological explanation,” (19).  
 
[It] “… consign(s) mental properties to epiphenomena,” (1998: 33-34).  
 
“… anomalous properties are causally and explanatorily impotent, and it is doubtful 
that they can have any useful role at all,” (1989/1993: 271). 
 
“… [F]or if something that purports to be a theory of mental causation assigns no 
causal role to mental properties – if it has nothing to say about the causal powers of 
mental properties while having plenty to say about those of physical properties – the 
theory can, it seems to me, reasonably be said to be epiphenomenalistic with regard 
to mental properties, (1993: 20-21). 
 
“[T]his means that individual events can enter into causal relations only because they 
possess physical properties that figure in laws. Consider an example: Your desire for 
a drink of water causes you to turn on the tap. On Davidson’s nomological 
conception of causation, this requires a law that subsumes the two events, your 
desiring a drink of water and your turning on the tap. However, psychophysical 
anomalism says that this law must be a physical law, since there are no laws 
connecting mental-event kinds with physical-event kinds.… [T]he fact that it is an 
event of this mental kind… apparently has no bearing on its causation of your 
turning on the tap…. Mental events play no role in making mental events either 
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causes or effects… We must therefore conclude that Davidson’s anomalous monism 
fails to pass the test of mental causation; by failing to account for the causal efficacy 
and relevance of mental properties, it fails to explain the possibility of mental 
causation, (2006: 188-189). 
 
The reason Type-E seems devastating is because the salience of our practice of reason 
explanation commits us very deeply to a causal explanatory role for mental properties. As 
we’ve said, if they are not causally explanatory then that important practice falls apart. So, I 
would assert that a hidden part of Kim’s argument against Davidson says that Type-E entails 
or at least leads to what we have been calling the Catastrophe Thesis. Again: 
 
 
5. Catastrophe): Mentality plays no role in the causal explanation of intentional  
  action. 
 
In the next section, I begin my criticism of the critics,97 by first laying out the shared 
assumptions about causal explanations, the deeper implications of which I later argue the 
critics fail to understand.  
 
§ 
 
4.3 The Canonical Formula For Causal Explanations 
When we ask for an explanation it is because we find ourselves in an epistemic deficit. There 
was an event, e, or, more precisely, a particular aspect of it, G,98 which now stands in need of 
explanation. So we ask: 
                                                
97 Before moving on though, I should say that, to my mind, the problem between Davidson and 
McLaughlin/Kim cannot be satisfactorily solved by noting how regularly Davidson spoke of 
predicates or descriptions and not properties. See footnote xy above. Davidson himself and 
others have certainly tried this defense. But it would isolate anomalous monism from the 
contemporary discussion, which is usually conducted in terms of properties and not predicates. 
And in any case, McLaughlin and Kim take Davidson to be talking about properties of things, 
not just linguistic ways of approaching things. 
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 6.) Why is e G? (Why did e become G?) 
 
That is, we might ask: 
 
 Why did this building collapse? 
 Why did this wine glass shatter? 
 Why did Jill return to the bank? 
 
Let’s call “e’s being G” the primary explanandum. In response to questions of this form there 
comes an explanation, for example: 
  
Hurricane Katrina! 
The wine glass shattered because the soprano emitted a sound wave with acoustic 
properties P. 
Because she left her glasses there. 
 
These explanations can take considerably different surface forms and are undoubtedly 
enthymematic. For example, uttering “Hurricane Katrina!” is a causal explanation of why the 
given building collapsed because it offers the event described as Hurricane Katrina as the cause of 
the event described as the building collapsing. In this debate, the descriptions are reformulated into a 
gerundial form of “to be,” thus: the event’s being Hurricane Katrina caused the event’s being a building 
collapse. Indeed, all parties to the debate I am discussing are in agreement with respect to 
representing the canonical formulation of causal explanations in this manner, like this: 
 
7. Form of Causal Explanation, CE): c’s being F caused e’s being G 
 
                                                                                                                                             
98 Even more precisely: Rather than the event or the property, it is actually “e coming to be (or 
becoming) G” that stands in need of explanation.  
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where, c and e are particular token events, and F and G are descriptions, predicates, types or 
properties of c and e respectively.99 Including its token-type structure, this is indeed the 
formula all of the participants use.100  
Nevertheless, it would behoove us to review why we ought to think it is the correct 
formula. 
 
§ 
 
4.4 Epistemically Adequate Explanatory Generalizations 
One of the strongest considerations in favor of CE is the observation that to identify the 
cause of an effect (or to state that a causal relation holds between the primary explanandum 
and one’s candidate cause) is not yet to explain that effect. This is because it is possible that 
there be a difference in explanatory adequacy between two true singular causal claims that 
refer to the same two events. Compare, for example, the two following singular causal 
claims: 
  
 8a.) “The hurricane caused the building to collapse” and  
 8b.) “The event reported on page one of the newspaper caused the building to  
collapse.”101  
                                                
99 It is standard in this debate to speak of particular events which token a variety of different 
types. This is the Davidsonian notion of events as opposed to the Kimian notion of events – the 
latter takes the token event to be the instantiation (intuitively an event) of a specific type at a time, 
t, where what instantiates the type is the thing that has that type or property. It would be 
unfortunate if Kim’s criticism of Davidson turned on their talking past each other because of 
different notions of “events.” Kim insists this is not the case.  
 
100 Kim himself says, “… it makes sense to ask questions of the form ‘What is it about events c 
and e that makes it the case that c is a cause of e?’ and be able to answer them, intelligibly and 
informatively, by saying something like ‘Because c is an event of kind F and e is one of kind G’,” 
(22). 
 
  138 
 
These two sentences are, let’s say, extensionally equivalent (they are referring to the same 
events) and (let us suppose) both true. But even when they are both true, the second 
sentence is not explanatory because… well, it is difficult to say. In our example, an event’s 
being a hurricane does seem explanatorily relevant to another event’s being a building 
collapsing. This may be because we are familiar with the former type of thing typically 
causing the latter type of thing. We are not familiar with any general tendency for events 
reported in the newspaper causing buildings to collapse. But some generalization relates the 
other types, like this: “Hurricanes make buildings collapse.” Maybe that particular 
generalization relating those types is not explanatory enough for some purposes. In that case, 
to be explanatory F and G would have to express a relation between, maybe, wind speeds 
and yield strength of the building materials. In any case, participants to this debate all agree 
that in order to be explanatory F and G will instantiate a generalization relating them as 
types. Not “the hurricane caused the building to collapse” (a singular causal statement) but 
“winds of 200 mph tend to cause wood to reach its yield point,” a statement connecting all 
instances of 200 mph winds to wood yielding, i.e., a generalization. What more can be said 
about generalizations between F and G that are actually explanatory? 
I discuss what’s required of the relation between F and G in order for explanation to 
succeed in more detail below. For now let’s just note the second sentence about the 
hurricane, (b), lacks whatever it takes to achieve epistemic satisfaction and therefore lacks what 
                                                                                                                                             
101 I have italicized the candidate cause (appearing under different descriptions) in both 
sentences. This example is of course adapted from Davidson (1963, p. 16) and may seem 
overused, but it remains misunderstood. 
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I will call “explanatory adequacy.”102 The point is that because (8a) is explanatorily adequate 
and (8b) is not – yet both are true – the truth of the causal statement, we can see, does not 
depend on how the relata are described.103 That stands in favor of revising CE into CE*, 
which better represents the fact the causal relation and causal explanation can be pulled apart 
in the way just described: 
 
9. Intensional Causal Explanation [CE*]): c caused e and c’s being F causally explains e’s 
being G. 
 
Now, what does it takes for a relation between F and G to be explanatory? We earlier 
(Section 2.1.3) examined the literature on scientific explanation which has moved from 
Hempel’s deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation to widespread 
dissatisfaction with that account. There is a long list of alternative accounts, including 
Salmon’s statistical-relevance account, Friedman and Kitcher’s unificationist accounts, David 
Lewis’s account of causal explanation as providing information about the explanandum’s 
causal history, transfer of energy accounts, and Woodward’s interventionist account. My 
                                                
102 Throughout, whenever I say “causal explanation” I intend an epistemic notion. There may 
be such a thing as metaphysical explanation, but it should be clear that I am talking about 
epistemological matters when I talk about adequate causal explanations of events here. On the 
other hand, the metaphysical, extensional, causal relation is not intended to be epistemic but 
metaphysical. (The epistemic appeal to it, though, while itself not being metaphysical, grounds 
the causal explanation in factive events.) As usual, just what “metaphysical” means is difficult to 
say, but here I suppose I am using it to mean something like “beyond our best epistemologies,” 
which is a “kantian” sense, small “k,” big “ian.”  
 
103 We can see that singular causally explanatory claims exhibit intensionality, such that 
explanatory adequacy is not preserved upon substitution of co-referential terms. In other words, 
“The hurricane” and “The event reported on page one of the newspaper” can be descriptions that refer to 
the same event, but when we substitute one for the other, the status of the explanatory 
adequacy of the true singular causal claim changes. Antony (1989) misunderstands the 
significance of the hurricane case. She says “While it could be perfectly obvious that the event 
reported on page 5 of Tuesday's Times caused the event reported on page 13 of Wednesday's 
Tribune, it would be ludicrous to look for a law relating events of these kinds” (p. 164). She 
mistakenly takes (8b) to be explanatory, which entirely misses Davidson’s point. 
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purpose here is not to characterize scientific explanation in toto but just to survey the variety 
of ways a causal generalization might be conceived to achieve adequacy. 
I imagine a continuum from very minimal requirements to requirements that are 
robust to the point of being unattainable. On the end of the continuum with the most 
minimal requirements, our first stab at the explanatory relation between F and G, we could 
call the “causal lore” view. It is just whatever minimal connection between those two descriptions that 
remedies the epistemic deficit in regards to the primary explanandum. Importantly, such a remedy of the 
contextual epistemic lack may or may not be accompanied by a mere psychological buzz or 
“feel-good.”104 
 So on the causal lore view of the relation between F and G that is required for 
explanatory adequacy, we would say: 
 
10. Causal Lore): c caused e and c’s being F and e’s being G is some lore that has the 
minimal virtue of remedying the epistemic deficit in regards to the primary 
explanandum.  
 
So now on a slightly more demanding view of what’s required for F and G we might say: 
 
11. More or Less Strict): c caused e and c’s being F and e’s being G instantiate a more or 
less strict law or ceteris paribus generalization. 
 
Or, in the specific domain of reason explanation:  
 
12. Constitutive ideal of rationality): c caused e and some relevant platitude of folk 
psychology is invoked. 
                                                
104 Rather than allowing the mere feel-good buzz of explanation to count as adequately 
explanatory, we should demand more be true than some psychological fact about the hearer. On 
the other hand, when an explanation is explanatory, we do empirically often get “epistemic 
satisfaction” (some take it to be a kind of buzz or intuitive feel that explanation has been 
accomplished). As Keil & Wilson (2000) say, “There is a sense both that a given explanation 
satisfies a cognitive need, and that a questionable or dubious one does not.” 
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Now let’s imagine the most demanding view on causal explanatory adequacy. 
 
13. Procrustean): c caused e and c’s being F and e’s being G instantiate a strict law of an 
ideal physics. 
 
 How shall we choose which is the correct account of the required relation between 
F and G in an explanation to achieve genuine explanatory adequacy?  For my part, I think I 
can mostly stay out of the fight. The participants in the debate between Davidson and Kim 
do not feel the need. All we need to do is take it as given that some reason explanations 
somewhere are adequate without requiring they be Procrustean explanations. That is to say, for 
my purposes, any position from Causal Lore on down will work as long as it is not as 
demanding as the Procrustean account. The Procrustean view, if correct, would have untoward 
ramifications for anomalous monism, as I have laid it out. It would amount to a denial of my 
central claim that identifying a causal relation is not the same as offering an adequate 
explanation. But I would argue it is a mistake to affirm the Procrustean view of causal 
explanatory adequacy, and McLaughlin and Kim do not explicitly endorse it in the articles 
I’m reviewing.105  
I call the most demanding view “Procrustean,” because instantiation of strict laws is 
a bad fit for epistemic adequacy. This view would force our epistemic notions about causal 
explanation into a Procrustean bed of metaphysical notions about the relation between 
causes and what grounds them – often laws – more about which later. It would eviscerate 
the explanatory adequacy of every special science and even of any non-ideal physics.  
                                                
105 Although Kim seems to endorse it elsewhere, namely, in his discussion of “explanatory 
exclusion,” (1989). 
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Much less than what is demanded by the Procrustean view will provide epistemic 
adequacy. Many philosophers, when discussing properties and necessary and sufficient 
conditions for explanatory adequacy, talk about the nomic subsumption of properties. But 
they are making a metaphysical point, I believe. As far as the necessary requirement on the 
relation between F and G for an explanation to be adequate, we are asking about epistemic 
matters. And with respect to epistemic causal explanation, “Ignorance of competent 
predictive laws does not inhibit valid causal explanation, or few causal explanations could be 
made” (Davidson 1963: 16). So unless we want to eviscerate the explanatory adequacy of 
every discipline of knowledge except fundamental physics, we need to deny the Procrustean 
view of the second (epistemic) necessary condition on an explanation’s explanatory 
adequacy.106 
 
§ 
 
4.5 Two Conditions On Causal Explanations’ Adequacy 
The arguments I gave above for adopting CE* can be recast as suggesting two necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions on the explanatory adequacy of causal explanations. We say a 
causal explanation asserts a causal relation between two events; that is natural enough. But 
that the asserted causal relation hold is not sufficient for the adequacy of the explanation that 
asserts it. The hurricane example shows this. But we can also see that this is a necessary 
condition. That the asserted causal relation hold is necessary because it grounds the 
                                                
106 As is well known, in order to be explanatory these generalizations cannot be accidental, they 
must be law-like; but this is a difficult distinction to delineate. The necessity distinct from 
accident in these generalizations is discussed in Section 4.6 below. 
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explanation insofar as causally explaining one thing by appealing to another thing would not 
be possible if there were no causal relationship between the two things. 
 So, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition on an adequate causal explanation 
that its asserted causal relation be true. (Let’s call this condition the “metaphysical” or 
“groundedness” condition on adequate causal explanatory statements.) Now when we ask, 
“What more is needed in a causal explanation, besides a true causal relation, to make the 
causal explanation adequately explanatory?” a ready answer is that the grounded cause be 
described in an epistemically informative way relative to the effect-event. As the hurricane 
example hints, the candidate cause must be described in an informative way relative to the 
description of the given-event in the primary explanandum. That is, F and G must be related 
by some epistemically informative generalization connecting their relevant types. This 
condition of informativeness, we can call the “epistemic” condition on adequate causal 
explanatory statements. In any case, the epistemic condition is a second necessary condition, 
which, jointly with the necessary fact of the causal relation, might be considered a sufficient 
condition for adequate causal explanations. 
We should now consider a different example in order to see how the two conditions 
hang together. First note that the hurricane example is a case where the epistemic condition 
is not met while the metaphysical or “groundedness” one is. We now need the case where 
the “groundedness” condition is clearly not met, while the epistemic one arguably is. 
Reverend Pat Robertson may say that flooding in New Orleans was caused by God’s 
displeasure at the city’s moral corruption; and that may be explanatorily satisfying 
(psychologically-speaking) to people for whom there is an explanatory generalization 
between God’s anger and natural disasters. That is, it may meet the necessary condition that 
the descriptions of the events advert to an explanatory generalization. But Robertson’s 
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explanation is false or non-explanatory because it does not meet the necessary condition that 
there actually, truly, be an extensional causal relation between the candidate cause and the 
event in primary explanandum. 
It should now be clear that Davidson holds (and his critics wish to grant him) that 
the causal relation is a relation between token particular107 events (not between types) and 
that various types, descriptions, predicates and properties can be more or less informative 
ways of describing those particular token events, so as to achieve epistemic satisfaction and 
explanatory adequacy. So c and e are related as particulars by the causal relation, and F and G 
are related by some explanatory generalization. 
We may therefore parse Davidson and the critics’ shared representation of causal 
explanations this way: 
 
14.) c and e are related by the causal relation; and c’s being F causally explains e’s being 
G, because F and G are types related by an explanatory generalization. 
 
 
§ 
 
4.6 What Metaphysically Undergirds The Causal Relation? 
According to the previous section, referring to the fact of c’s being F is causally explanatory 
with respect to e’s being G because of, or indeed, in virtue of F and G being related by some 
explanatory generalization. With that in virtue of question on our lips, we may ask further what 
in virtue of which are c and e related by the causal relation. That is we may ask, in virtue of 
what are c and e related by the relation of causation? (I put it carefully so as to preclude an 
                                                
107 The critics also allow Davidson his point that causation is a two-place relation not a multi-
place relation with some place for relevancy and the like. It is not “cause as” as Davidson insisted 
it was not. See (McLaughlin 1993).  
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epistemic understanding.) They, c and e, will be so related in virtue of108 some of their 
properties instantiating a relation that backs or grounds the causal relation, to put it 
tautologically. But the question is what is the relation that backs or grounds the causal 
relation?   
 In the context of this debate, what backs the causal relation is taken to be some 
necessary relation. This is what most readers take Davidson to have meant by a “strict law” 
of an idealized physics. And whether one prefers a nomic subsumption view like that 
endorsed by Kim and McLaughlin in Davidson’s stead, or a counterfactual account without 
nomic necessities, there is still an idea of necessity involved in our idea of causation. As Kim 
writes in his textbook,  
 
“A principle connecting laws and causation that is widely, if not universally, accepted, 
is this: Causally connected events must instantiate, or be subsumed under, a law. If heating a 
metallic rod causes its length to increase, there must be a general law connecting 
events of the first type and events of the second type,” (2006: 188, italics in the 
original). 
 
It might be enough for the epistemological case of explaining some particular fact that the 
law be only ceteris paribus. However, as far as what undergirds the causal relation as a 
metaphysical matter, it should be clear we need strict laws which express relations of 
necessity between the cause and effect.109  
Now, even for those who do not take the nomological approach, necessity remains 
relevant. The counterfactual approach, as Kim notes, seems not to require laws, but does not 
                                                
108 I speak this way now, although in Chapter 5 I consider that the “in virtue of” order of 
explanation might go the other way around. 
 
109 For a discussion of ceteris paribus laws see Lange (2002) and Fodor (1991), which argues that 
Davidson’s strict laws are a special case of ceteris paribus laws, namely when the requirement that 
“all things be equal” is met “vacuously.”        
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deny the kind of necessity under discussion presently. According to the counterfactual 
approach, to say that event c caused event e is to say that if c had not occurred, e would not 
have occurred.110 As Kim says: “The basic idea is that a cause is the sine qua non condition, or 
necessary condition, of its effect…” (189). 
This idea has intuitive plausibility. “The overturned space heater caused the house 
fire. Why do we say that? Because if the space heater had not overturned, the fire would not 
have occurred,” Kim says.111 But there’s more. The necessity appearing in both the 
counterfactual and nomological approach is needed to block mere correlations. To see this, 
consider another example.    
Imagine every time I light a fire in my fireplace an owl hoots outside. It happens a 
whole lot, so I am beginning to want to say that I am causing the owl to hoot by lighting my 
fire. But I am not allowed to conclude there is a causal relation between my lighting the fire 
and the hooting, or the explanation for owl hooting won’t be believed at any rate. It remains 
a coincidence, a mere correlation between the hooting and my lighting the fire.  
If I look into the chimney and see an owl in there I may want to go ahead and assert 
more than a mere correlation. If I do go ahead and claim that my fire caused the owl to hoot, 
basically what I am saying is that this is more than an accident, more than constant 
conjunction, more than correlation. It is the kind of thing that can be predicted and 
intervened upon. When I make a causal statement, in fact, I offer a prediction that certain 
counterfactuals are the case. That is, I say, "were I to light a fire now the owl would hoot." So 
to assert a causal claim is to assert what would necessarily be the case in another possible 
                                                
110 It is also a requirement that there be a chain of “counterfactual dependencies” connecting the 
cause to the effect, and the necessity must be mitigated for cases of pre-emption. But the special 
considerations are not relevant to our discussion. See Lewis (1973). 
 
111 There is, of course, Mackie’s INUS condition theory. 
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world. As Scruton, from whom I adapted the owl example, says "every time we assert the 
existence of a causal connection our thought reaches beyond the actual to embrace the 
possible as well" (77). When we posit a cause we also posit and commit ourselves to there 
being a necessary relation between the posited cause and the given effect.  
The properties in virtue of which c and e are causally related are, therefore, the 
properties that relate c and e necessarily.112 We can add this to our schema thus:  
 
 15. Form of Causal Explanation, Disambiguated or CE**): c and e are related by the 
causal relation in virtue of c’s being H and e’s being J where H and J instantiate a 
necessary relation; and c’s being F causally explains e’s being G, in virtue of F 
and G being related by an explanatory generalization. 
 
 
§ 
 
4.7 Two Distinct In Virtue Of  Questions 
We can now see that there are at least two different ways properties are involved with 
various causal explanatory talk. There is the role properties play in describing the particular 
token events (the cause and the effect) such that reference to the cause under that 
description explains the effect under the description given in the primary explanandum; and 
there is the role of the properties of c and e in virtue of which c and e are related by the 
metaphysical causal relation. H and J are whatever properties in virtue of which two causally 
related events are in fact causally related – whatever properties ground the causal relation, 
whatever properties instantiate the relation of necessity we’ve said backs causation.  
                                                
112 One last thought, the relation of necessity between c and e can itself be contingent. It is 
nomologically necessary, according the laws of nature in the actual world, that if c, then e. But in 
other worlds c and e may not be related by necessity. This is sometimes called contingent 
necessity. 
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 Behind the fact that talk of properties has two roles to play is the fact that there are 
two in virtue of questions to be asked of any causal explanation, one epistemic and one 
metaphysical. About any normal causal explanation we can pose an epistemic question in 
which, basically, we ask for a more informative description of the candidate cause relative to 
the effect given in the primary explanandum. But we can also pose a metaphysical (and non-
epistemic) question about what undergirds or grounds the causal relation. Importantly, these 
two in virtue of questions are two distinct questions. Answers to these two in virtue of questions 
are as logically independent as the hurricane example shows epistemic causal explanations 
and metaphysical causal relations are.113  
A friend of the critics might object by denying that the two questions are numerically 
distinct. One could say that explanation is not achieved until the necessity is demonstrated, 
but that would amount to saying that F is identical to H and G to J, which would involve a 
commitment to what we have called Procrustean notion of epistemic causal explanation. 
We are now finally in a position to see what is wrong with the critics’ program.  
 
§ 
 
4.8 My Criticism Of The Critics’ Objection 
It follows from the original argument for anomalous monism that there are two in virtue of 
questions with respect to causal explanations; but this has been not been recognized by the 
                                                
113 As above I sometimes refer to the metaphysical in virtue of question as simply the “second” in 
virtue of question and the epistemic as the “first” because an inquiry does not become 
metaphysical just by calling it metaphysical. We have seen this before: the Catastrophe thesis is not 
catastrophic in virtue of its name and a relation called the “necessitation” relation does not 
thereby necessitate anything. Many of my interlocutors conflate what I call metaphysics and 
epistemology; I wonder if the word metaphysics continues to remind them of what I mean by it 
(namely what makes a cause be the cause it is., exclusive of our epistemic intuitions.) 
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critics. When asking an in virtue of question in natural language, there can be ambiguity 
between whether you mean a possible metaphysical in virtue of question or a possible 
epistemic in virtue of question. The properties that would answer the in virtue of questions 
come in two flavors, as do the questions. The epistemic in virtue of question does not pose a 
threat to anomalous monism. Why is the epistemic in virtue of question not a threat to 
anomalous monism? In this framework, a merely epistemic question will be either the first 
request for an explanation of the explanandum or it will be a question put to a purported 
explanation that does not achieve adequacy. Provided we do not accept the Procrustean 
requirement on explanatory adequacy, anomalous monism is not threaten by persistent 
epistemic in virtue of questions. 
 We are interested in the metaphysical in virtue of question. However, the key question 
to which the critics accuse Davidson of offering a counterintuitive answer is actually 
ambiguous.114 Here’s a disambiguation: 
 
16. Type-E, Metaphysical Disambiguation): Events are causes of other events in virtue of 
falling under physical types, but no event is a cause of another event in virtue of 
falling under mental types. 
 
To say, as Type-E, Metaphysical Disambiguation does, that “events are causes… in virtue of… 
Q” is to say that a cause and its effect are causally related in virtue of… Q, in this case, 
physical types. But Type-E, Metaphysical Disambiguation does not entail Catastrophe. Here, in one 
long sentence, is why. That an event token (i.e., a cause) is related by the causal relation to 
                                                
114 To the charge of equivocating over an ambiguity, the critics will instantly insist that they are 
indeed asking a metaphysical question. However, unless more is said, all they have asserted is that 
they label their ambiguous in virtue of question with the same word as I label the in virtue of 
question about what grounds causation (not what is explanatory). They would still fail to prevent 
the equivocation I am talking about unless they can show the two questions are not numerical 
distinct, instead of merely showing that these two distinct questions are sometimes called by the 
same name. 
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another event token (i.e., its effect) in virtue of the physical properties of both does not at all 
conflict with the positing of the cause event under a certain (mental) description serving to 
explain the effect under the description in which it appeared in the primary explanandum. 
This is demonstrated via the hurricane example. Mental properties absolutely play an 
important role in causal explanation. (This was the phenomenon we meant to capture in the 
first place.) Are mental properties the properties in virtue of which c and e are metaphysically 
related by the causal relation? No. But to want that that be the case is a mistake. We do not 
need mental properties to undergird the metaphysical causal relation. In fact, we do not want 
that. We want physical properties to undergird the metaphysical causal relation, if we are to 
be physicalists. 
 We want mental events to be causally explanatory. That would thankfully deny 
Catastrophe. But we do not need those events to have the causality they have in virtue of their 
mentality. They need only be actually causally related (and referred to in an appropriate way 
in an explanation).115 In an important sense, then, the power of the in virtue of criticism relies 
on an equivocation. It asks what in virtue of which are c and e related, requesting the 
metaphysical answer. When it hears that answer (“in virtue of something physical”) it charges 
that it is incorrect epistemically-speaking because in intentional explanations of action we say 
that reasons cause actions in virtue of being reasons, or in virtue of their mentality. But that 
is an equivocation. We know it is an equivocation if only because we know that to detail 
what in virtue of which a candidate cause-event is causally related to the given effect-event is 
not sufficient to provide an adequate causal explanation of e’s being G. 
                                                
115 Anomalous monism is given by its critics that the purported token cause event is indeed a 
cause via the original argument from anomalism to token identity. “The very mental event is 
token-identical with a physical event, and thus causally efficacious insofar as the physical event 
with which it is identical is causally efficacious,” (Yoo 2007).   
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 Another way to understand what goes wrong with the charge of type-
epiphenomenalism would be as follows. The critics think they have token identity, type 
nonidentity views on the ropes if those theories cannot seem to answer the in virtue of 
question intuitively. But in fact, the critics do not see an ambiguity in what their question 
asks. The answer from views like Davidson’s to the in virtue of question exhibits the 
suppressed equivocation. The question, again, is: c causes e but in virtue of what is c a cause 
of e? To this I say, explanations that appeal to c’s being F to causally explain e’s being G are 
adequate in virtue of something about the properties of c and e, namely an epistemically 
informative relation between F and G; but that c can be a cause of e is another question, a 
question of a metaphysical nature. An answer to how c can be a cause of e is not going to 
suggest epiphenomenalism one way or the other about causally explanatory statements… 
about the causally explanatory statements that describe the causal relation between c and e in 
an informative way, such that it is clear how c’s being F causally explains e’s being G. 
 In the end, many of the critics’ claims are unclear. I quoted Kim at the beginning as 
saying, “Mental events play no role in making mental events either causes or effects” (2006: 
188-189). If he means something more epistemic, which he denies by the way, then he’s just 
wrong. Mental properties do play a role in showing how George’s going to the fridge is 
caused by his desire for beer. But if Kim means by “making mental events causes of effects,” 
– what I’ve called “grounding” the causal relation between causes and effects – then his 
mistake is to think that that is a challenge to the status of reason explanations. What makes c 
and e related by the causal relation, in this debate, (namely, a law of nature) is much different 
than why appeal to c under a description F causally explains e’s being G. 
 For one more nail in the coffin of this criticism, consider that Kim has says:  
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All that is necessary to see the problem for Davidson is the recognition that it makes 
sense to ask questions of the form “What is it about events c and e that makes it the 
case that c is a cause of e?” and be able to answer them, intelligibility and 
informatively, by saying something like “Because c is an event of kind F and e is one 
of a kind G (and, you may add if you favor a nomic conception of causality, there is a 
law of an appropriate form connecting F-events with G-events)”. This is only to 
acknowledge that the causal relation obtains between a pair of events because they are 
events of a certain kinds, or have certain properties (22). 
  
 However, as I’ve shown, the properties under which c and e are nomically subsumed 
(i.e., those properties in virtue of which c and e are related by the metaphysical causal 
relation) are not the properties we refer to in epistemic causal explanation. So thinking it is 
sensible to ask Kim’s question does not entail that Catastrophe follows for anomalous 
monism.116 
 
§ 
 
4.9 The Shattering Glass Objection 
One might object to what I’ve put forth here with the same intuition pumps used at the 
beginning, during the early criticism of anomalous monism. Objectors to my view could say 
that it is a liability to say that the weight of the rock doesn’t cause but only causally explains the 
window’s breaking. We say that properties are causal not causally explanatory, the objector 
might offer. Critics have offered various intuition pumps. To repeat our earlier example, a 
silver, square paperweight dropped on wax will produce an indentation in the wax. But it is 
the paperweight’s mass and square shape, not its silver color, that seem causally relevant to 
                                                
116 If he means the metaphysical question (i.e., if he means to ask for those properties in virtue of 
which c is related by a relation of necessity to e), then it’s not a liability. If he means it 
epistemically, then it is like the case we discussed above where a purported explanation somehow 
fails to achieve explanatory adequacy and the person in an epistemic deficit about the primary 
explanandum asks for another explanation or a deeper explanation; they ask for a generalization 
between some F and G that is satisfying. 
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the impression made (Robb and Heil 2000). More famously, an opera singer may shatter a 
glass by singing the word “Shatter!” Yet, when we explain the event we say that the word 
caused the glass to shatter in virtue not of its semantic properties but in virtue of, say, its 
acoustic properties (Dretske 1989, Braun 1995). Intuitively, it is a French pear’s weight and 
not its color, nor its “Frenchness,” that makes the scale depress and present its reading 
(Honderich 1982).  
 But the fact that intuition pumps of this form were marshaled against Davidson’s 
anomalous monism is one of the ironies of a philosophical criticism working with dense and 
difficult texts. The intuition pump shares the same form as the one Davidson offered to 
illustrate his account, namely the “hurricane and page one of The Times” case. These pumps, 
clearly, are meant to show that some properties (or types) are relevant and some are not; and 
that, for a given explanandum, we have an intuitive sense of which is which.  
 Those who offer these pumps as considerations against anomalous monism fail to 
notice that the cases they are describing remain, in Davidson’s terms, epistemic causal 
explanations. The properties appearing in those cases of explanations are not the properties 
in virtue of which the cause and the effect are necessarily related. What the critics mean by 
“causal relevance” Davidson means by “explanatory relevance” or what I’ve called 
“epistemic informativeness.” It’s true that a causal explanation requires that the cause actually 
be related to the effect by the metaphysical causal relation, but causal explanation does not 
require that we know the properties in virtue of which they are so related (necessity in many 
accounts), only that it is a fact that they are. 
 
§ 
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4.10 LePore and Loewer on Two Types of Causal Relevance 
LePore and Loewer (1987) draw a distinction between what they call “causal relevance1” and 
“causal relevance2.” Like what I’ve said above, their distinction allows them to show how 
anomalous monism is able to dodge the qua problem. On their account as well, it is the critics 
who equivocate between the two possible meanings of causal talk and thereby violate an 
important distinction. “The confusion is between two ways in which properties of an event c 
may be said to be causally relevant or irrelevant,” to an event e. Consider the following 
locutions: 
 
(a) Properties W and X are causally relevant1 to making it the case that c causes e, and 
(b) c’s possessing property Y is causally relevant2 to e’s possessing property Z. 
 
The distinction that Lepore and Loewer highlight seems rather similar to the distinction that I 
have highlighted. But there are differences. Causal relevance1 is the way properties can be 
relevant to two particular events being related by the causal relation. LePore and Loewer, 
furthermore, hold that W and X need to be connected by a strict law to actually be causally 
relevant1. Causal relevance2 describes what I would call explanatory relevance. In our 
everyday causal explanations, you want to know what property of the cause is causally 
relevant2 to the given property of the effect in the explanandum. When you hear the 
explanation “Because c is Y,” you understand why e became Z. But you may understand such 
without direct appeal to a strict law. “The heart of our response to the claim that anomalous 
monism is committed to epiphenomenalism is this: anomalous monism entails that mental 
features are causally irrelevant1, but does not entail that they are causally irrelevant2,” (LePore 
and Loewer 1989, adjusted slightly). 
 Although they are different distinctions, the one I make and that of LePore and 
Loewer seem to share the same form. However, LePore and Loewer do not make the exact 
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distinction between metaphysics and epistemology that I make here. They do not understand 
the claim that “there is” a strict law as a metaphysical claim and not epistemological. Further, 
they do not offer much of an answer to just what it is that makes it the case that c is a cause 
of e when c is in fact a cause of e. Or, if they do, they say “strict law” without any 
elaboration. I consider possible elaborations below.  
 
§ 
 
4.11 Davidson on “Cause” and “Explain” 
Davidson strikes a distinction between “causal explanation” and “causation.” When people 
use the words “causes,” “cause,” or “caused,” and even “cause in virtue of” they most of the 
time mean causal explanation, Davidson (1967) says. Causal explanation is intensional, mind-
dependent, pragmatic, contextual and so on. The causal relation, Davidson says, is 
extensional, mind-independent, non-pragmatic, noncontextual and so on. More specifically, 
Davidson held that events simpliciter, just the bearers of properties, are the relata of the 
causal relation, not properties. Properties, for their part have their role in causal explanations. 
The causal relation relates events. Does Davidson address the further question of that in 
virtue of which a cause is the cause it is? 
First, just what is the nature of that question? It is supposed to be metaphysical and 
not merely epistemological. Recall after making a distinction that dodges the qua problem, 
then the question to ask is: In virtue of what is a cause a cause? Or, in other words, why does 
a cause have the causality it has? We may begin by offering one place a cause does not derive 
its causality from: a cause does not get its causality in virtue of appearing in a causal 
explanation. It must be a cause already, so to speak, in order for appeal to it in a causal 
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explanation to do any work. As we worked out above, if we have in hand a causal explanation 
that is good, genuine, adequate or true (that refers to mental properties) then we can know 
that there is a strict law relating cause and effect under another description.117 But this is not 
because of appearing in the causal explanation. The cause is metaphysically a cause already, 
perhaps in virtue of falling under a law or perhaps in virtue of nothing – just brutely.  
Whereas Davidson is widely thought to hold that a cause is the cause it is in virtue of 
falling under a strict law with its effect, most of the time Davidson’s published words actually 
remain neutral on the Euthyphronic question of what’s in virtue of what. 
There may be a lot of possible answers to what makes a cause a cause. But 
importantly – and this has not been noticed in the literature – the answer to this question can 
be separated from the fact that when c causes e we have a law. That is, it could be that a 
cause is the cause it is, for instance, as a matter of brute fact. And then at the same time it 
could be that when c causes e there is a law connecting them. How so? Because it could be 
the case that there is such a connecting law in virtue of the brute causal patterns. This is at 
least a position in logical space and is consistent with the rest of anomalous monism even 
though Davidson did not commit himself one way or the other. (I continue to discuss brute 
causal relations in Chapter Five, next.) 
 
§ 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
                                                
117 To relate them under the same or explanatory description would be Procrustean (see Section 
4.4 above). 
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I have been at pains to show that the precise way that the critics of anomalous monism 
formulate their worry about its entailment of type-epiphenomenalism conflates the 
properties in virtue of which c is related to e by the relation of causation with the properties 
of c and e in virtue of which we can achieve epistemic satisfaction and explanatory adequacy 
in our interest-relative explanations of the primary explanandum (e under a certain 
description). 
 Where the critics go wrong is to think that if mental properties do not feature in the 
relation that undergirds the metaphysical causal relation between c and e, then mental 
properties have no role in causal explanation. That inference relies on an assumption that the 
properties that satisfy us epistemically are or should be identical to the properties grounding 
the causal relation, i.e., the properties in virtue of which c and e are related by a necessary 
relation.  
In the next chapter we consider a new way to answer the newly disambiguated 
metaphysical “in virtue of” question. As promised, I momentarily take the nomological view 
of causation. The laws that back the causes are the laws of nature. And the laws are not mere 
de facto regularities but are necessary. To achieve the strictness or necessity we need an 
account of laws. Whence the necessity of generalizations that are actual laws as opposed to 
the generalizations that are mere regularities? 
The overarching structure of Chapter Five is a bit complicated. I introduce a debate 
among historians as to what Hume really said. I don’t do this in order to assert that 
philosophers calling themselves Humean do not really understand Hume. No. In the course 
of presenting the various positions on Hume we discover that there is a position not 
represented in the laws of nature discussion. I end by articulating and defending that position 
tentatively and just as a first pass.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CODA: NEW HUME AND THE QUASI-HUMEAN REVERSE VIEW 
 
5.1 The New Hume Debate  
5.1.1 Introduction 
Against the once widely held positivist interpretation, Hume scholars now agree that Hume 
did not hold a simple regularity theory of causation devoid of any aspect of necessity. Yet, the 
contemporary literature on causal laws is split between so-called Humeans and Non-
Humeans, where one is a Humean if one denies necessity in causal laws.118 I do not remark 
on this to suggest a simple change in nomenclature. Rather, the insights we gain from 
examining the New Hume Debate will help us in determining relative plausibility in the battle 
between the two Davids: the Humean David Lewis and the Non-Humean David Armstrong.  
In the end, Blackburn’s quasi-realist, projectivist Hume offers yet another argument against 
Non-Humeans about the necessity of causal laws.  
 
5.1.2 The New Hume Debate 
If we let “Causation” with a capital “C” and “thick connexion” refer to one event producing 
another, or necessitating another, but involving something more than mere regular 
succession, then the old positivist interpretation of Hume holds that there is no such thing as 
                                                
118 Non-Humeans about the laws of nature argue that non-nomic facts, e.g., causal regularities, 
depend or supervene on nomic facts, e.g., laws. While Humeans argue that the laws depend on 
the de facto regularities. 
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Causation or thick connexions in the world. The old positivist interpretation holds that 
Hume takes causation to be nothing more than constant conjunction or “regularities,” lacking 
any element of necessity.119 Hume claims, on this account, that we have no impression of 
necessity, so any talk of necessary connection is either unintelligible or meaningless. 
However, this positivist reading has fallen out of favor.  
In recent decades there has been a considerable shift in the interpretation of Hume’s 
philosophical theories about causation.120 Yet the positivist influence remains, at least in 
nomenclature. Regularity theories in the contemporary debate about causation have been 
called Humean. But “this usage just betokens a limited acquaintance with the work of 
Hume,” Craig writes (2007: 113). While it persists in the nomenclature of the contemporary 
debate about causation, the positivist interpretation has been thoroughly discredited among 
historians of philosophy: 
 
Off the agenda now is the idea that he [Hume] taught a strict regularity theory: that 
there is nothing in reality but regular sequence, and that that is accordingly all that 
causality amount to, either in our concept of it or in things and events themselves 
(Craig 2007: 113). 
 
Strawson (1987) charges that the positivist theory of causality attributes to Hume an unhappy 
inference from epistemology to ontology, from what we happen to know to what exists in 
reality. The positivist reading, Strawson argues, fails to countenance the legitimate distinction 
between objects in the world and our ideas about objects.  
                                                
119 The positivist interpretation makes reference to Hume’s “philosophical” definition of “an 
object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects 
similar to the second,” (E76).   
 
120 In this section, my tone may appear more positive than it actually is towards the New Hume 
skeptical realist view. I disagree with the New Humeans but I also disagree with the old positivist 
reading.  
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Against the positivist reading of Hume, Strawson and others offer what they call a 
“skeptical realist” reading.121  “The skeptical realist interpretations claim that Hume believed 
we can know that causal powers and objects exist in the world, although we may not be able 
to know any more about them than that they exist,” (Richman 2007: 1). So the New Hume is 
a realist about the ontological question but a skeptic with respect to the epistemological 
question. Hume “takes it for granted… that Causation does exist in reality, although we are 
entirely ignorant of its ultimate nature,” (Strawson 1989: 219).122 So the realism comes from 
taking it that Hume holds that “causal power is some feature or property of the world, one 
which does not in any way owe its existence to human existence,” (Craig 2007: 113). The 
skepticism, then, comes from their claim that Hume consistently maintained the point of 
view that the real causal powers and forces in nature “are not directly accessible to our 
senses,” (Wright 1983: 129). As Strawson summarizes, “In the end Hume’s regularity theory 
of causation is only a theory about causation so far as we can know about it in the objects, 
not about causation as it is in the objects,” (Strawson 2007: 33). So there exist thick 
connexions or genuine Causation out in the world among objects but it is beyond our ken.  
 A good way to get clear on the differences among the possible interpretative positions 
is to chart where each falls on a classic interpretative problem for Hume studies. It is a 
problem for any interpreter of Hume to reconcile these three apparent commitments of his: 
 
(a) Endorses beliefs in objects and causes; 
(b) Holds that we should not endorse beliefs that do not have appropriate grounding in 
our impressions (as described in his theory of ideas); 
                                                
121 I am eliding the differences between Wright, Strawson, Popkin and others who’ve written on 
skeptical realism. 
 
122 It is because he is “following Newton, [that] he [Hume] repeatedly insists on the 
epistemological claim that we know nothing of the ultimate nature of Causation,” (Strawson 
2007: 35). 
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(c) Holds that the beliefs in objects and causes do not have appropriate grounding in our 
impressions. 
 
The positivist reading achieves consistency by denying or qualifying (a). On the other hand, 
Strawson accepts (a), and qualifies (b) and (c). That is, Strawson expands what is allowed to 
be an appropriate grounding by highlighting a supposed distinction of Hume’s between what 
we can “conceive” and what we can “suppose.”  
The above formulation is due to Richman (3); Blackburn offers his own inconsistent 
Humean triad: 
 
1) We have an idea of a thick necessary connexion between distinct events;  
2) We have no ideas except those that are preceded by suitably related impressions;  
3) There are no impressions that are suitably related to the idea of a thick necessary 
connexion between distinct events. 
 
The positivist interpretation “takes Hume to be claiming that when we talk of causation we 
only mean something that strips out the thick element of necessity, and substitutes regular 
contiguous succession,” (Blackburn 2007: 101). So positivists deny (1). From this perspective, 
Strawson can be taken to be trying to distinguish between the terminologies of (1) and (2) in 
order to resolve the inconsistency. Briefly, he says that while we may have no impression of 
Causation or thick connexions and thus cannot conceive of them, we can nevertheless 
“suppose” them to be the case and thereby have a “relative idea” of them.  
 
5.1.3 Blackburn’s Hume  
Blackburn (1990/2007) offers an interpretation of Hume that is distinct from both the 
positivist and skeptical realist views. There is a further distinction, Blackburn says, that both 
the positivist and skeptical realist interpretations fail to countenance. “When we think of a 
causally connected pair of events, such as the impact of the first billiard ball causing the 
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motion of the second, we want there to be a further fact than (mere) regular succession,” 
(103). There is supposed to be more than regular succession. There is supposed to be 
dependency. We want a fact making it such that when the first happens the second must 
happen. Blackburn calls this the desire for a “causal nexus.” When Blackburn says we “want” 
or that “there is supposed to be” a further fact, I take him to be saying that our idea of 
causation includes the component of thick connexion.  
 “But now suppose we shift our gaze to the whole ongoing course of nature,” (103) by 
which Blackburn means for us to imagine not any old pair of causally related events but 
lawful regularities or patterns of events of said type. We want there to be something in virtue 
of which these patterns continue. But according to Hume (E37, T90-1),  
 
There is no contradiction in supposing that the powers and forces with which events 
are endowed at one time cease at another, nor in supposing that any secret nature of 
bodies upon which those powers and forces depend itself changes, bringing their 
change in its wake,”(Blackburn 2007: 103). 
 
To imagine that the natural order might at any moment fall apart is to suffer “inductive 
vertigo,” as Blackburn calls it. We desire a further fact beyond the patterns or regularities in 
order to avoid this inductive vertigo. What we want, 
 
…is whatever it is that ensures the continuation of the natural order, that dispels the 
inductive vertigo that arises when we think how natural it might be, how probable 
even, that the constrained and delicate pattern of events might fall apart. Call the 
desire for this further fact the desire for a straightjacket on the possible course of 
nature: something whose existence at one time guarantees constancies at any later 
time,” (103). 
 
 “Nexuses by themselves do not provide a straightjacket,” Blackburn says. A fact 
alleviating inductive vertigo would be “a very peculiar fact” because: “It has to be something 
whose own continued efficacy through time is subject to no possibility of change or chance of 
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failure,” (103). For otherwise, “the fact that it keeps on as it does would itself be a case of 
coincidence or fluke, another contingency crying out for explanation and engendering 
inductive vertigo,” (103). Where are we to find such a straitjacketing thing? “Some 
philosophers think they can point us toward a fact with this potency…Armstrong believes 
that a kind of necessary, timeless gridlock of universals will do” (103).123  
 Strawson cites “fundamental forces” as essentially constitutive of “the nature of 
matter,” and invokes these, as Blackburn writes, “to soothe away inductive vertigo.” 
However, Strawson is failing to see Hume’s point, Blackburn says. “Even if forces are taken 
‘to latch on to real, mind independent, observable-regularity-transcendent facts about reality’ 
(Strawson 1987: 91) they need something further in order to serve as a straightjacket. They 
need necessary immunity to change; they need to be things for which the inductive vertigo does 
not arise,” (Blackburn: 105). One may object that Armstrong and Strawson each individually 
have offered a straightjacket. But Hume’s point is that at every moment one is vulnerable to 
inductive vertigo. It is simply part of the nature of human understanding that nothing can be 
straightjacketed. When one is offered, then it too will need a straightjacket and we get an 
infinite regress. 
“Hume’s main interest in causation is to destroy the idea that we could have such 
[ultimate] knowledge, and hence ever apprehend a straightjacketing fact: we have no 
conception of it, nor any conception of how we might approach such a conception,” (105). 
“In particular, we must not think of the advance of science as targeted on finding such a 
thing. The lesson drawn from Newton is that just as Principia gives us the operation of 
                                                
123 To repeat it here, Armstrong’s attempt at fighting off inductive vertigo is as follow`s. He 
argues that there is a relation of universal necessity between types or universals. “Suppose it to be 
a law that Fs are Gs. F-ness and G-ness are taken to be universals. A certain relation, a relation of 
non-logical or contingent necessitation, holds between F-ness and G-ness. This state of affairs 
may be symbolized as ‘N(F,G)’” (Armstrong 1983: 85). 
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gravitational force, but does not ‘tell us what it is’, so any conceivable advance in science can 
only do more of the same,” (105). It can put events in wider and more interesting and 
exception free patterns, and that is all,” (105).  
 
§ 
 
5.2 The Reverse View 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Someone wise once said that all you have to do to write a philosophy paper is find a claim a 
writer says is so obviously true that it needs no argument and, then, deny that claim. In 
arguing that anomalous monism entails epiphenomenalism about mental properties, 
McLaughlin (1993) makes one such “obviously true” claim.     
McLaughlin says it is typically the case that “when a particular bears an extensional 
relation to another particular, the particulars are so related in virtue of something about each,” 
(32, my italics). The extensional relation he is talking about, we know, is causation. The hard 
question he puts to Davidson is: “What are those properties of an event, c, and an event, e, in 
virtue of which they are related by the causal relation?”  
One possible response – not the one he ultimately imputes to Davidson – is 
considered but is immediately dismissed by McLaughlin. It is this: The two events, c and e, 
might just be causally related as a matter of brute fact. They might be what they are without 
being what they are in virtue of something else being the way it is. However, if causal 
relations were brute, McLaughlin says, “there would be nothing in virtue of which c and e are 
causally related, no properties and no law in virtue of which c is a cause of e,” (32). 
McLaughlin says this is “implausible,” (32) and dismisses it out of hand as perhaps absurd.  
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This supposedly “implausible” or perhaps “absurd” claim is the claim, suitably 
understood, that I will endorse.  
In the following sections, I will outline a view that: 
• makes saying “causal relations are brute” no longer engender the worry that 
McLaughlin is implying when he says that were causal relations brute “there 
would be nothing in virtue of which c and e are causally related, no properties and 
no law in virtue of which c is a cause of e;” 
• makes the mental causation problem as usually formulated impossible to come 
up, a non-starter; 
• is broadly-speaking empiricist. 
 
The “Reverse View” will reverse the traditional order of priority between causes and laws.   
Here’s the structure of my arguments. I pose a Euthyphro question. It works as an 
argument against the absurdity (inconceivability) of the Reverse View. I then argue that the 
Reverse View does not have the problems that McLaughlin thought made a view like it 
“implausible.” The Reverse View also provides a response for the non-reductive physicalist 
to the “qua problem” of mental causation (a.k.a., type-epiphenomenalism) that McLaughlin 
and many others leveled at anomalous monism. Finally, I make two objections to the main 
competitor to the Reverse View, Armstrongism. 
 
5.2.2 The Second “In Virtue of” Question and Laws 
In the previous chapters, we arrived at the question of what makes a cause be the cause it is. 
What we called the second or metaphysical “in virtue of” question asks: When an event, c, is 
a cause of event, e, in virtue of what are they causally connected?  
As we’ve discussed, a standard answer begins with a discussion of the properties in 
virtue of which a cause and its effect are related. Davidson writes:  
 
 “If a caused b, then some descriptions of a and b instantiate a strict causal law,” (p. 
243).  
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Here is Robb’s reconstruction of Kim’s interpretation of the PNCC:  
 
“The principle of the Nomological Character of Causation appears to require that, 
when one event causes another, it does so in virtue solely of its physical properties,” 
(Robb 2003, my italics).  
 
Here is another example from Davidson: 
 
“…when events are related as cause and effect, then there exists a closed and 
deterministic system of laws into which these events, when appropriately described, 
fit.” 
  
And here is another example of the imputation of a direction of what’s in virtue of what.  
 
“Davidson’s principle of the nomological character of causality implies that… events 
can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict 
laws…” (McLaughlin 1993, italics added). 
 
Davidson’s language in regard to the PNCC is neutral as to what is in virtue of what, laws or 
causes. No one has noticed that the “in virtue of” locution is slipped in by his critics. 
Davidson’s original expression was in fact neutral on the direction or order of metaphysical 
dependency. Davidson’s PNCC says that when there is causation then you will find that 
 
(1) c and e are related by the causal relation and  
(2) properties of c and e instantiate a strict law.  
 
Let’s let CR(c,e) be read as “c and e are related by the causal relation” and let N(H,J) be read 
as “properties of c and e, H and J, instantiate a strict law.” The PNCC says CR(c,e) and 
N(H,J). However, the question remains, is CR(c,e) in virtue that N(H,J) or is N(H,J) in virtue 
that CR(c,e)? This a question of Euthyphronic form. Are c and e related by the causal relation 
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in virtue of H and J instantiating a strict law, or do H and J instantiate a strict law in virtue of 
c’s being causally related to e? 
In virtue of its silence on the matter, Davidson’s PNCC gives rise to the question. 
Nomic subsumption is a way of answering it such that CR(c,e) in virtue of N(H,J); but, I 
suggest, a view is conceivable that answers it such that N(H,J) in virtue of CR(c,e). That view 
would be the Reverse View. 
 
5.2.3 No Catastrophe 
As above, the Reverse View is not simply absurd. We can conceive of such a position by 
imagining a direction of what’s in virtue of what going the other way than usually attributed 
to Davidson’s PNCC. We argued in the previous chapter that the usual reading of the PNCC 
did not, as commonly assumed, entail Catastrophe. Now I wish to remark that the PNCC read 
in the other direction does not entail Catastrophe either. What prevented the entailment before 
also prevents it here. And that was namely the distinction between epistemology and 
metaphysics. When we ask “in virtue of” questions we need to be careful to make explicit 
whether we are asking an epistemological or metaphysical question.  
If the causal relation between c and  e does not stand in virtue of any of their 
properties instantiating a causal law, then it does not make sense to ask what in virtue of 
which said causal relation stands. If it is primitive then it stands in virtue of nothing. If it’s 
primitive other things stand as they do in virtue of it. 
 
5.2.4 Wider Ramifications 
The view that I am denying here is central and often tacit in the mental causation debate. The 
directionality of the PNCC is decidedly from laws down to causal relations. However, I think 
  169 
it is plausible to disagree with this central idea, which Bennett calls “accepted” and Kim says 
“makes sense.” 
 
Kim (1993): All that is necessary to see the problem for Davidson is the recognition 
that it makes sense to ask questions of the form “What is it about events c and e that 
makes it the case that c is a cause of e?” and be able to answer them, intelligibility and 
informatively, by saying something like “Because c is an event of kind F and e is one 
of a kind G (and, you may add if you favor a nomic conception of causality, there is a 
law of an appropriate form connecting F-events with G-events)”. This is only to 
acknowledge that the causal relation obtains between a pair of events because they are 
events of a certain kinds, or have certain properties (p. 22). 
 
Bennett (2006): “[It is accepted that] it makes good sense to talk about the causal 
efficacy of properties, to say that c (your thirst, say) caused e (your movement 
towards the kitchen) in virtue of or qua some but not other of its [c’s] properties. This 
idea – and the worry that establishing the causal efficacy of particular (token) mental 
events… does not guarantee the efficacy of event-types or properties – attracted 
attention in the wake of Davidson’s defense of anomalous monism,” (p. 34). 
 
In McLaughlin, Kim and Bennett, and indeed more widely, it is assumed often without 
argument that properties (often nomic properties) feature in the appropriate answer to the 
metaphysical question of what it is in virtue of which a cause is the cause that it is. When B 
stands in virtue of A, then B depends on A. The direction of this dependence inherent in the 
nomic subsumption theory of causation can be reversed with good results for our theory of 
mental causation. No Catastrophe. Indeed The Reverse View suggests itself as an alternative to 
the Armstrong-backed nomic subsumption view. See Chapter Two for a discussion of nomic 
subsumption. 
 
5.2.5 The Reverse View Versus Armstrongism 
Nomic subsumption funded by Armstrongism about nomological necessity may be a 
plausible view. I am not disputing that. I am here only arguing that there are good reasons 
that motivate looking for an alternative. 
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 Here I scope my criticism down to two main arguments. 
 
(1) Something brute in Armstrongism is just as prima facie implausible as brute causal 
relations in the Reverse View. 
(2) There are problems with the Armstrongian account of “necessity,” – worries one 
would expect a Humean to point out. 
 
With respect to (1), I expose the deep and strange commitments involved with the 
realism of Armstrong. Ancillary commitments of Armstrongism are just as counterintuitive, 
at least at first glance, as a view that says causal relations are brute.  
With respect to (2), I have already asked for what “straightjackets” (in Blackburn’s 
phrasing of his take on Hume’s “skepticism” about necessity, see Section 5.2.2) the necessary 
causal nexus that guarantees it will necessarily be a necessary causal relation at a time in the 
future, t. Armstrong can assert that it is just brutely necessary, but as above in Section 5.2.2, 
even its brute necessity needs straitjacketing.  
I believe these two reasons motivate at least looking for an alternative to nomic 
subsumption, such as the Reverse View. Let’s now look at (1). 
 
5.2.6 Armstrong’s Counterintuitive Realism 
We have seen McLaughlin argue that a view asserting that causal relations be brute would be 
an implausible view. However, the Armstrongian view must itself appeal to something in its 
account being brute, namely that such and such universals are necessarily related. The fault 
here lies not with Armstong himself, who recognizes that he himself must assert something 
as brute. The fault is with McLaughlin, as discussed above, for thinking assertion of bruteness 
is immediately damning.  
 
Is there any hope of demonstrating the necessity of the ultimate connections? I do 
not believe there is (Armstrong 1985: 159). 
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Bruteness is not immediately damning. What matters is where you locate the bruteness. 
Armstrong and McLaughlin seem to agree in their preferred location of what is brute; they 
prefer it to the location of bruteness I advocate. But the views are on level playing field with 
respect to any liability in assertion of bruteness insofar as each theory asserts it somewhere.  
I would argue that a view that held that causal relations were brute was no more prima 
facie implausible than a view that said such and such universals are necessarily related in virtue 
of nothing at all, i.e., their necessary relation is brute. It is not a terribly strong argument to 
say that one’s own position is no more prima facie implausible than one’s opponent’s position. 
However, it is not nothing. A view that asserts brute causal relations should not be dismissed 
out of hand at first glance as we observed McLaughlin (1993) does. It may eventually be 
found to be “unchoiceworthy” in terms of theory choice, but how choiceworthy it is requires 
looking into. If it accounts for the relevant phenomena to be explained, brute causal relations 
may turn out to be even more plausible than the position of the Armstrongian-backed nomic 
subsumption view which holds that causal relations depend on laws, an important aspect of 
which turns out to be brute. I leave that for future work. However, I can imagine virtues of 
the Reverse View, for example, where it locates the bruteness might be preferable to where 
Armstrong, for example, locates it. 
The Reverse View would be more inline with an “empiricist” point of view on 
philosophy on this score. An empiricist point of view would, for example, find a 
conventionalist view on what makes laws different than accidents more appealing than a 
realist view. After all, the empiricist would say, what we have experience of are only the 
regularities observable in the past to the present. Those regularities or causal relations we 
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have observed should be deemed “more real” in an empiricist theory, rather than supposing 
that what’s “more real” is something arrived at in fact by speculation.  
Armstrong (1985) himself says:  
 
But if explanation has to stop short of the Absolute, then we have to accept brute 
fact, that is, contingency at some point. At what point should we do this? That is a 
question of the utmost delicacy for every philosophy. In my judgement, the Regularity 
theory of law gives up much too soon. Instead, I have argued, regularities among 
particular states of affairs can be explained by connections between universals. … 
Can these connections in turn be explained? The system of connections may be 
simplified, and brought under higher-order laws. But when all this has been done, is 
there any hope of demonstrating the necessity of the ultimate connections? I do not 
believe there is. Necessity can be asserted, but it cannot be demonstrated or even 
made plausible (159). 
 
I would argue that it’s not a matter of “giving up too soon” versus sticking it out to the end. 
It’s a matter of where you take the beginning and ends of things to be. We have a choice, so 
speak, to go in for brute (and in some sense “more real” – for being explanatory and being 
that on which other things depend) causal relations or going in for brute necessary 
connections between universals. Well, if “necessity” is something that cannot be proven and 
causal relations (which are regularities lacking necessity) are right here before us, then why not 
think that where “the being of being” begins, and where explanation ends, is at the stuff 
closer to us, more immediately available? Why give ultimate status to the fictions we create in 
order to sustain our mind-dependent epistemologies, such as necessary connections among 
universals?  
 
§ 
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5.2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I briefly surveyed the New Hume debate in order to get the concept of 
“straitjacketing” on the table. I then introduced my novel observation that the PNCC is 
ambiguous as to the Euthyphronic order of explanation between causes and laws. The 
traditional view is to say that causes depend on laws. I articulated the Reverse View which 
says that it goes the other way around – laws depend on causes, metaphysically speaking. 
This does not entail Catastrophe. I then compared what’s taken as brute in the traditional 
answer to what would be taken as brute in the Reverse view, with some implications 
favorable, I think, for the Reverse view. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
By way of conclusion allow me to return to two notions I’ve put forward and see if they are 
mutually consistent. I do not know if they are. One of my aims in this dissertation was to 
present and defend their plausibility. The further question of their consistency is work for the 
future. However, I may take a stab at it now. 
I have asked two Euthyphro questions: one between reasons and causes and the other 
between causes and laws. I said that a reason is a cause in virtue of being a reason and not the 
other way around. (That is, it is not the case that a cause is the reason in virtue of being a 
cause). With respect to causes and laws, the traditional view – manifest in the nomic 
subsumption view of causation – has it that causal relations are what they are in virtue of the 
laws being the way they are. I, however, offer a Reverse View, which takes the Euthyphronic 
direction to run the other way: the laws are what they are in virtue of causal relations being 
what they are. According to the nomic subsumption view, when backed by Armstrongism, 
the laws – second order universal relations between universals – are themselves brute. 
According to the Reverse View, causal relations are brute and the laws derivative of, or 
supervenient on, the causal relations. How is it possible that causes are brute, as per the 
Reverse View at the same time as causes, according to my first Euthyphro question, are not 
the reason for action in virtue of being causal? How is it that causes are brute with respect to 
laws but between reasons and causes a cause is what it is in virtue of being a reason and not 
the other way around? Do my answers to these two Euthyphro appear mutually inconsistent? 
Let me try to explain how I see it such that they are not inconsistent. 
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 First of all, the Euthyphro question between causes and laws is a question about 
causes metaphysically-speaking and laws metaphysically-speaking. The Euthyphro question 
between reasons and causes, on the other hand, is a question about reasons epistemically-
speaking and causes metaphysically-speaking. That is an important difference, more about 
which momentarily. 
Secondly, I said “posit” four times in this dissertation. It is time to bring them 
together. My answer to the Euthyphro question between reasons and causes was explained in 
the context of my Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis and the Strict Qualification Thesis. According to 
the latter, we are dealing only with true, genuine, successful reason explanations. According 
to the former, we move roughly speaking from epistemology to metaphysics. So, according to 
these two theses when we explain action by reference to reasons we attribute a reason to an 
agent according to what we called “the epistemology of the reason,” which is broadly 
speaking hermeneutic. Whatever deliverance the epistemology of the reason issues in is the 
reason for which the agent acted. And, according to the multiple reasons argument, if a 
reason is the reason then that reason is the cause of the action.  
The fact that we move from epistemic-reason to metaphysical-cause solves the 
identification problem. The identification problem asked which mental event token was going 
to be token identical to which physical event token. The Priority of the Phenomenon Thesis, the 
Strict Qualification Thesis, the multiple reasons argument and my answer to the Euthyphro 
question between reasons and causes jointly have it that the reason is token identical to the 
cause and for principled reasons. The cause that the reason is identical to is “programmed 
for” in Jackson and Pettit’s language or “posited” as I say it. The successful epistemology of 
the reason imputes to us the further metaphysical commitment that the reason is the cause. 
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In Section 4.11 on Davidson’s distinction between “cause” and “causally explain,” I 
asked what in virtue of which c is a cause of e, metaphysically-speaking. I said it would not do 
to suggest that a cause is the cause that it is in virtue of featuring in a causal explanation. The 
cause must already be a cause, so to speak, in order for reference to it under some description 
to be explanatory with respect to the primary explanandum. Maybe we should say that a 
causal explanation “posits” the cause it references. In a true, genuine and successful reason 
explanation the posit will in fact be the cause. This is what we said with respect to Bontly’s 
critique of Yablo’s proportionality constraint. There we noted that causal explanation – 
explanations that refer to causes under a description – could go deeper and deeper or into 
ever different contexts forever. Each causal explanation will posit the cause it refers to as the 
cause and posit that every subsequent true explanation will describe the very same event, 
even if in radically different ways.  
So in some sense the causality of the reason is achieved transcendentally. That the 
reason be the cause is a necessary precondition of a true, genuine and successful reason 
explanation according to the multiple reasons argument. We’ve said we have a true, genuine 
and successful reason explanation, so that means we can know a priori that the reason is 
causal. What remains to ask is this: Are causal relations which are brute with respect to their 
derivative, supervenient causal laws incompatible with the causality of reasons being arrived 
at transcendentally? Can the cause that is the reason be brute? I think we may offer a cautious 
“Yes.” It is transcendentally posited as brute. This is so because a cause does not become the 
cause it is in virtue of being referenced in a true, genuine and successful explanation. The 
reason is already the cause before we refer to it under a description in our true, genuine and 
successful reason explanation. The causal relation between the reason and the given action 
can be brute with respect to the law supervenient on it; and this is not inconsistent with the 
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reason’s causality being arrived at transcendentally. To be arrived at transcendentally just 
means to be arrived at in the move from successful epistemology to what further is imputed 
to us metaphysically-speaking.  
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EPILOGUE 
  
In the Prologue to this dissertation, I said that I would lay out the minimal metaphysics that 
even a Rortyian pragmatist is or must be committed to. I am speaking only of the Rortyian 
pragmatist who takes it that adopting Davidson’s philosophy of mind, namely anomalous 
monism, “allows us to treat poetry and physics even-handedly.” This Davidsonian Rortyian 
pragmatist is sanguine in his anti-metaphysical stance, such that he does not believe the 
special sciences need any metaphysical undergirding. My argument has been that in the act of 
subscribing to the truth, genuineness, and success of true, genuine, successful reason 
explanations certain commitments, call them metaphysical, are imputed to us, those who 
subscribe to anomalous monism. The commitments are these: the mental event that is the 
reason is a physical event and is the cause of the action; additionally, the causal reason is 
covered by some strict-law, which we need not know. It’s just that we can know that there is 
such a law even if we don’t know what the law is.  So the minimal metaphysics is what other 
commitment are imputed to us besides what the causal explanation commits us to directly. 
These metaphysics include the causality of reasons and the lawfulness of causal relations.  
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